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Abstract 
 
 
Corruption in business occurs in situations of a quid pro quo relationship between 
public officials and business managers representing corporations. Many a time, such 
corrupt situations can harm stakeholder interests. Managers, as decision-makers, in 
corruption-related situations may fail to understand the impact of their decisions in 
such situation for they operate from a position of “position-dependent objectivity” 
(Sen, 2002) focusing on economic objectives usually. They may fail to understand 
that their involvement in corrupt acts can lead to violation of fundamental stakeholder 
issues such as human rights as in the cases of Shell and Enron (discussed in this 
thesis).  
 
The thesis examines the meaning of corruption in relation to its stakeholder impact 
and proposes that corporate good governance in corruption-related situations is a 
matter of ethical decision-making, exceeding legal compliance. It explores the 
decision-making factors that operate within an individual manager while dealing with 
corruption-related situations in business and maps an analytical mental model of a 
decision-making manager in such situations. The thesis proposes ‘Corruption-related 
Decision-making’ (CRDM) as an orderly way of thinking for managers to deal with 
corruption-related situations in business. 
 
The CRDM concept is demonstrated through the use of a new Corruption-related 
Decision-making model that protects human rights, environmental issues, sustainable 
development and any other relevant stakeholder issue that one may wish to include. 
The relevance of the CRDM concept and the model was evaluated in a survey of 
forty-one multinational companies from Mumbai, India. The survey confirmed that 
none of the respondents used any decision-making tools while dealing with 
corruption-related situations. The survey revealed that 40 out of 41 companies 
experienced rent-seeking behaviour (bribes demanded) in India. Out of these 41 
companies, 26 companies ‘usually’ lost business due to non-compliance with bribe 
demands and another 9 companies lost business ‘sometimes.’ The survey also 
explored the role of ‘fear of loss of business’ in the decision-making process and 
found that ‘fear of loss of business’ led decision-makers change stance from a state of 
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passive corruption (facing demand) to a position of active corruption (making an 
offer), with 27 companies actually moving from a position of passive corruption to 
active corruption. All 41 companies, without a single exception, believed (when 
asked) that corruption can adversely affect stakeholder issues such as human rights.  
 
The survey findings confirm the relevance of the CRDM model as a decision-making 
tool and as a good practice document in corruption-related situations. The CRDM 
model can motivate an internal review of a manager’s persona with a reminder that 
ethical decision-making and protection of stakeholder rights is possible in corruption-
related situations. The concept of CRDM is a potential contribution in dealing with 
the illegitimate, the illegal and the oppressive aspects of international business.  
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Preface 
 
Sometime in 260 BC, the Indian emperor Ashoka of the famous Mauryan dynasty 
fought and won the bloodiest battle on Indian soil. It was the battle of Kalinga1 fought 
in Eastern India, to gain control over the land and sea routes to Southern India. The 
battle2 left 100,000 dead, 150,000 were taken as prisoners and many times that 
number were wounded on either side. After the battle, Ashoka surveyed the 
battlefield, littered with bodies of dead and dying men and beasts. Rivulets of blood 
flowed into a nearby river changing its colour to blood-red. While Ashoka was 
surveying the battlefield, an old man came up to him carrying a small bundle of cloth 
enveloping the corpse of a three-year old child. The old man sang praises of glory to 
the victorious Emperor and then held out the dead child pleading with Ashoka to 
bring the child back to life. The old man went on to say that ‘you O mighty emperor 
could take thousands of lives, so surely you can bring back just this one life.’ Ashoka 
knew he could not and soon left the battlefield stricken with remorse. This incident at 
Kalinga transformed the twenty-four year old Emperor Ashoka, within two years, into 
a monk preaching Buddhism and peace. He adopted the path of Dhammapada, the 
path of righteousness. Ashoka built monuments all over his kingdom displaying 
messages of peace, and in particular at Sarnath, he erected a pillar called the Ashoka 
sthamb (pillar) which displays till this day, a slogan borrowed from the Upanishads3 
namely: Satyameva Jayate.  
 
Literally translated, it means truth triumphs or truth shall prevail or truth prevails 
(modern day India has adopted Satyameva Jayate as the nation’s motto).  However, 
truth usually prevails only after destruction; because a battle had to be fought, 
100,000 lives lost and suffering inflicted on countless more for the moment of truth to 
prevail in an emperor’s mind.  It happened in 260 BC and has happened again and 
again in human history and it continues to happen in our daily lives even today. Truth 
usually prevails after destruction, as witnessed in the fraud-induced corporate 
collapses of Enron, World.com, Parmalat and other companies during 2001 and 2002. 
These events led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in USA that aims to regulate corporate 
                                                 
1 Kalinga is the modern day Indian State of Orissa in Eastern India.   
2 ‘A History of India’ by Romila Thapar, p.72, 1966 edition, Penguin  
3 Group of late Vedic metaphysical treatises – Collins Concise Encyclopedia. Written around 800 B.C. 
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actions as none before. Legislation, whether it is Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the 2003 UN 
Convention against Corruption cannot by themselves ensure ethical corporate actions 
as is evident from our experiences in recent times. Enron was considered the most 
successful company in the energy sector and appeared to meet all legislative 
requirements, till it went bankrupt in 2001, with the dubious distinction of being the 
largest fraud-induced company failure in US history. Like Enron, some successful 
companies meet their Kalinga from time to time with the truth prevailing after 
damage has been inflicted on the company and society. Royal Dutch Shell was 
considered the most profitable company on earth, yet it faced allegations of human 
rights violations in Nigeria due to its corrupt stakeholder practices. Shell is just a 
typical case of a very successful multinational that failed to assess the impact of its 
own actions or inaction vis-à-vis its stakeholder environment. It is only after Shell 
was condemned internationally, during November 1995, that Shell adopted damage-
control measures. Shell, then publicly declared human rights as a significant issue in 
business operations, introduced mandatory human rights training for all its executives 
and publicised the company’s commitment to honour human rights.4 However, at the 
time of writing this thesis, Shell has not been able to win over the Ogoni in Nigeria 
nor resume oil drilling operations in the Ogoni region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Shell’s website discusses stakeholder issues such as human rights, sustainable development at length 
and displays the UN Declaration of Human Rights as their commitment to human rights issues. 
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Introduction 
Corruption in business is amongst the serious problems confronting global society 
today. United Nations, World Bank, OECD5, and other international bodies 
acknowledge its occurrence in international business. However, corruption is not a 
recent phenomenon nor is it a creation of a particular society or civilisation or present 
day business operations. The incidence of corruption was observed in all ancient 
civilizations. Our holy scriptures mention about corruption and condemn it on moral 
grounds (Noonan, 1984). Instances of corruption are found in the recorded history of 
ancient Greece, Rome, Egypt, China and India (Noonan, 1984). Corruption continues 
to be a part of the contemporary social structures. We hear and read about the 
occurrence of corruption on a daily basis, in the media and the works of anti-
corruption bodies such as Transparency International.6 The phenomenon of corruption 
cuts across all cultures and continents. Corruption in business conduct is a sub-set of a 
wider phenomenon of corruption prevalent in all parts of the world.  
 
Corruption in business usually occurs during the interface between business managers 
and public officials. Business managers seek dispensation of favours (both legitimate 
and illegitimate) and public officials command the discretion to dispense those 
favours. Some examples of legitimate (within law) favours sought by business could 
be grant of trading rights, licenses, permits, award of contracts, tenders and 
amendment of laws to suit business interest. Illegitimate favours could range from tax 
avoidance; suppression of wrongdoing including illegal acts to almost anything that 
maybe ultravires the law, but suits business interests. On the other hand, public 
officials command discretionary powers to satisfy both the legitimate and illegitimate 
favours that business may need. Thus, there is room for trade of these discretionary 
powers, for a quid pro quo between public officials and business managers (Rose-
Ackerman, 1978; Elliot, 1997; Harris, 2003). The desire to trade discretionary powers 
by a public official has often been referred to as rent-seeking behaviour (Rose-
Ackermann, 1978; Bhagwati, 1982; Klitgaard, 1988, Bardhan, 1997). Likewise, the 
                                                 
5 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
6  Transparency International (TI) is an international anti-corruption body operating in 60 countries 
with headquarters in Berlin. TI extensively researches global corruption and amongst its publications 
runs a daily email service, which lists out all reported (in media) corruption and allegations of 
corruption worldwide.   
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desire to pay for those discretionary powers and make private gain at public cost can 
be termed as gain-seeking behaviour of business managers.  
 
Traditional definitions of corruption in literature do not reflect the far reaching 
consequences of corruption in business. They are narrow and limit themselves to the 
understanding that a corrupt act amounts to deviating from some norms (Scott, 1972); 
(Huntington, 1968) or laws (Leff, 1964) or jumping the queue (Rose-Ackerman, 
1978) or securing an undue favour or making a private gain (Nye, 1967) at public 
expense. These definitions fail to explain the possible negative impact corrupt acts of 
business can have on the stakeholder community (Alatas, 1990). An act of corruption 
on part of a multinational business manager may have the potential of inter-alia 
jeopardising human rights, the environment and sustainable development. Many a 
time the decision-making manager may fail to identity all the stakeholders who could 
be affected and fail to take into account that sustainable development is a concept not 
restricted to the present generation of stakeholders, but includes all the future ones 
whose interests might be endangered. Therefore, corruption needs to be redefined in 
terms of the resulting implications of a corrupt act on part of a decision-making 
manager. Accordingly, the compelling circumstances of business that many a time 
lead managers to take part in corrupt acts needs to be revisited and examined in the 
perspective of outcomes relevant to stakeholder issues. The purpose of redefining 
corruption for business managers will fail if one is not able to drive home that 
corruption has serious potential to damage, to harm and destroy society many a time 
beyond repair. With this purpose in mind, I propose a redefinition of the concept of 
corruption in this thesis so that it becomes more relevant and salient for business 
managers. 
 
Defining corruption from the perspective of a decision-making manager will 
overcome the limitations of existing definitions of corruption in literature.  The need 
to redefine corruption also arises from the need to appeal to the opinion leaders of our 
contemporary society who control societal wealth as CEO’s and senior decision-
making managers of multinational corporations.  External control mechanisms of anti-
corruption alone are not likely to win the battle against corruption without the aid of 
internal self-restraint decision-making models. Transparency International admits that 
the incidence of corruption is increasing and anti-corruption bodies are losing the 
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battle.7 When we place societal wealth in the hands of bright minds that are members 
of our society who manage these multinational companies, we also need to provide 
them with perspectives that motivate them to refrain from corrupt acts. The aim is to 
encourage internal self-restraint mechanisms (framework offered in the thesis) within 
the hearts and minds of decision-making executives. Engaging and eliminating 
corruption has so far been seen as a legal process at international and national levels; 
however, it is essential that elimination of corruption is considered also as a process 
of conscience in terms of honouring basic stakeholders rights at the individual 
managerial level. Democratic societies cannot function on legal processes alone but to 
thrive need commitments from individuals who are part of society.  This thesis aspires 
to convey that message to decision-making managers.  
 
The thesis comprises of eight chapters. Chapter one defines corruption and bribery as 
understood in current literature and explains associated terms, including gift-giving 
and its disclosure. A new definition of corruption is proposed that takes into account 
the impact of corruption on the stakeholder environment. The conceptual distinction 
between “active corruption and passive corruption” (Roy, 2001; Roy & Singer, 2004; 
Roy, 2004) is revisited to understand the intent and role chosen by a bribe-giver in a 
situation related to corruption or bribery. The second chapter discusses whether good 
governance should be interpreted as compliance with law or should ethical decision-
making be an added dimension. It is in this context that good governance is discussed 
in this chapter vis-à-vis the current international laws dealing with corruption. The 
chapter proposes that corporate good governance in the area of corruption in business 
can be achieved by moving from a narrow legal compliance approach to ethical 
decision-making   
 
Chapter three of the thesis examines the dynamics of corruption in business 
represented by the factors that influence decision-making in corruption-related 
situations, the position from which a decision-maker operates in such situations, and a 
decision-maker’s mental model in terms of the likely exchange and psychic utilities 
operating at the individual decision-maker’s level. The fourth chapter provides the 
theoretical grounding and context for a new CRDM (corruption-related decision-
                                                 
7 Peter Eigen, Chairman of Transparency International admitted that corruption is on the rise while 
releasing the Bribe Payers Index 2002 in Berlin and we are losing the battle (www.transparency.org). 
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making) model. Chapter five provides an easy-to-use decision-making model for 
corruption-related decision-making (CRDM) by business managers, based on the 
theoretical grounding discussed in the previous chapter. The decision-making model 
is designed to help a manager conclude within a very short span of time: whether to 
participate or not in a transaction involving bribery and/or corruption. It is an attempt 
to provide a contextual meaning to one’s decision. The model provides an opportunity 
to assess the impact of one’s decisions on stakeholders.  The CRDM model proposed 
in this chapter incorporates protection of issues such as sustainable development, 
environmental issues and human rights.  
 
Chapter six of the thesis analyses two significant cases of highly successful 
multinational companies and their complicity in human rights violations and 
environmental issues. These real life cases are narrated and discussed with a view to 
substantiate the utility of the CRDM model to avoid acts of corruption on part of 
business that lead to violation of stakeholder rights and consequent rejection by the 
stakeholder community. The seventh chapter discusses the results of a survey of 70 
multinational companies conducted at Bombay, India during April 2002, June 2002, 
May 2003, September 2003 and March/April 2004. The objective of the survey was to 
understand whether the conceptual CRDM model as discussed in chapter five is 
relevant in practical decision-making. Another major objective of the survey was to 
understand whether CEO’s and senior managers believe that corruption can 
negatively impact human rights and environmental issues in corruption-related 
situations. Chapter eight, the final chapter, highlights the contribution of CRDM 
(corruption-related decision-making) to current business theory and practice to deal 
with the illegitimate, the illegal and oppressive ways of business. It discusses the 
emerging trend of management thought with a shift towards the concept of an 
organisational economy (Ghoshal & Moran, 2005) as opposed to the market economy 
concept and CRDM’s role to reduce corruption in business as an organisation based 
response, blending ethics and strategy in the process.  
 
Thus, the thesis places a choice of conscience on the decision-making table of 
powerful multinationals companies and their managers with a new concept in 
strategic management thought called corruption-related decision-making. The idea is 
to address the consequences of corruption on global stakeholder issues of grave 
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concern by appealing to the bright minds of our society who are at the helm of 
multinational corporations, to avoid such situations. It is all the more important to do 
so, as many multinational companies command greater wealth and influence than 
many nations. 
 
Multinational Businesses and Corruption 
Multinational business decision-making relating to corruption involves the 
satisfaction or rejection of rent-seeking behavior of public officials or a conscious 
design on part of decision-making managers to buy the discretionary powers of public 
officials for a price. Such decisions pose challenges and involve risks for any 
decision-making manager as they carry with them the potential to harm or help the 
growth of the multinational company as well as a corporate executive’s career graph. 
Such decisions can be viewed in terms of narrow corporate strategies to achieve 
profits, gain market shares discarding stakeholder interests cautiously, or they can be 
viewed in broader terms of corporate social responsibility. The more serious the 
impact on stakeholder groups, the more serious the consequences could be for the 
company and the decision-making executive. One may gain business and secure 
business interest by participation in a corrupt act or lose business by non-
participation. Needless to say, participation in corrupt acts raises moral questions.  
 
In terms of their impact on stakeholders, multinational businesses have increasingly 
been subject to the scrutiny of various stakeholder groups in recent times. Today’s 
corporations cannot escape the fact that its stakeholder environment expects higher 
standards of corporate conduct than ever before, and these standards are not likely to 
get diluted but raised over the years to come. Decision-making challenges in 
multinational business operations are more pronounced than ever before in 
corruption-related situations. Corporate performance measures are no longer restricted 
to profitability indicators, but include stakeholder expectations of compliance with a 
whole range of issues such as human rights and environmental issues. Against this 
backdrop of stakeholder expectation, it is critical that the phenomenon of corruption is 
studied from the perspective of a multinational business decision-making manager. 
The involvement in a corrupt act on part of any multinational company could have 
serious consequences for its public image and acceptance by society. Two such 
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significant examples of multinational companies and their complicity in corrupt acts 
that led to accusations of human rights violations by the stakeholder community are 
discussed in this thesis. These cases illustrate the challenges of corruption-related 
decision-making that a decision-making manager can face in the multinational 
business arena.  
 
When a manager actively plans, insinuates, arranges in anticipation to satisfy or 
encourage the rent-seeking behaviour of public officials, the manager’s actions can 
never be interpreted as anything other than that of an active participant. In order to 
understand one’s position in a corruption-related situation, the distinction between 
‘active’ corruption and ‘passive’ corruption (Roy, 2001) must first be drawn. The 
decision-making manager may offer his or her perspective and even believe that the 
arguments offered are correct in so much as they are objective and decisions were 
objectively made in the greater interest of the company. But again, this cannot be and 
should not be treated as objective because the decision-making manager cannot 
separate himself or herself from the usual object of observation (economic goals). The 
decision-making manager in a corruption-related situation is in a situation of 
“position-dependent objectivity” or “positional objectivity” as Sen (1993:126; 
2002:463-483) writes, “what we can observe depends on our position vis-à-vis the 
objects of observation.” The observer (decision-making manager) cannot separate 
oneself from the object of observation (economic goals). According to Sen (2002:465) 
the notion of positional objectivity, “is important in understanding the objectivity of 
beliefs, whether or not these beliefs happen to be correct.” The presence of positional 
objectivity in a corruption-related situation is apparent from the memoirs of Carl 
Kotchian, director of Lockheed.8 Kotchian, in his personal memoir, Lockheed Sales 
Mission: Seventy Days in Tokyo (Jacoby et.al, 1977:163) wrote:  
               Was it really possible, from the standpoint of reality, to say, “I refuse to pay”? 
                I thought of all the effort expended by the thousands of men since the conception 
                and designing of the L-1011 Tristar; our superhuman efforts to avoid bankruptcy 
                because of our own financial difficulties as well as similar difficulties of the engine 
                maker (Rolls Royce); the successive defeats in both the KSSU and Atlas compet- 
                -itions in the Eurpoean theater.  I thought of the painful final efforts of the seventy 
                days. And I thought of being told: If you make this payment, you can surely get 
                                                 
8  Lockheed Corporation confessed under amnesty during the 1975 US congressional hearings; to have 
paid bribes in 41 countries out of the 70 countries that Lockheed did business in (Noonan, 1984).  
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                 the order of as many as 21 airplanes.” I must admit that my moral and ethical 
              considerations gave way to the commercial gains we had been seeking for so many 
              hard days and weeks. 
Kotchian’s question: “was it possible from the point of view of reality?” offers a 
position-dependent insight into the mind of a decision-making manager in a 
corruption-related situation. Kotchian concludes that there is no other solution but to 
pay a bribe for securing the much needed business deal.   
 
The discussion here is not to find fault with either the bribe-receiver or the bribe-
giver, but to achieve a deeper understanding of the mind of a decision-making 
manager. It is possible that Carl Kotchian may have written his memoirs as a public 
relations device or he may have written it in remorse and in reflection. Whatever the 
purpose, if we search for answers in any situation of bribe-taking and bribe-giving we 
are likely to face the proverbial question of whether the chicken came first or the egg 
came first. Someone wanted to pay a bribe so someone took it or it could be someone 
asked for a bribe so somebody paid it.  To avoid such ambiguous areas in corruption-
related situations, we need to consider that doing business or the right to do business 
in society is derived from an unwritten social contract between the company and 
society. The company is required to honour some basic norms, which can be better 
explained in the context of ISCT thinking (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999) i.e. Integrated 
Social Contracts Theory.  
 
ISCT thinking proposes that certain basic norms are recognised as universally 
acceptable and are a part of an implicit social contract between business and society. 
The issues of human rights, environmental concerns and sustainable development are 
not subject to relativist thinking but are of universal concern and relevance. 
Corruption or acts of corruption that undermine universally accepted norms are 
clearly a violation of the social contract between business and society.  If these critical 
issues or universal norms are incorporated in a corruption-related decision-making 
(CRDM) process, not only will the managers of a socially conscious company be able 
to honour their stakeholder obligations but also pave the way for application of ethical 
principles in other aspects of business conduct.     
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Ethical Principles and Conduct: Value and Utility   
Ethics as a body of knowledge has found practical application (ethical conduct) in 
business situations, just as philosophy in general has influenced understanding of 
moral issues in society. Business ethics and its relevance in strategic thinking are now 
being mentioned in management literature more than ever before (Luijk Van Henk, 
2000:3).  Practical application of business ethics requires a dialectic understanding of 
issues in hand by a decision-making manager (Singer, 2002). Thinking in terms of 
profit and utility in the market place is one side of the coin. Values based outcomes 
relating to overall human flourishing are the other side of the coin. Both are 
complementary; they are not mutually exclusive. If both value outcomes and 
utilitarian outcomes are evaluated by business managers it will go a long way to 
ensure that businesses thrive and executives live longer in good health.   
 
There is indeed a cash value of ethical conduct besides the spiritual side of it.  Ethical 
conduct is likely to help an executive maintain good health free of undue stress and 
enjoy what he or she is doing and that can mean added years of life and earning to the 
executive. Rational company executives do not want to die on the corporate 
battlefield of unhealthy competition, corruption, intrigue, conspiracies and aim for a 
Mercedes Benz as his or her coffin, a fate that befell J Clifford Baxter, a senior 
executive of Enron. The executive shot himself in his Mercedes Benz because he 
could not bear the stress of investigations into his role in Enron’s bankruptcy 
(McClean & Elkind, 2003). Major corporate scandals have executive suicides 
associated with them. For instance, when the Lockheed investigations started, the 
treasurer shot himself (Jacoby et al, 1977); when United Brands was exposed in a 
bribery scandal in South America, the CEO Eli Black jumped off the twenty-second 
storey of his New York office building (Jacoby et al, 1977). The Academy of 
Management, USA, prompted by the series of fraud induced corporate failures in 
USA during 2001 and 2002, as a matter of reflection, admitted in an email to 
academia around the world that education institutions and business schools had failed 
to morally educate business school students about business conduct.9  Therefore, 
successful business conduct is ethical business conduct which in turn can ensure 
rising executive career graphs and handsome rewards, devoid of situations that are 
                                                 
9 Academy of Management USA sent out a draft resolution admitting this serious lapse on part of 
business schools in educating business school students in August 2002.  
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tarnished by allegations of corruption, fraud and rejection by the stakeholder 
community. This is possible through ethical decision-making and practices based on 
ethical principles and reasoning. Ethics generally deals with the reasoning process and 
is concerned with the justification of actions and practices in specific situations 
(Buchholz & Rosenthal, 1998).   
 
This thesis aims to address similar objectives, but specifically to assist decision-
making managers deal with corruption-related situations ethically through a process 
of “learning to think”, as discussed in Buchholz & Rosenthal (2001:30). The authors 
believe that when we learn to think we also become free moral beings in the process. 
Freedom involves moral responsibility and this in turn involves the ability to 
recognise moral problems. A plurality of conflicting interests must be integrated, and 
that can only be done by the morally perceptive, creative, individual operating in 
response to specific conflicts. The way of creatively integrating these is then a 
“manifestation of one’s moral character” (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2001:29).   
 
The corruption-related decision-making (CRDM) process as proposed in this thesis 
has a specific purpose: it is to make individual managers think and recognise moral 
problems, in specific contexts. It is a logical process that imports an ethical dimension 
to grey areas in corruption-related situations, with a view to achieving either an 
outright rejection of an action due to its consequences on others, or a justification of 
one’s decision in a specific context within the framework of corporate social 
responsibility. The CRDM process ensures that “ethical missteps” (Sims, 2002) do 
not occur defeating all other strategies for success.  
 
CRDM and Strategy 
Strategy is always designed to win, whether in business or in military science from 
where the concept originates. According to military science, strategy is an 
unambiguous term about the science and art of winning at war that requires planning 
(Husted & Allen, 2000) to achieve success at war. What constitutes a win in military 
science is bound to inflict pain and suffering on the enemy, but the same logic cannot 
be extended to the concept of a ‘corporate win’ in a civil society. What then 
constitutes a win for a multinational company (or any business) in society? Should a 
corporate win be defined as achievement of profitability, increase of shareholder 
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capital, growth of operations and expansion of market share or should it also include 
respect for human rights, good environmental practices, good manufacturing practices 
that protect sustainable development? Pursuing economic goals such as seeking 
profits will mean making money but implementation of the second part of the same 
question could mean outflow of money or reduction of profitability. Ostensibly, it 
represents a conflict and reflects the ethical problems in strategic management. 
According to Hosmer (1987:3) it is “a conflict between an organisation’s economic 
performance (measured by revenues, costs and profits) and its social performance 
(stated in terms of obligations to persons both within and outside the organisation).”  
 
These contradictions can be debated either way and represent binary issues whose 
solutions lie in dialectic reasoning or analysis (Singer, 2002). For any given thesis, 
there is an anti-thesis. A winning strategy for any business is a matter of dialectic 
understanding of how a win or victory should be defined. A good starting point to 
seek an answer would be to set out all the narratives and perspectives and then 
compare the elite-consensus view with the dissenting views including cultural specific 
understanding and minority voices (Singer, 2002), thereby restating or reframing the 
problem in its entirety. This would amount to shifting the paradigm of strategic 
management thought from a narrow perspective of an elite-consensus view of 
business reality to a state where dialectic reasoning becomes the central principle in 
strategic business analysis (Singer, 2002), thus leading to solutions that are 
everlasting with win–win situations for all concerned. This is essential because “the 
traditional language of competitive strategy is often associated with relentless pursuit 
of essentially selfish interest, by stronger and more powerful players” (Singer, 
1997:72). Mindless pursuit of competitive strategy is akin to a “descending iron cage” 
that Max Weber associated with calculated forms of rationality as it creates victims of 
economisation (Singer, 1997:73). This situation can be consciously overcome by 
adapting models of rationality augmenting the language of strategy so that strategic 
management becomes more akin to ‘business ethics.’   
 
 Strategic management thought has come a long way during the past two decades 
from the point where the business of business was to do business and nothing more. 
Today, strategic management thought acknowledges the existence of the stakeholder 
concept and a social contracts theory that binds business with and as a part of society 
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(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). Nowadays, economic and social objectives as 
competing with each other are considered an obsolete argument and a false dichotomy 
(Porter & Kramer, 2002:32). Today, many successful companies who respond to the 
global stakeholder environment consider ethical decision-making as a part of rational 
decision-making (Singer, 1994).  
 
The notion that a ‘rational economic man or a rational economic organisation’ is 
devoid of human feelings is discarded by Klein (2002). The author argues that 
emotions and feelings are essential ingredients to rational decision-making and 
practical rationality. It “involves the ability to determine and achieve ends associated 
with human flourishing or happiness” (Klein, 2002). Practical rationality therefore, 
“implies both determining the correct means for achieving the desired ends and 
aiming at those ends which promote what Aristotle calls human flourishing or 
eudaimonia”(Klein, 2002:349). Human flourishing can be analysed from the 
fundamental principle of hedonism as established in the ethical theory of 
utilitarianism propounded by John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. The original 
meaning of the term ‘hedonism’ implies achieving maximum pleasure at the cost of 
very little pain. When applied to business actions and decisions, the main stream 
meaning of ‘hedonism’ or utilitarian theory involves achieving greatest amount of 
happiness for the greatest number of human beings as opposed to pain inflicted on 
human beings by business actions and decisions. In analyzing business decision-
making outcomes one could adopt a qualitative approach (as proposed by John Stuart 
Mill) or a quantitative approach (as proposed by Jeremy Bentham) to determine the 
outcome. In doing this, one must remain mindful of the danger that the rights of 
minorities might be compromised and minorities may suffer. Indeed, this is a standard 
critique of utilitarian theory. With quantitative approaches, the limitations of all 
methods of quantification and assessment must also be understood, which in turn 
implies that pluralistic approaches are often appropriate (eg: Resnick, 2003). Overall, 
the ends and outcomes of any rational decision-making process should necessarily 
lead to human flourishing and not human suffering, therein lies the challenge in a 
corruption-related situation before any decision-maker.  
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Chapter One: Redefining forms of Corruption and Corruption-
Related Decision-making (CRDM) 
 
“Often what the general manager seeks and needs is a more or less orderly way of 
thinking through the moral implications of a policy decision” (Goodpaster, 1984:3) 
 
Introduction:  
Recorded history texts provide instances of corruption and bribery in all ancient 
civilizations, and through the ages our society has never been without corruption 
(Noonan, 1984). More than two thousand years ago in India, corruption and its related 
practices have found mention in Kautilya’s Arthashastra.10 This work mentions 40 
different ways in which a public official can make illegitimate gain from public office 
(Rangarajan, 1992:295-297). The prevalence of corruption and bribery in every 
ancient civilization, be it Babylonian, Egyptian, Hebrew, Indian, Chinese, Roman and 
Greek, is discussed at length in the work of Alatas (1990). Thus, human society has 
never been without the presence of corruption.  It exists in all societies (Huntington, 
1968:492) and has been accepted as a seemingly inevitable fact of life by people from 
all over the world today (Pieth, 1999). It is also a common perception amongst people 
that corruption is spreading and embedding itself within social sub-systems (Ryan, 
2000). The phenomenon of corruption is inseparable from questions of public 
morality and morality in general (Theobald, 1990:1).  
 
There is something immoral and wrong with the phenomena of corruption, bribe 
giving and bribe taking. Yet corruption and acts of corruption occur daily all over the 
world. Transparency International, an international NGO fighting corruption, records 
daily media reports of corruption from all over the world; and emails these headlines 
with web sources to access the individual cases, to members on its mailing list. Not a 
single working day passes without an instance of corruption being reported as having 
occurred in some part of the globe. Corruption and bribery are not confined to any 
geographical boundary or any single nation or a particular culture, but occur 
universally on a daily basis. The domain of corruption and bribery is comprised of 
participants who gain from their corrupt acts to the detriment of others in society. It is 
                                                 
10 Arthashastra covers all aspects of statecraft and administration. It was written by Kautilya, Prime 
Minister in Chandragupta Maurya’s empire. Written around 300 –310 B.C.  
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these others who bear the cost and consequences of corruption or bribery in some 
form or the other. This chapter defines corruption and bribery as understood in current 
literature and explains associated terms, arguments for and against corruption, gift-
giving and its disclosure. A new definition of corruption is proposed in the thesis 
which takes into account the impact of corruption on the stakeholder environment. 
The conceptual distinction between “active corruption and passive corruption” (Roy, 
2001; Roy & Singer, 2004; Roy, 2004; Roy, 2005) is revisited to understand the intent 
and role chosen by a bribe-giver in a situation related to corruption or bribery.   
 
As in daily life, corruption frequently occurs in trade and commerce and often 
becomes a decision-making issue for many managers in multinational corporations. 
They encounter corruption at different times, in different situations at home and 
overseas. Such corruption in business is either due to the rent-seeking behaviour of 
public officials (Bhagwati, 1982; Bardhan, 1997) or gain-seeking intentions of 
managers. These involve decisions---whether to participate in a corrupt act and gain 
business or lose business by non-participation; whether to risk reputation and 
company image or not risk it at all; whether to think of economic benefits and 
personal agendas alone or to take into account stakeholder responsibilities as well.  
 
Most multinational business managers encounter these questions in a multi-location 
and multi-cultural context. These add to the complexity of the process as managers 
are also aware that the world of multinational business implies higher 
interdependence, more threats and opportunities, and needs greater awareness of the 
world’s diversity and the ramifications of one’s action in terms of host and home 
countries (Wartick & Wood, 1998).  When companies are convicted of misconduct in 
business or irresponsible behaviour towards their stakeholders, they experience a 
significantly lower return on assets and lower return on sales (Ferrell et.al, 2002:250). 
Several studies have examined whether socially responsible behaviour is associated 
with profitability of a company. Some studies concluded that there is a positive 
relationship between the two, while others did not find any significant association 
between the two, but none of the studies found any negative association (Velasquez, 
2002:42). Therefore, a corporation’s success can be either made or marred by the 
quality of socially responsible actions towards its stakeholders.  
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Considering the importance of corruption-related decisions to a corporation’s success 
or failure in many situations, decisions relating to situations of corruption and bribery 
need to be studied from the perspective of strategic management.  In order to address 
the company’s long-term strategic interest managers need an “orderly way of thinking 
through the moral implications of a policy decision” (Goodpaster, 1984:3) while 
dealing with corruption-related situations. Corruption-related decision-making 
(CRDM) is that orderly way of thinking through the moral implications of a policy 
decision in the realm of corruption and bribery. It is concerned with the protection of 
stakeholder interests and strategic interests within the framework of corporate social 
responsibility. Corruption-related decision-making or CRDM can, therefore, be 
regarded as a new concept in strategic management thought whose purpose is to 
consciously protect stakeholder issues during decision-making in corruption-related 
situations.  
 
Background Literature: Corruption and Bribery 
Corruption and bribery in whatever form and manner have been accepted as universal 
phenomena by different authors (Leff, 1964; Nye, 1967; Huntington, 1968; Johnston, 
1982; Noonan, 1984; Klitgaard, 1988, Theobald, 1990). Most authors have studied the 
causes of corruption, its consequences, and its occurrence as a part of political 
structures as well as the public official’s role in corruption (Scott, 1972; Rose-
Ackerman 1978; Klitgaard, 1988; Alatas, 1990; Theobald, 1990; Mauro, 1995; 
Mauro, 1997; Johnston, 1997; Perry, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; Harris, 2003). Corruption has 
also been seen as a matter of “embedded local cultures” and as a result of “political 
structures and institutions” (Heywood, 1997).  
 
Available literature states past cases, provides justification for the passage of the 
FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) by the US government (Noonan, 1984; Jacoby 
et al. 1977) or enumerates consequent disadvantages faced by US companies while 
doing business overseas (Jacoby et al.1977; Kaikati et al. 2000). Publications 
discussing corruption-control and installation of control mechanisms focus on the 
public official (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Some scholars have explored 
the correlation between the stages of a nation’s development and their influence on 
corruption and found that increased corruption is experienced as an economy takes off 
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and every developing nation experiences increased corruption in times of rapid 
development (Wraith & Simpkins, 1963; Theobald, 1990).  
 
 In certain situations corruption has been seen as a positive occurrence. Altman (1989) 
considered corruption and black market in the erstwhile Soviet Union as a “market 
correction mechanism”, correcting the Soviet government’s price and distribution 
control policies. Tillman (1968:437-443) considered the black market price as a 
“mandatory pricing system.” Szeftel (1983) in his study of private enterprises in 
Zambia felt corruption led to ‘formation of capital and enterprise’ as Zambian public 
officials who amassed wealth through corrupt means became entrepreneurs in later 
life. Kiltgaard (1988) finds corruption useful is some organizational situations to cut 
down bureaucracy and save time. However, authors such as Leff (1964); Scott (1972); 
Szeftel (1983); Klitgaard (1988) and Theobald (1990) have extensively argued against 
corruption asserting that the negative side of corruption far outweighs its perceived 
contextual benefits. Corruption has also been considered as a matter of culture tracing 
its origins to paying homage to the tribal chief or paying obeisance to a monarch 
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963) but this argument is considered outdated by the 
stakeholder community and in particular in the anti-corruption efforts of Transparency 
International and the United Nations.                 
 
 In recent times, scholars have studied the impact of corruption on society (eg: Alatas, 
1990). Empirical studies, such as Mauro (1997) provide tentative evidence about the 
economic effects (i.e. lowers growth and investment) of corruption. Mauro (1998) 
provided the first cross-country (across sovereign nations) empirical evidence that 
corruption affects the composition of government expenditure and adversely impacts 
government expenditure on education. Gupta, Demello, Sharan (2001) suggest in their 
study that nations with higher incidence of corruption also experience higher military 
expenditure in relation to both a nation’s GDP and government spending. Leite & 
Weidmann (2002), in their empirical studies of natural resource rich nations, who are 
otherwise poor, found that such nations experience slow economic growth due to the 
incidence of rent-seeking activities of public officials and corruption. Gupta, Davoodi 
& Tiongson (2002) concluded in their empirical study that nations with high levels of 
corruption experience adverse consequences on infant mortality rates, higher 
percentage of low birth weight babies and higher dropout rates in primary schools (the 
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authors used Corruption Perception Indices11 of each country selected for the study 
and then used individual country data against the above three variables to support 
their findings). Tanzi (1998:45) explains the qualitative effects of corruption on the 
economy, namely: distortion of markets, distortion of allocation of resources, 
distortion of incentives, corruption as an arbitrary tax, increase in poverty, reduction 
of the legitimacy of a free market mechanism and distortion of the fundamental role 
of government. Perry (1997) views corruption as a part of human activity in the 
geographical context and has discussed the causes, proximates, characteristics and 
functions of political corruption. Harris (2003) in his study of political corruption has 
distinguished between nations of low corruption and high corruption. 
 
Elliot (1997) mentions three different actors in the arena of corruption, namely: 
elected officials and politicians, non-elected officials (identified as judiciary and the 
bureaucracy) and private actors (which includes business). Elliot (1997) also 
distinguishes between “grand corruption” and “petty corruption”. She describes 
‘grand corruption’ as corruption occurring at the highest levels of government 
involving decisions such as “procurement of military equipment, civilian aircraft, or 
infrastructure or broad policy decisions about the allocation of credit or industrial 
subsidies” (Elliot, 1997:178). While “petty corruption” according to Elliot, occurs 
when private actors interact with non-elected government officials for transactions 
such as “taxes, regulations, licensing requirements and the discretionary allocation of 
government benefits.”  
 
However, in all these studies the decision-making role of business managers as a part 
of what can be called the “supply side of corruption” (Roy, 2001) has not been 
explored.  It is clear that there is dearth of significant literature or specific scholarly 
work that could provide decision-making guidelines to lead business managers 
through a decision process when dealing with corruption in business.   
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Corruption Perception Indices are annual indices released by Transparency International. They 
convey the level of corruption in a country as perceived by its people (business leaders, press, scholars, 
accountants are usually surveyed)  
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Corruption and Bribery in International Business: 
Bribery in international business has increasingly come under scrutiny of international 
organizations such as the OECD12, UN13, IMF14, World Bank and regional 
organizations in Europe, the Americas and Africa. In February 1999, the OECD 
criminalised bribery of foreign public officials through the OECD Anti-bribery 
Convention, 1999. The document is internationally significant as it is signed by 34 
nations who control 70% of exports and 90% of direct foreign investment worldwide 
(Pieth, 1999). Moreover, ten international anti-corruption conferences under the aegis 
of Transparency International; the role played by (TI) Transparency International’s 60 
national chapters, the strengthening of the FCPA15 in USA; the regional anti-
corruption conventions in Africa, America and Europe (discussed in the next chapter) 
and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003 indicate deep concern 
about the prevalence of corruption in international business and public life.  
 
The recent United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003 (UNCAP) is by far 
the most comprehensive international effort covering all aspects of corruption in 
public life and business. These international efforts imply that business managers and 
public officials are expected to refrain from corruption and bribery. However, these 
anti-corruption conventions ignore the myriad situations today’s multinational 
managers face in day-to-day conduct of business in many countries around the world 
where the rule of law and civil society is far from desirable. Moreover, international 
efforts in the form of such signed conventions lack uniform legislative enforceability 
across all signatory nations as well as non-signatories due to various reasons ranging 
from varying stages of ratification of these instruments (discussed in next chapter) to 
differences in the judicial and legislative structures of individual signatory nations 
(Pieth, 1999). Legislation has not been successful in curbing the incidence of 
corruption in international business as is evident from the last (BPI) Bribe Payer’s 
Index (see appendix I), published after the OECD Convention came into effect.  
 
What is then required, is a multi-faceted approach to tackle corruption in international 
business. Effective curbing of corruption in international business through legislation 
                                                 
12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
13 United Nations  
14 International Monetary Fund 
15 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
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is still in its nascent stages, and will take years to catch up with the reality of doing 
business in many parts of the world. One significant way could be to use the 
enormous influence that multinational companies exercise in global business by 
encouraging MNC16 managers review corruption-related situations and decisions 
within a framework of corporate social responsibility. Multinational companies by 
virtue of their phenomenal growth in their size, operations and importance are in a 
position to influence global business ethics (Donaldson, 1989). Buller, Kohls & 
Anderson (1991) further maintain that multinationals are in the best position to create 
a global ethic. Prahlad & Hammond (2002) believe that multinational companies who 
enter and invest in poorer countries to serve the “bottom of the pyramid” market will 
be able to steadily reduce the effect of corruption. It is, therefore, worthwhile to re-
examine the concept of corruption in business from the perspective of a decision-
making manager.  
 
Corruption and bribery are by nature private arrangements for private gain (Nye, 
1967; Huntington, 1968), but any such private arrangement for private gain needs to 
be revisited to satisfy not only one’s moral conscience but also address stakeholder 
concerns. In the past, some authors have considered corruption in international 
business as a matter of ethical relativism and attributed it to differences in culture 
(Wraith & Simpkins, 1963; Fadiman, 1986:128). This understanding influences 
business decision-making even today. The oft quoted, “when in Rome, do as the 
Romans” is considered as the best way to do business in a different culture to ensure 
success. Francis (1991) has explained the “when in Rome” approach as a matter of 
ethical relativism. The multinational business manager operating in a global 
environment faces conflicts between home culture and host culture, between 
shareholder interests and stakeholder concerns, between one’s moral conscience and 
profit objectives, and conflict between one’s legal obligations and career 
advancement. A clearer understanding of corruption and its many hues would help 
formulate corruption-related decision-making as a part of corporate strategy to 
eliminate negative stakeholder outcomes.   
 
 
                                                 
16 Multinational Corporations 
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What is Corruption?  
What constitutes corruption and acts of corruption is a question of debate among 
scholars; however, they agree on certain common features evident in an act of 
corruption. Scott (1972:3) sums this up, “Corruption, we would all agree, involves a 
deviation from certain standards of behaviour.” This gives rise to a series of pertinent 
questions as to what those standards of behaviour are from which one deviates? What 
are the criteria laid down to establish those standards and who lays them down?  
Whose behaviour is to be checked against those standards? Scott (1972:3) mentions 
three broad criteria, each with a distinct analytical focus but overlapping with each 
other, namely: public interest, public opinion, and legal norms. He debates what 
constitutes “public interest” and what is “public opinion” and issues of law. He 
concludes that both public interest and public opinion have different connotations in 
different situations and may be difficult to use as yardsticks in all cases. If compliance 
with the law is the expected standard of behaviour, then are we narrowing down the 
issue of corruption to contractarian requirements and in the process are we relegating 
a moral problem to a contractarian solution? The requirement of compliance with law 
would still harbour lingering doubts as to what is acceptable behaviour and what is 
not, and whether the law in question is unconstitutional or repressive. Scott (1972:5) 
addresses this dilemma aptly when he writes:  
       Our conception of corruption does not cover political systems that are, in  
       Aristotelian terms, “corrupt” in that they systematically serve the interests  
       of special groups or sectors. A given regime may be biased or repressive; 
       it may consistently favour the interests, say, of the aristocracy, big business,  
       a single ethnic group or a single region while it represses other demands.  
              
Scott’s definition mentions “special groups” whose interests are served, albeit within 
the law by designs of a political structure. Some formal special interest groups who 
expressly promote the interest of their own groups within the law are professional 
bodies of accountants, lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers and trade associations, 
wherein the rules are set for satisfying specific group interests, and in so far as they do 
that, such systems still remain corrupt. This happens if in the process of serving their 
own interest, they act to the detriment of society. Likewise,  the theory of ‘milgram’s 
 24
six degrees of freedom’17 or the concept of chinese guanxi18 or the old boys network 
are indicators of the prevalence of informal groups of people who can end up serving 
their group interest to the detriment of others. The activities of such groups may meet 
legal compliance but that compliance may not rule out pursuit of corrupt advantage 
over others.  
 
Legal compliance, however, as a criterion is not ruled out and scholars have used 
words like “norms”, “formal duties”, “extra legal”,  “system of public order” to define 
corruption and the underlying notion of legal compliance. Leff (1964:510) has 
highlighted the outcome of a corrupt act, namely: private gain at the expense of 
common good.  He defines corruption as:  
            Corruption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain  
             influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. As such, the existence of 
             corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the  
             decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.       
Leff’s definition strengthens the use of legal compliance as a criterion, but at the same 
time discusses influence to a “greater extent than would otherwise be the case” as an 
outcome of the process. However, Leff’s use of the word “extra-legal” and his 
definition and related work is critically assessed in the work of Alatas (1990: 177-
182).  
 
Alatas (1990:3) categorises corruption into seven distinct types: transactive, extortive, 
investive, defensive, nepotistic, autogenic and supportive and provides a context-
specific insight into corruption in public office. Huntington (1968:492) defines 
corruption as, “behaviour of public officials, which deviates from accepted norms in 
order to serve private ends.” Huntington highlights the private nature of gain made 
through a corrupt transaction by public officials. Nye’s (1967:567) definition is more 
comprehensive:  
                Behaviour, which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
                 (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close  
                                                 
17 Milgram’s six degrees of freedom is based on an experiment conducted by Prof. Milgram on a 
hypothesis that everyone in this world is connected through a short chain of acquaintances 
(approximately 6 persons in a chain).   
18 The underlying theme in a Guanxi relationship is a reciprocal relationship for mutual benefit between 
people in business or otherwise. Guanxi is a word coined during Confucian times to indicate various 
relationships between the Emperor and people and between networks of people.   
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                 family, private clique) wealth or status gains: or violates rules against  
                 the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. 
Nye (1967) offers a better understanding by mentioning the possible beneficiaries of a 
public official’s corrupt transaction. Rogow and Lasswell (1963:132) define it from 
the viewpoint of public good or common good, thus:  
           A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one system of public or civic  
           order and is in fact incompatible with (destructive of) any such system. A system  
           of public or civic order exalts common interest over special interest; violations  
          of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt.  
 
Klitgaard (1988:75) contends that illicit behaviour (corruption) flourishes when 
agents (public officials) have monopoly power over clients by virtue of great 
discretionary powers that they (public officials) command by way of occupying a 
public office. On the other hand the agent’s (public official’s) accountability as an 
agent to the principal (the nation’s electorate) is weak. In his work detailing control 
mechanisms for corruption, he has defined these ingredients of corruption in an 
informal equation thus: Corruption= Monopoly + Discretion–Accountability. In other 
words, corruption is a situation of monopoly arising out of the discretionary powers 
vested in a position without being accountable for one’s actions.  
 
A general consensus is noticed amongst these scholars: that corruption is for private 
gain at the expense of common good, it is a deviation from norms and subverts the 
rule of law. ‘Private gain at the expense of common good’ provides the ground of 
ethical reasoning against corruption. However, literature also provides exceptions to 
what is perceived as common good, but in reality may not be for be individual good 
nor satisfy basic principles of equity and justice. For instance, in war time Germany 
the Nazi perception of common good involved imprisonment and extermination of 
Jews. Rose-Ackerman (1978:9) explains this situation in her book when she writes, 
“One does not condemn a Jew for bribing his way out of a concentration camp.” The 
morality of this act of corruption overrides issues of legal compliance and private 
gain. Hence, the definition of corruption needs contextual application. Johnston 
(1989:16) says “there are many forms of corruption, differing in participants, settings, 
stakes, techniques, and cultural legitimacy.”  
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Corruption, thus, is private gain at public cost and involves deviation from rules, 
norms and the law. It is also a trade in discretionary powers of a public official with 
an underlying element of a quid pro quo relationship between the public official and 
the beneficiary of the discretionary powers. It usually has the ingredient of illegal and 
immoral gratification. However in certain cultural situations, the discretionary powers 
are exercised by a public official’s corrupt act to provide private gain to a close circle 
of people at public costs, without the underlying element of reciprocity. These 
beneficiaries (people) could belong to the public official’s own family, extended 
family, circle of friends and associates, persons from one’s tribe or ethnic background 
or province. Such misuse of powers vested in a public office of national trust is 
undertaken by the public official to express love, devotion, loyalty towards one’s 
family, tribe, province or friends and associates, although the public official is not 
paid for it by the beneficiaries (Abueva, 1966).  This exception to the standard quid 
pro quo practice also amounts to corruption because the actions are designed to 
provide an unfair advantage to certain individuals or a section of society.  
 
Tanzi (1998:24) addresses all these situations by comparing corruption to an elephant:  
                 Like an elephant, while it may be difficult to describe, corruption is 
                 generally not difficult to recognize when observed. In most cases, 
                 different observers would agree on whether a particular behaviour 
                 connotes corruption. 
 
Morals, Ethics and Corruption: 
Corruption like any other human activity in society is subject to evaluation against 
certain moral standards. These are standards of expected behaviour based on beliefs 
held by society or a group of persons, of what is right and what is wrong or what is 
good or what is bad. When society classifies some human activity as wrong or bad, 
the logical question would be on what basis does society do that?   
 
This question brings us to the well documented debate in Great Britain between Lord 
Patrick Devlin (Justice of the High Court, Queens Bench, 1948-1960 and Lord of 
Appeal, 1961-1964) and Prof. H.L.A. Hart (Professor of jurisprudence at Oxford 
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University, 1952-1968) that ensued over the Wolfenden Report.19 The debate was 
essentially about legal enforcement of morals in society. Lord Devlin takes a view 
that morality is a sphere in which there is public interest and there is private interest, 
often in conflict, and the problem is to reconcile the two with a toleration of 
maximum individual freedom that is consistent with the integrity of society (Devlin, 
1959). Here, in order to retain the integrity of society, Lord Devlin has argued that the 
law has the right to curtail individual private activity if that activity is considered as 
detrimental to society by the ‘majority’, which is reflected in the opinion of any 
ordinary person (who could be picked up at random from the street and placed in the 
jury box).  The source of a majority opinion is immaterial, as long as the reasonable 
man on the street believes that a practice is immoral (Devlin, 1959:46).  
 
Prof. Hart questioned Lord Devlin’s views. Prof. Hart argued that the legislator 
should investigate whether the majority moral opinion is based on ignorance, 
superstition, or misunderstanding. He argued that moral issues are both private and 
public, and certain issues may cause disgust and intolerance but if it is a private 
activity, it cannot be curtailed by law merely because it is disgusting or intolerant as it 
will result in curtailing individual liberty (Hart, 1963). To take the step of legal 
enforcement of a moral issue involving any human activity, Hart (1959:52) 
recommended two questions,  
             First, we must ask whether a practice which offends moral feeling is  
              harmful, independently of its repercussion on the moral code. Secondly,  
              what about repercussion on the moral code? Is it really true that failure  
              to translate this item of general morality into criminal law will jeopardize  
              the whole fabric of morality and so of society?       
 
Thus, legal enforcement of moral standards is logical only when the moral standard 
itself has been investigated, and whose breach is likely to cause serious harm to 
society. Although moral standards are based on beliefs of individuals and society, in 
order to legally justify and enforce them, mere majority opinion can also amount to 
tyranny of the majority. A moral standard becomes suitable for legal enforcement 
only when its breach will jeopardize the fabric and existence of society. Whether a 
                                                 
19 The Wolfenden Report (1957) refers to a parliamentary committee report in Great Britain dealing 
with homosexuality and prostitution. It is a landmark report because it also queries the function of law 
itself while dealing with two very difficult legal and social problems of that period.   
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moral standard is reasonable or unreasonable is the study of ‘ethics’ as a body of 
knowledge. Ethics is the normative way of studying moral standards, in which, the 
normative study attempts to find out what ought to be the moral standard or state of 
affairs and why so, and if not, then why not? Morality and moral standards offer a 
choice between right and wrong but the justification for that right or wrong is found 
through the discipline of ethics.  
 
The arguments in the Hart-Devlin debate and the concepts of moral standards and 
ethics are inter-related and sometimes used in an interchangeable manner. When 
applied to the human activity of corruption, one can safely conclude that is immoral 
and unethical since it fundamentally involves private gain at public cost. If left 
unchecked, corruption can lead to chaos and anarchy in society. Corruption also 
breaches the principle of distributive justice and undermines the fiduciary role of 
business as a custodian of societal wealth and resources. Moreover, corruption 
violates the utilitarian role of business to achieve the economic welfare of society. 
This logic has prompted the formulation of anti-corruption legislation both at national, 
regional and international levels to protect the economic interests of society and 
protect society from an immoral situation of private gain at public costs. Except for 
the situations defined by Abueva (1966), corrupt influence and acts of corruption are 
largely sustained through an intricate system of bribery (irrespective of the 
nomenclature), questionable payments and influence peddling against a quid pro quo. 
 
Bribery:  
Bribery is the act of providing incentives in exchange for an act of corruption. A bribe 
includes payments in cash or kind and can include provision of free goods or services 
and non-repayable loans. A bribe can also be termed as a gift or donation or bear any 
nomenclature denoting cultural customs and nuances but with a view to extract a 
corrupt act. Companies get around bribery legislation by donating money to a trust 
that the bribe-taker nominates as in case of Lockheed and Prince Bernhard of Holland 
where Lockheed made donations to the Prince’s wildlife trusts in exchange for aircraft 
orders (Jacoby et.al, 1977) or by providing free goods, free services, scholarships for 
the bribe-taker’s children for overseas study, payment of marketing commissions, 
payment of consulting fees to third parties nominated by the bribe-taker.      
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Bribes can be paid or provided before the task sought by the bribe-giver is done or it 
may be paid or given after the task sought by the bribe-giver is done. At times, bribe-
givers and bribe-receivers claim legitimacy for their acts under labels of customs and 
cultural requirements. If the objective of any of these acts is to seek reciprocity and 
create a relationship or understanding of quid pro quo for private gain against public 
good, it is a bribe irrespective of the nomenclature used.  
 
In the context of business and its interaction with the government (public officials) 
corruption occurs and bribes are paid or given by a business manager. According to 
Noonan (1984:23),“in a modern society corporate bribers may be more powerful than 
the officials they bribe” and the “bribe-takers are among the powerholders in society 
that is why they are bribed.” One (corporate executive) has the power to bribe and the 
other (public official) has the power to reciprocate with the discretionary powers of 
one’s office. The bribe given by a corporate manager to a public official is to achieve 
a favourable disposition and line of communication with the public official who has 
dispensing powers and whose dispensation is sought by the corporate. As Noonan 
(1984:697) clarifies, “The bribe is intended to reflect or create an overriding 
obligation. The briber pays because he (or she) feels he (or she) must reciprocate or 
must have reciprocation.” Noonan (1984:697) reiterates that, “Bribe is used today not 
only in its primary sense of an exchange with an officeholder, but in the sense of any 
inducement given to alter conduct that would naturally be otherwise.” Johnston 
(1997:62) explains the process that underlies this primary sense of exchange thus:   
                  The initiative may come from either private clients or public officials: 
                    the first may offer bribes, the second may delay decisions or contrive 
                    shortages until payments are made, or may simply exhort them. The 
                    climate of corruption can be so pervasive that no explicit demands 
                    are needed: “everybody knows” that decisions must be paid for. 
 Once an understanding is reached, the bribe-taker is expected to reciprocate by way 
of a corrupt act in exchange for the bribe.  
 
In case of bribe transactions involving large stakes there are inherent elements of 
‘secrecy’ and ‘enforcement.’ Lambsdorff (1998:43) has analysed the element of 
secrecy involved in such bribe transactions in two ways i.e. (a) it has to be kept as a 
secret from the world at large to avoid public scandals and extortion (b) as a secret 
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transaction known to only few within the organization under a safeguard that 
employees privy to the bribe transaction will not be able to skim off some of the bribe 
for their own. Lambsdorff (1998) writes about an employee of a German firm in Hong 
Kong who was given money and asked to bribe Chinese government officials. The 
employee diverted funds meant for bribing Chinese government officials to his 
personal account instead of delivering the bribe. Later, the company discovered that 
bribes were not delivered and it threatened the employee with prosecution. The 
employee, in turn, threatened to expose the company and the Chinese government 
officials involved and escaped prosecution.  
       
 When it comes to enforceability of a bribe, a bribe-taker is also conscious that the 
secret arrangement of reciprocity between the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker is 
enforceable by the bribe giver (though not in all situations).  In event of non-
performance by bribe-receiver, the bribe-giver (business) can use the services of 
others to ensure performance and may have access to other influential persons within 
the bribe-taker’s organisation, or to organised criminals or command political 
influence. The bribe-giver can use a combination of all three or two of these to ensure 
compliance (on behalf of the bribe-giver) by coercing and intimidating the bribe-
taker. Only in those instances where a bribe-taker is not afraid of such coercion by 
virtue of being more powerful than the bribe-giver can the bribe-taker risk non-
performance in a corrupt transaction.  
 
Dellaporta & Vannucci (1999:20-24) in their extensive study of corrupt exchanges in 
Italy between the networks of politicians, business, mafia and middlemen believe that 
corruption operates successfully because of a complex web of relationships between 
public officials (bribe-receivers), business cartels (bribe-givers), middlemen and 
organized crime that ensure “flow of information” (discretionary powers) in exchange 
for “money” (bribes) with the underlying element of “trust.” Casual observation 
indicates that what has been observed in Italy holds true in other countries around the 
world in relation to the nexus of corruption. The main actors are the public officials 
(rent-seeking behaviour) and business (gain-seeking behaviour) with supporting roles 
played overtly by ‘middlemen’ who act as consultants or liaison agents brokering 
deals between the two (indicated by the double headed arrows in figure 1), with 
organized crime in the shadows to play a covert enforcement role paid for by the party 
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asking them to intervene (indicated by arrows in the figure) if it becomes necessary. 
The web of these relationships is depicted below:       
 
Figure 1. The Nexus of Corruption 
Middlemen as brokers of deals/ trust 
 
             Public officials (rent-seeking)                                           Business (gain-seeking) 
 
Services of Organised Crime as enforcers of corrupt deals if needed  
 
Bribes vs. Gifts: 
Most people understand when a bribe is offered or demanded from them. Indeed, 
most nations around the world have words denoting a bribe in common parlance in 
their own language (see Appendix II). But, it is essential that a distinction be made 
between a bribe and a gift, because many bribes acquire the cloak of gifts within a 
cultural context. Noonan (1984:697) elucidates this distinction:  
              The key differences between a gift and a bribe are: a gift may be disclosed, 
               a bribe must be concealed, the size of a gift is irrelevant whereas the size  
               of a bribe is decisive, a gift does not oblige, a bribe coerces; a gift belongs  
               to the donee; a bribe belongs to those whom the bribee is accountable. 
These two words, bribe and gift form two ends of a segment, with a few related 
activities in between ranging from tips to cultural situations of gift-giving. Tips are 
used to influence conduct for future services and reward past services, however the 
distinction between a tip and a bribe can be determined from the size of the tip, its 
relevance to the service rendered or expected and the fact whether it can disclosed or 
not. If the size of a tip is disproportionate to the service and it cannot be disclosed, it 
is a bribe (Noonan, 1984:688).  
 
Gifts in a cultural situation express love, affection and exchanges during occasions in 
a context of personal relations (example: gifts exchanged at Christmas). The 
distinction between such a gift and a bribe can be made by examining whether love 
and affection exist within the cultural context claimed and furthermore, is it being 
concealed or disclosed. Even in instances of statutory disclosure such as campaign 
 Bribes in 
 Exchange 
 for favours 
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contributions which can be made out of love for a political cause, the clue lies in pre-
election or post-election campaign conduct of the donee (Noonan, 1984:621-51). If 
the donee reciprocates by a quid pro quo act, the campaign contribution is a definite 
bribe. The briber has sought in this case to secure a benefit of some kind from the 
office of the bribee. A gift always belongs to the donee (Noonan, 1984:697) once 
given by the giver20, but a bribe belongs to the bribe-giver to whom the bribee is 
accountable for reciprocal performance of a corrupt act in exchange for the bribe.  
 
A few centuries ago, in most countries around the world, gift-giving to people in 
power, especially monarchs, nobles, tribal chiefs and public officials, were an 
accepted and essential practice (Wraith & Simpkins, 1963). In Japan for instance 
during the Tokogawa (1603-1867) rule, written regulations existed prohibiting 
acceptance of bribes, but in practice merchants offered large gifts of gold to public 
officials, calling them “gifts in anticipation” and promised them a “thanks offering” 
(Mitchell, 1996:5) when the work was done.  Today gift-giving to people in public 
office, especially large gifts of gold will be open to question and the act would be 
viewed with suspicion.  
 
Gift-giving and taking is subject to cultural relativism in many places around the 
globe (Wraith & Simpkins, 1963) and such cultural relativism confuses and clouds the 
judgement of an observer. Certain cultural situations are accepted as ethically correct 
or moral within the society in question. A Middle-Eastern princess was beheaded for 
adultery in the Eighties. This was considered sound punishment for adultery in that 
particular society but if the same treatment were meted out to anyone (for adultery) in 
another society, it would raise a human rights debate. Such cultural relativism “is 
grounded in the assumption that a person or culture believing an act is morally 
correct, helps make it morally correct” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:20). The fallacy 
of a relativist view is obvious; morality is linked to group or cultural belief and not to 
universal principles of ethics.  
             
                                                 
20 There are exceptions, for example one of the principles used by diplomatic corps is that a gift must 
be accepted lest refusal give offence; but it is understood that the gift was made in an official capacity. 
The donee later hands the gift over to some worthy organization such as a charitable organization.      
 33
Managers with relativist views, when involved in an overseas gift-giving decision can 
use the test of disclosure to satisfy themselves and their critics that their act of gift-
giving is being done to honour a local custom or culture of gift-giving. If managers 
feel that their act of gift-giving can be announced in the local newspapers without any 
adverse impact on the company’s work or reputation in the host country, then it is a 
gift within the cultural context of that country. If managers are uncomfortable about 
local journalists learning about the gift, then it is certainly not a gift within that culture 
because announcement of gifts, which are culturally accepted, will not create an 
embarrassing situation for the company in that country or in that society. We come 
back to Noonan’s (1984:697) distinction between a bribe and a gift: “a gift can be 
disclosed, a bribe needs to be concealed.” To be called a gift, it has to pass the “test of 
disclosure with comfort” (Roy, 2001). It is important in such situations to provide 
disclosure as evidence confirming that the gift in question is culturally acceptable in 
the host country. Undisclosed gifts, hidden from the public eye, thus can be classified 
as bribes, irrespective of cultural arguments as they fail the “test of disclosure with 
comfort” in the host country.   
 
Lobbying:  
Lobbying is the promotion of individual or group interests by various means including 
dissemination of information to create a favourable disposition towards that individual 
or group. Businesses adopt lobbying, inter-alia, for creation of favourable public 
opinion and legislative opinion to obtain benefits by passage of favourable laws or 
repeal of unfavourable laws. Lobbying involves creation of favourable public opinion 
and/or legislative direction to serve group interest or individual interest of the 
lobbyists. It is achieved unnoticed, usually to the detriment of public interest or 
common good.  
 
A lobbyist need not promise bribes nor pay a bribe; lobbyist influences situations, 
individuals or systems to make them favourably disposed towards the purpose of the 
lobbyist. Lobbying can occur through different means. One of the recognised forms of 
lobbying which is legally prohibited in USA is the “revolving door phenomenon.” 
Revolving door situations are said to occur when  “government officials leave office 
and join private firms that then bid on contracts from government agencies for which 
the officials formerly worked”(Rauch, 1997:113). In Japan, revolving door situations 
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known as amakudari (literally descent from heaven) are legally accepted (Rauch, 
1997:113). Another form of accepted lobbying is use of public relations consultants 
who plan media publicity to create or sustain a favourable public image of the client 
company. Such public relations exercises are widely accepted and not prohibited.  
 
Favouritism and Nepotism:  
Favouritism can be an after-effect of successful lobbying activity by an interested 
group or individual. Favouritism can also occur not necessarily as a result of 
lobbying, but on account of considerations of friendship, kinship, nationality, 
ethnicity, ideology or plain prejudice. Favouritism is said to occur when the decision-
maker decides in favour of specific group or individual interests by deviating from the 
established standards of decision-making. The rules are bent, the procedures are 
abandoned or the procedures are ostensibly followed with a premeditated decision in 
favour of a particular group or individual who would not otherwise have been the 
beneficiary by merit. Nepotism is a form of favouritism. Abueva (1966:534) defines 
nepotism as arising from “kinship claims” in certain cultures and is expanded to 
include “non-kin on the basis of other personal or partisan considerations” (Abueva, 
1966:534). Nye (1967:567) defines nepotism as: “bestowal of patronage by reason of 
ascriptive relationship rather than merit.” Nepotism, therefore, is a form of 
favouritism influenced by relationships between the concerned parties (example: 
Contracts given to a minister’s relative without inviting bids). 
 
Marketing Commissions as bribes: 
Some marketing commissions have been used as a sophisticated version of bribery 
(example: Lockheed). Such commissions are paid to either the direct beneficiaries or 
their middlemen. These payments are not declared in public and statutory 
documentation, nor are they mentioned in agreements available for public scrutiny. 
These payments are made either in cash or in the form of providing free goods, 
services or non-repayable loans or amounts paid into numbered bank accounts (in any 
of the tax havens). Bribes of this nature are labeled as marketing commissions or bear 
any nomenclature to hide the nature of payment. Lockheed Corporation made such 
payments from a “market contingency fund” as Lockheed called it. Lockheed used its 
“market contingency fund” to pay Saudi Arabian middlemen in order to win the deal 
to supply planes to Saudi Arabia (Sampson, 1977:198). Such commission payments 
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frequently occur in transactions involving sale of arms; sale of airplanes (example: 
Lockheed aircraft sales in Japan and Indonesia), both civil and military airplanes; 
construction tenders; and aid spending by donee country. Secrecy from the public eye 
and non-disclosure in statutory documentation are the key features of such bribes. For 
example in case of Lockheed’s aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia, three different contracts 
were discovered for the same transaction in course of investigations and obviously all 
three were not public documents (Noonan, 1984:659). 
 
Facilitating payments:  
Multinational companies while doing business in a foreign country encounter 
situations when they have to either pay a bribe or suffer business losses, property 
losses and even loss of human life due to non-payment. In those countries where 
political corruption is rampant at all levels, it becomes a part of a multinational 
corporation’s business agenda to take care of public officials. Payments have to be 
made at every stage of business conduct right from securing permissions to do 
business in that country to everyday functions dealing with various administrative 
departments who can interpret laws, rules and regulations in ways that harass the 
company. Usually petty officials will find fault with day-to-day rules ranging from 
hygiene, employee welfare, working conditions, export/import documentation and 
packaging, to bank permits for repatriation of profits to anything that can be done to 
hinder smooth business operations. These situations are typically called rent-seeking 
behaviour (Bhagwati, 1982; Bardhan, 1997) and require multinational businesses to 
pay or else suffer time delays, losses and, at times, threat of closure of operations. 
These are situations in which the bribe-taker demands bribes by virtue of one’s 
position or public office and the bribe-giver has to give in as a matter of commercial 
prudence and practicality. For instance, in a country where the corrupt sub-systems 
operate (Ryan, 2000) as a part of one’s daily life an importing company may find it 
difficult to clear a simple import consignment through the customs department 
without paying the standard facilitating payment for clearance of documents 
(experience of the author in India). In a situation where the consignment to be cleared 
comprises of perishable produce or goods, the rent-seeking behaviour of petty 
officials in the customs department becomes more pronounced, predatory and 
extortionate. 
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Extortion:  
Payments made under necessity or grave compulsion need to be distinguished from 
the bribes explored above. If the bribe-taker is in the position to oppress and cause 
physical harm to the bribe-giver, the act should more appropriately be termed 
extortion. The bribe-receiver becomes a collector of bribes by virtue of his or her 
power to oppress, harm or injure. In such situations the moral responsibility is with 
the bribe collector or the extortionist and not the bribe-giver paying for peace and 
protection. This applies to companies as much as to individuals. Payment of 
protection money to organised extortionists (ranging from politicians, administrators 
to crime syndicates and terrorists) is not uncommon in many countries. It is similar in 
some ways to buying insurance to protect corporate property and lives of one’s 
employees as much as to ensure the survival of the business. Occurrence of extortion 
indicates serious political and administrative failure on part of the national 
administration.  
 
Corruption: Active vs. Passive:  
In any given corrupt transaction, either the bribe-giver initiates the corrupt act or the 
bribe-receiver initiates the process of corruption, or both participate as in a courtship 
process. During the corruption courtship between the bribe-giver and the bribe-
receiver, neither party spells out in clear terms one’s intentions, but both parties go 
through the motions of discussing and doing everything else without the bribe-
receiving party completing the transaction till the bribe exchanges hands. From a 
multinational manager’s perspective there could be two situations (active or passive) 
as in figure 2:  
a) When the manager initiates the process of corruption or the corruption courtship  
b) When the manager faces demands from a corrupt system, group or an individual  
Figure 2: Active and Passive Corruption (Source: Roy, 2001:23) 
   Bribe-giver is:                        Initiator           Compliant 
 
Bribe-receiver is:  Initiator 
 
 
                         Compliant 
 
 
Passive 
corruption 
 
Active 
Corruption 
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As an initiator of the corruption process, the manager’s role as a bribe-giver is pre- 
meditated and therefore it amounts to “active corruption” (Roy, 2001:23). Every 
business manager who initiates the process of corruption, be it bribery, lobbying, 
undisclosed gift-giving or offering facilitating payments without a demand, is 
involved in active corruption.  In those cases where the manager responds to the 
demands of a bribe-seeking system, or a group or an individual, the manager is a 
passive participant and is said to have involved in “passive corruption” (Roy 2001).  
 
This distinction between active and passive corruption clearly states and reveals the 
role chosen by the multinational business managers in a corruption-related situation. 
“Business has the power to uplift, business can also corrupt and damage” (Donaldson 
& Dunfee, 1999:25), therein lies the difference in the intent and role chosen by the 
decision-making manager. The distinction between active and passive corruption will 
help us re-define the meaning of corruption for a multinational business manager. 
This new definition is much wider than all the existing definitions and it takes into 
account the power of business to uplift and respect stakeholders or the choice of 
business to ignore stakeholders and inflict damage or destruction by corrupt acts.  
 
Redefining Corruption for the 21st Century Business Manager:  
Corruption from the perspective of today’s business managers can be redefined as: A 
phenomenon that involves illegal, immoral gratification in cash or kind in exchange 
for securing an unethical advantage over others in business and/or in society. The 
word ‘unethical advantage’ in the above definition refers to corrupt acts that lack 
justification from a stakeholder perspective. Corrupt business conduct has the 
potential to undermine human rights, democracy and sustainable development, 
amongst other stakeholder obligations. The explicit mention of human rights and 
sustainable development is essential to the core of all stakeholder commitments that 
any business operation has to honour in today’s global society. It is the core social 
clause in the contract between business and society which business has to honour 
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999).  
       
The corrupt advantages sought by multinationals over others in business and/or 
society can manifest itself in various forms, such as bribes paid to win commercial 
tenders and contracts, obtaining of promotional articles in return for paid 
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advertisements, bribes paid to escape legal obligations to more serious situations. 
These could include usage of political influence for passage of favourable legislation 
by governments, installation of favourable governments both civil and dictatorial, and 
result in wilful damage to means of livelihood, wilful damage to the environment, 
compromising on human right issues and issues linked to sustainable development.  
 
 Redefining corruption to include stakeholder issues will help us analyse inherent 
shortcomings of well-intended anti-corruption guidelines of the OECD as we shall see 
later in this thesis. It will also help us understand the concept of CRDM (Corruption-
related decision-making).  
 
CRDM or Corruption-related Decision-making:  
Corruption-related decision-making by a business manager is an orderly way of 
thinking through the moral implications of any decision in the realm of corruption and 
bribery. Corruption-related decision-making or CRDM is a new concept in strategic 
management thought whose purpose is to consciously protect stakeholder issues 
during decision-making in corruption-related situations and not jeopardise stakeholder 
issues ranging from fundamental or universal human rights, to sustainable 
development. Conduct of business cannot and should not lead to outcomes of human 
suffering, degradation of the environment, loss of means of livelihood or any such 
outcome that will mean a legacy of pain and regret for us and our future generations.  
 
Although, it is said that the business of doing business is business and sustained profit 
outcomes are essential for the continued survival of business, its very existence is also 
dependent on the continued goodwill and acceptance of business operations by 
society. Business cannot and does not operate in an isolated sphere, but within 
society. If society rejects the actions of business, sooner or later business will find it 
difficult to sustain profitability and survive. A good example of such a situation was 
the entry and demise of Enron in India discussed in chapter six. Corruption-related 
decision-making thus comes under the domain of business ethics and corporate 
strategy, both long-term and short-term, and it is concerned with the continued 
success of a corporation.      
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CRDM and Ethical Decision-making:  
Corruption-related decision-making differs from ethical decision-making by 
addressing the ethical dilemmas in corruption-related situations between economic 
objectives, the business environment and stakeholder issues. The general process of 
ethical decision-making is concerned with the concept of right and wrong. However, 
in a corruption-related situation (such as paying a bribe to secure a business contract) 
when the company’s economic interests are in question,  one’s decision about whether 
to take part in a corrupt act or not, is usually evaluated in terms of the economic 
impact on the company and not in terms of what is right and wrong. For instance, 
CEOs in India acknowledged in 1993 that their companies constantly engaged in 
bribery and payoffs and they justified their actions on grounds of  “extortion” (by the 
Indian government officials) as they were “forced to bribe” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1999:226). Thus, these business managers did not see it as a matter of right or wrong 
but as a matter of their business environment that forces them to pay a bribe or take 
part in corruption. This argument was also offered in the infamous Lockheed case and 
by 500 US companies who confessed to overseas bribery (under amnesty) before the 
US Senate during the seventies (Jacoby et al., 1977). 
 
In those cases where a company possesses an ethical frame of mind and refrains from 
a corrupt act once or twice or on numerous occasions because it is ethically wrong to 
do so, but as a consequence loses business and suffers the economic impact of their 
honest policies, the decision-making managers in question may become bitter and 
disgruntled. Later, they may get tempted by the business environment around them 
and start participating in corrupt acts because every one else is doing it and they have 
to do it to survive (this is a timeless argument noticed in literature dealing with 
bribery scandals eg: Sampson, 1977; Jacoby et. Al, 1977; McClean & Elkind, 2003). 
This was also observed in the survey of multinational companies at Mumbai, India 
(discussed in Chapter seven). Thus, in order to achieve the economic objectives, the 
very same company may enter into corrupt transactions with the justification that 
other companies are doing it or it is the norm of doing business in country ‘x’ or 
country ‘y’. It is in such cases where the companies are ethically pre-disposed but 
suffer from a dilemma between ethics and economic gains that CRDM takes over and 
provides the decision-maker an opportunity to check whether a corrupt act on part of 
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the decision-maker has the potential to negatively impact human rights, 
environmental issues, sustainable development or any other stakeholder issue.  
 
If one establishes as a result of the CRDM process that the decision is going to 
adversely affect stakeholder issues then the company withdraws from such a situation. 
It is in such situations, when a company has withdrawn under the most difficult 
business conditions, the company will succeed in sending a message (both within and 
outside their organization) that the company will never do anything to jeopardize 
critical stakeholder rights as some things will never be done and should never be 
done.  As a result the company may suffer economic consequences but the company 
will have created a moral fabric within the organization, and displayed moral courage 
to its outside environment, thus communicating and setting an ethical standard where 
it did not exist. On the other hand, when there are no prospects of negative 
stakeholder consequences under the CRDM process in a particular corrupt 
transaction, if the company is forced to take part, then there will a sense of 
justification for the company’s participation.  
 
CRDM may also work in cases where a company did not possess an ethical company 
culture but has suffered from a public scandal and wants to recover its public image 
and status by changing its organizational culture. Adoption of a CRDM process will 
help in such a situation.   
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Chapter Two: Good governance and the CRDM process                            
 
 
Introduction:   
In the previous chapter, the concept of corruption was explored and redefined from 
the perspective of a decision-making manager. There is no doubt that corruption in 
general has the potential and ability to impact society in many ways (Mauro, 1997; 
Mauro, 1998; Gupta, Demello, Sharan 2001; Gupta, Davoodi & Tiongson, 2002; 
Leite & Weidmann, 2002; Tanzi, 1998). Corruption in business plays a hidden role in 
many corporate decisions either because of an external situation (bribe demands faced 
by the company) or an internal motivated organizational culture of success at all cost 
(example: Enron’s dealings). Therefore, while dealing with corruption-related 
situations managers need to enlarge the frame of reference of their “positional 
objectivity” (Sen, 2002) to include the serious possibility of stakeholder rejection and 
closure of business as a consequence of their corrupt acts. When stakeholders reject a 
company on ethical grounds, the company is likely to ethically fall in the eyes of 
society, losing “reputational capital” and may suffer serious consequences including 
closure of business (Sims, 2002). This is the decision-making challenge posed by 
corruption and corruption-related situations to all decision-making managers. The 
answer to such challenges is adoption of a CRDM process that demonstrates 
stakeholder commitment and protects one’s strategic interests. It is in this context that 
good governance is being discussed in this chapter vis-à-vis the current international 
laws dealing with corruption. Good governance in the area of corruption in business 
can be achieved by moving from a narrow legal compliance approach to ethical 
decision-making.   
 
What is Good Governance?  
 The term good governance, as part of both public sector (government) and corporate 
communication, is used to convey best practices adopted by an organisation in all its 
aspects of functioning. The term good governance is also being increasingly used to 
convey the concept of compliance with stakeholder issues by companies, but in 
practice it remains largely an exercise of compliance with the existing statutory 
requirements (Kaushik & Dutta, 2005:1). This is evident from the results of a survey 
carried out by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) and Economic Intelligence Unit 
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(EIU) in April 2004 to study the effect of compliance on performance of financial 
institutions. The survey findings reveal that financial institutions “equate effective 
corporate governance with meeting the demands of regulators and legislators” 
(Kaushik & Dutta, 2005:10). The adoption of a compliance approach with current law 
by institutions does not help them strategically pre-empt the negative impacts of their 
decisions (if any) on stakeholders, in areas that can prove to be critical to the 
continued success of an institution. One such area in corporate decision-making 
relates to transactions/ decisions where paying a bribe or entering into a corrupt act is 
an underlying act or an incidental act to secure a commercial transaction. Such 
decisions to pay a bribe or enter into a corrupt act are justified in the economic 
interest of the company, but such transactions/decisions may sometime have the 
potential to harm serious stakeholder interests in the areas of human rights or 
environment. Besides, pursuance of economic success through such activities or 
transactions is likely to create an organizational culture such as Enron’s. 
 
Sims (2002:174) observes that Enron collapsed as a result of decision processes that 
evolved from erosion of ethics within the company. The culture at Enron “ate away at 
the company’s ethical boundaries, allowing more and more questionable behaviour to 
slip through the cracks” (Sims, 2002:174).  Good governance therefore cannot be 
limited to satisfying statutory minimums and accounting standards, but needs to create 
an ethical framework of action and a company culture that goes beyond the minimum 
compliance approach. The idea is to achieve twin goals of stakeholder satisfaction and 
sustained growth of the company, especially when one is faced with decisions in the 
conduct of business where corruption and bribery seem necessary to secure economic 
success. The law is what society thinks are minimal standards of conduct and 
behaviour (Sims, 2002:22) but to achieve good governance one needs to extend one’s 
vision beyond the current business law dealing with corruption. This is so because 
new business laws come into existence as a result of financial scandals, ethical 
misdemeanours and corporate failures and usually as a matter of hindsight but not as a 
matter of foresight.  
 
Wharton legal studies Professor Philip Nichols believes that, “the most useful action a 
business can take is to really understand corruption, and to create and articulate a 
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general response to corruption before it encounters difficult situations.”21 Thus, 
corporate good governance has the scope to look beyond compliance of current law to 
discharge the responsibility of a corporate citizen towards the society in which it 
functions.  
 
Reed (2002:238) has explored the re-conceptualisation of current corporate 
governance models. He distinguishes between a shareholder governance model and 
stakeholder governance model and advocates responsibility towards “development of 
a nation” as an essential aspect of a new model of corporate governance, especially in 
developing countries. He argues that reform processes need to be reviewed in terms of 
the impact that they have on society.  
 
In case of corruption as a governance issue, the OECD in its set of ‘Principles for 
good Corporate Governance’, 1999 and ‘Revised Principles, 2004’22 has included the 
‘Protection of Stakeholder rights’ and the ‘Role of stakeholders in Corporate 
governance’ respectively (Kaushik & Dutta, 2005:20-21). However, the OECD 
Principles of good Corporate Governance, the OECD anti-bribery Convention, 1999,  
and other prominent anti-corruption conventions at the international level are not 
sufficient to ensure protection of stakeholders’ issues such as human rights and the 
environment in corruption-related situations (Appendix III provides a list of current 
international and regional legislation/ Conventions against corruption in business).   
 
Current International Law and Conventions against Corruption in Business  
Background: 
 Bribery and corruption in international business and its magnitude came to public 
limelight during the Lockheed investigations in 1975. During these investigations, 
senior Lockheed executives admitted that they had paid bribes in 41 countries out of 
the 70 countries where Lockheed sold its aircraft (Jacoby et al., 1977). Besides 
Lockheed, about 500 US companies came forward (under amnesty) admitting that 
bribes were paid by them to secure business overseas (Noonan, 1984). As a result of 
                                                 
 
21 http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/arti…accessed on 19/02/2003 
22 Non-binding on any country except that all OECD member countries have signed the set of 
principles.  
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these confessions under amnesty, the United States passed the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA), 1977 prohibiting US companies from paying bribes overseas. 
French and German companies could still pay bribes overseas to secure business and 
claim the bribes paid as legitimate tax-deductible business expenses. Thus, US 
companies bidding for business overseas business found themselves in a situation of 
competitive disadvantage (Jacoby et.al, 1977). In 1979, the United States attempted to 
table a convention at UN to declare bribery in international business as illegal, but the 
proposal was turned down by other member nations (Pieth, 1999) as “most trading 
partners did not endorse the US proposal to end tax deductibility and to impose legal 
sanction” (Lambsdorff, 1998:41).  
 
During the 1990’s there was a growing awareness about the negative impact of 
corruption on developing economies (Mauro, 1995; Mauro, 1997; Mauro, 1998; 
Klitgaard, 1988; Theobald, 1990). This was coupled with sustained efforts of NGOs 
such as the Transparency International (formed in 1995 by Peter Eigen, a former 
World Bank official who was appalled by corrupt use of aid funds by African rulers 
and business corporations during his posting in Africa). Accordingly, the issue of 
corruption and bribery in international business kept coming up on the agenda of the 
United Nations, World Bank, IMF23, OECD24, and a few other regional and 
international organisations. These organisations served as platforms for deliberation 
between nations, which resulted in the creation, and passing of some significant anti-
corruption conventions at regional and international level. 
 
Anti-corruption legislation: national and supra national  
The efficacy of new legislation in any democratic society is tested in the actual 
prosecution of cases. New legislation is then subject to review and amendment if it 
does not meet the aspirations intended in the piece of legislation. National level 
legislation is based on certain culture-specific and historical antecedents and this 
gives rise to domestic rules of prosecution. Anti-corruption legislation at the national 
level is subject to the same process and is enforced through domestic rules of 
prosecution. One of the major aims of such anti-corruption legislation at the national 
level is to prevent corruption and punish it where discovered. The jurisdiction of 
                                                 
23 International Monetary Fund  
24 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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national level anti-corruption legislation extends largely to domestic occurrences of 
corruption. However, in case of US companies, the US FCPA (Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 1977) applies to the overseas activities of US companies.  
 
Anti-corruption legislation at the supra national level is an expression of commitment 
between signatory nations to a path of eliminating corruption over a period of time 
through a variety of co-operative processes. The OECD Convention against Bribery is 
one such instrument, which to be effective, has sought (through the articles of the 
Convention) to achieve a “functional equivalency” of anti-corruption legislation 
between the articles of the OECD Convention and various national level legislation of 
signatory nations (Pieth, 1999). In practice, it has proved difficult to achieve 
functional equivalency because (i) domestic rules of prosecution differ between 
nations (ii) definitions of certain terms, including the term ‘offence’ in the OECD 
Convention and national level legislation differ (Pieth, 1999).   
 
National and Supra national legislation have to also deal with various groups interest 
and political lobbying. In particular supra national legislation faces substantial delays 
due to the entire consultative nature of the process between nations. Pieth (1999:9) 
observes that international anti-corruption legislation is intended to motivate 
corporations to change their attitude more than prosecute them criminally. This 
appears to be a significant deviation at the supra national level as opposed to the usual 
intent of anti-corruption legislation at a national level.   
 
Regional Anti-corruption Conventions  
Anti-corruption efforts in the form of Conventions against corruption started as a   
regional effort with the OAS25 organising the first International Anti-Corruption 
Convention in 1996. The Convention26 came into force on March 6, 1997 with 31 
ratifications out of 32 member states. The Convention covered both sectors i.e. public 
and private, provided a wide interpretation of corruption offences, money laundering, 
recovery of assets. The agreement was of a regional nature, but its 28 articles covered, 
inter alia, transnational bribery (article 8), doing away with property, bank secrecy in 
course of investigation (article 15,16), domestic law in member nations to establish 
                                                 
25 Organisation of American States comprising of 32 member states 
26 www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58 accessed on 22/07/2005 
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criminal offences (article 7), and introduced many preventive measures to ensure 
good governance on part of the State, as regards its public officials such as 
whistleblower protection, declaration of assets in public office, public sector standards 
of conduct, government revenue collection and control systems. The Convention also 
denied tax deductibility of corruption-related expenditures incurred by business 
(article 3, clause 7). In its preamble, the Convention recognised the connection 
between corruption and organised crime (as in Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999 
discussed in chapter one) as well as the need to safeguard democracy, moral order and 
justice. However, it lacked specific standards of sanctions on businesses that were 
involved in transnational bribery and did not relate the impact of corruption in 
business to specific stakeholder issues such as human rights or issues of sustainable 
development. More regional anti-corruption conventions followed in Europe during 
the 1990s, namely Council of Europe (Criminal Convention), 199827 and Council of 
Europe (Civil Convention), 1999.28 The first convention comprises of 42 articles 
covering active bribery and passive bribery (articles 2,3,5,6) of both domestic and 
foreign public officials, bribery of judges and officials of international courts (article 
11), bribery of officials of international organisations, trading in influence (article 12), 
money laundering proceeds of corruption (article 13), protection of whistleblowers 
and the concept of private to private corruption (i.e. between two or more business 
entities or within a business entity) but this convention is yet to be ratified (as on 
August 2004) by 15 major member nations including France and Germany.  
 
The second convention with its 23 articles is the first anti-corruption convention 
dealing with civil law aspects of corruption on parties affected by it. The Convention 
provides for compensation for damage caused by corruption and responsibility of 
state for a public official’s corrupt behaviour (article 3, 4). The Convention also deals 
with limitation periods (article 7) and provides a broader definition of corruption. 
However, neither of these anti-corruption conventions specifically deals with 
situations of business corruption and its impact on human rights and issues of 
sustainable development (except that the Council of Europe (Civil Convention), 1999 
provides for compensation to be paid to affected parties). As on August 2004, this 
Convention has not been ratified by 17 member nations. 
                                                 
27 http://www.u4.no/themes/conventions/cocrimconvention.cfm accessed on 22/07/2005 
28 http://www.u4.no/themes/conventions/coecivilconvention.cfm accessed on 22/07/2005 
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 The most recent regional anti-corruption convention is the African Union Convention 
on preventing and Combating Corruption, 2003.29 It is an instrument of regional 
consensus dealing with prevention of corruption, criminalisation of corrupt acts and 
asset recovery process. The convention has 28 articles with provisions to deal with the 
region’s realities namely: fight against corruption and related offences in the public 
sector (article 7), illicit enrichment (article 8), minimum guarantees of a fair trial 
(article 14), extradition (article 15) and related issues such as international co-
operation for extradition, assets recovery (article 16 and 17) and the most significant 
being funding of political parties (article 10). This is the only anti-corruption 
convention dealing with corruption and funding of political parties. The Convention is 
yet to be ratified by the minimum number of African nations (15 signatories required) 
to bring the convention in force.          
 
The OECD Convention: Good Governance and Economic Development30 
The OECD Convention for Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, signed by 
34 nations came into effect on February 15, 1999. The 17 article Convention 
“criminalises active bribery of foreign public officials” and lays down guidelines for 
signatory nations to adopt and implement within their national legal infrastructure. 
These signatory nations control 70% of exports and 90% of foreign direct investment 
worldwide (Pieth, 1999). The objective of the OECD Convention is to reduce or 
eliminate bribery in international business conduct. The purpose is to achieve good 
governance, economic development and fair competitive conditions in international 
business. The preamble to the convention document states:  
          Bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business 
          including trade and investment, which raises serious moral and political  
          concerns, undermines good governance and economic development,  
         and distorts international competitive conditions. 
The preamble of the OECD convention has identified “good governance and 
economic development” as issues that are sought to be protected by the convention. 
Although these objectives provide a good general starting point for fighting 
corruption and bribery in international business, “good governance and economic 
                                                 
29 www.africa-union.org accessed on 18 September 2004 
30 http://www.oecd.org/document accessed on 22/07/05 
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development” do not by themselves ensure that human rights will be protected, nor 
that sustainable development (explicit goal of the United Nations) will be considered 
vis-à-vis economic development (mentioned in the preamble of the OECD 
Convention).  This further underscores the need to re-emphasise the role of corruption 
in undermining human rights and sustainable development in certain situations.  
 
 The seventeen article OECD Convention criminalises active bribery of foreign public 
officials and uses words such as ‘offer’, ‘attempt’ and ‘conspiracy’ in the first article 
of the convention to define the offence of active bribery but the Convention and its 
articles fail to cover passive bribery, private to private corruption31, compensation for 
parties affected by corruption, responsibility of state for corrupt behaviour of public 
officials, whistleblower protection, funding of political parties.  
 
 It appears that the OECD Convention has been reduced to a public relations exercise 
on part of the major trading nations without any impact on the corruption-related 
decision process in business. This is evident from the results of the first Bribe Payer’s 
Index (BPI), 2002 published by Transparency International after the OECD 
Convention came in force (see appendix I). The results indicate that the propensity 
towards overseas bribery has not gone down after the OECD Convention.  The BPI, 
2002 is based on a survey (the largest so far) of 835 business experts in 15 emerging 
market countries. They were asked: “In the business sectors, with which you are most 
familiar, please indicate how likely companies from the following countries (names of 
countries were listed) are to pay or offer bribes to win or retain business in this 
country?” The BPI 2002 indicates that companies from countries that are signatories 
to the OECD convention are not behind in bribery nor has the criminalisation of 
bribery been a deterrent to these companies or their executives. Companies from 
USA, Japan, France, Spain, Germany, Singapore and United Kingdom are involved in 
paying bribes. Companies from Russia, China, Taiwan and South Korea show the 
highest propensity of bribe payments in emerging market economies. Peter Eigen, 
Chairman of Transparency International remarked, “our new survey leaves no doubt 
that large numbers of multinational corporations from the richest nations are pursuing 
a criminal course to win contracts in leading emerging market economies of the 
                                                 
31 Private-to-private corruption has been defined in UNCAP, 2003 and refers to corruption within the 
private sector. 
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world.”32 The survey revealed that only 19% of the 835 respondents were aware of 
the OECD Convention criminalising bribery, implying that 81% of these business 
experts were not aware of its existence. However, even if a company were aware of 
the OECD Convention and intended to comply with the requirements of the OECD 
Convention it would be sufficient for a company to follow a decision-process as 
under: 
Figure 3: The Statutory Minimum Compliance Model or the OECD Compliance Model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If yes, then do not pay a bribe  
 
Hence, if a company were involved in any other form of bribery overseas then they 
would arguably have complied with the minimum requirements of the OECD 
Convention. Such a company can also escape prosecution in a maze of laws 
pertaining to jurisdiction and rules of evidence in most countries who are not 
signatories of the OECD Convention. As is evident from the above, such compliance 
if it is used as a measure for good governance by any corporation, would actually 
amount to weak governance. There will remain a scope for stakeholder dissatisfaction 
and unethical behaviour in situations of private-to-private corruption (Argandona, 
2003) or in situations of passive bribery (as discussed in chapter one). Generally, 
‘good governance’ in corruption-related situations cannot be mere compliance with 
the law; it also needs to consider stakeholder issues and the company’s strategic 
interest within the framework of corporate social responsibility.  
 
The UN Convention Against Corruption, 2003 (UNCAP)33 
This is the most significant anti-corruption convention by far, with the largest number 
of signatory nations and participant nations. The Convention has been signed by 111 
nations and is open for signing to all nations and regional economic organizations.  In 
                                                 
32  www.transparency.org…. ses_archive/2002 
33 www.un.org accessed on 22/07/2005 
Corporate 
decision on 
overseas bribe 
payment 
Is it active 
bribery of a 
foreign public 
official?  (offer, 
attempt, 
conspiracy) 
If not, then bribe 
could be paid  
 50
its preamble the Convention acknowledges that corruption is a threat to democracy, 
stability and security of societies, ethical values and justice. It recognizes the link 
between corruption and organized crimes and declares corruption as a global issue 
that requires a multi-disciplinary approach with international co-operation to prevent 
and control it.  The 71 article Convention provides an exhaustive coverage by far, of 
issues relevant to the public sector and public officials ranging from relevant 
definitions, jurisdictional issues, preventive anti-corruption policies and practices 
(article 5), preventive anti-corruption bodies (article 6), public sector (article 7), Code 
of Conduct for Public officials (article 8), public procurement and management of 
public finances (article 9), public reporting (article 10) to abuse of functions (article 
19), illicit enrichment (article 20), laundering of proceeds of crime (article 23), 
obstruction of justice (article 25), freezing, seizure and confiscation (article 31), 
protection of witnesses, experts, victims (article 32), whistleblower protection (article 
33), co-operation between nations (article 38), between law enforcement agencies 
(article 37), international co-operation (article 43), extradition (article 44), joint 
investigations (article 49), assets recovery process ( article 51, 52, 53, 54,55, 56) .  
 
From the perspective of corruption and bribery in the private sector this Convention 
provides an exhaustive coverage of provisions covering accounting, financial issues 
and governance issues (article 12), denying tax deductibility for bribes paid  (article 
12), bribery of national public officials (article 15), bribery of foreign public officials 
and officials of public international organizations (article 16), trading in influence 
(article 18), bribery within the private sector (article 21), embezzlement of property in 
the private sector (article 22), liability of legal persons and natural persons in charge 
of the legal persons (article 26).  
 
Like all previous anti-corruption conventions, this one too fails to explicitly mention 
the link between corruption (both in business and in public life) and human rights, 
although the preamble does make a passing reference to the issue of sustainable 
development. Articles 34 and 35 deal with the consequences of corruption (without 
any mention of the issue of human rights or sustainable development) and provide 
compensation for damage due to corruption. This seems to imply that human rights 
abuse victims can institute damage recovery proceedings against erring companies 
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and company executives, which can be of the highest strategic significance to a 
company. 
 
The Relevance of anti-corruption Conventions to business decision-making:  
These anti-corruption conventions and the exhaustive coverage of corruption-related 
issues within them are testimony to the incidence of corruption and bribery and the 
far-reaching consequences of corruption. Most of these conventions have provided 
frameworks to signatory nations to amend and adapt their local laws to the articles in 
these conventions. The prerogative to amend laws and bring them in tune with the 
conventions rests with the nation in question and many nations are still bogged down 
by the failings of their own legal system. Between individual nations, extradition 
agreements and jurisdictional issues need to be streamlined before the articles in these 
conventions acquire some teeth. 
 
  It is also worth noting that the two biggest emerging economies i.e. China and India 
are not signatories to the OECD Convention. While China has signed the UN 
Convention, India has not signed the UN Convention though it had sent a team to 
participate in the Convention. In that context, it is worthwhile to note that no regional 
anti-corruption convention has occurred in the continent of Asia.  
  
None of these existing conventions recognize the incidence of facilitating payments of 
small amounts, a reality of everyday life in many countries around the world. 
Therefore, from the perspective of a decision-making manager dealing with a 
corruption-related situation, there is still plenty of scope for a manager or a company 
to escape accountability in the maze of current anomalies in law and jurisdictional 
issues. From the perspective of a multinational company or a decision-maker one can 
adopt an ethical decision-making process or take advantage of the nascent stages of 
anti-corruption legislation. If one chooses the later, citing economic imperatives and 
ignoring stakeholder issues, then one obviously risks reputational capital and survival 
of the company as Enron and Shell did.  
 
Good governance is ethical decision-making  
Empirical research has not been undertaken to estimate the propensity of 
multinational companies to pay bribes that can lead to a compromise of human rights 
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issues, environmental issues, and endangerment of sustainable development and 
means of livelihood. The researcher’s task becomes difficult in conducting empirical 
studies of the decision-making process in corruption-related situations because of 
inherent difficulties in obtaining accurate data and operationalising it. Klitgaard 
(1988:ix) admits these difficulties in relation to any empirical corruption research 
when he writes, “data are scarce, and the literature is tentative and thin, with few 
theoretical frameworks, international comparisons or careful case studies.” Perry 
(1997) too mentions about similar difficulties in methodology. The only significant 
empirical studies that one can refer to are the annual indices of corruption and bribery 
published by Transparency International such as the Bribe Payers Index (BPI) and 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The BPI was first formulated and published by 
Transparency International in 1999. It ranks 19 leading exporting countries in terms 
of their propensity to pay bribes (See appendix I for the last published Bribe Payers 
Index) in course of doing business.  
 
 However, there are many cases in literature such as Enron and Shell that confirm the 
connection between corruption-related situations, decisions and human rights and 
environmental violations (discussed in Chapter six). Shell was the most profitable 
company on earth while Enron was a global success in the field of utilities but both 
failed in their stakeholder commitments (human rights and sustainable development 
issues) and later failed to do business in those parts of the world where they faced 
stakeholder rejection of their corrupt practice. In academic literature we may not 
come across such cases on a daily basis but the incidence of corruption in 
international business is not disputed as is evident from the media headlines 
summarized and emailed by Transparency International to members on its mailing list 
every working day of the week. 34  
 
 As Goodpaster (1991:270) writes, “mere compliance with law can be unduly limited 
and even unjust.”  Civil society and the law are struggling to cope with the role played 
by the omnipresent nexus of corrupt politicians, business and organized crime (Della 
Porta & Vannuci, 1999). “Corporations are not solely financial institutions; fiduciary 
obligations go beyond short-term profit and are in any case subject to moral criteria in 
                                                 
34 www.transparency.org 
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their execution” (Goodpaster, 1991:270). Global pluralism of ethics is not possible on 
all issues, but there are fundamental issues such as human rights that are critical to the 
very survival of civil society and in turn the long-term operation of any business 
enterprise. The law and fear of punishment by itself may not be the only way to 
ensure a corruption free business world. Accordingly the CRDM process ought to be 
considered a part of strategic management thought process empowering a review of a 
decision-maker’s persona in the decision-making process.  
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Chapter Three:  The Dynamics of Corruption and the need for an 
Ethical Decision-making model 
 
“Well designed instruments are needed, to make ethical intentions operational in real-life 
business relations” (Luijk Van Henk, 2000:3) 
 
 
Introduction:  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, good governance as a practice cannot occur 
without ethical decision-making in corruption-related situations and that in turn 
cannot occur without a review of oneself while making such decisions. This chapter 
examines the dynamics of corruption in business represented by the factors that 
influence decision-making in corruption-related situations, the position from which a 
decision-maker operates in such situations, and a decision-maker’s mental model in 
terms of the likely exchange and psychic utilities operating at the individual decision-
maker’s level. 
 
 The key to an effective internal review of a decision-maker’s persona is in disrupting 
the dynamics of corruption operating in business on oneself through ethical decision-
making. In order to do so, a contextual meaning has to be given to the decision 
process in terms of the company and its environment as well as the decision-maker’s 
responsibilities to society. Only then can we bring about a transition in a decision-
maker’s responses from a prudential and commercial individual to an individual of 
mixed motives to include prudential and commercial aspects accompanied with moral 
commitments and altruism. 
 
Factors in a corruption-related decision 
Roy & Singer (2004); Roy & Singer (2005) have argued that at an individual level 
powerful psychological factors come into operation, in any corruption-related context. 
Securing of a single contract or a bid may be crucial for a manager’s career 
advancement or the company’s performance (as indicated in the famous Lockheed 
testimony of Carl Kotchian). In such circumstances, decisions by individuals are often 
based on a narrowing perception akin to panic. The decision-maker is not likely to 
thoroughly consider all consequences, nor reflective or deliberative forms of 
rationality associated with ethics and ideals, in such situations. Whenever a manager 
is faced with the question of whether to participate in a corrupt transaction or not, the 
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decision-maker is likely to rely on economic rationality more than anything else as is 
evident from the following factors that operate in practical business situations:  
 
a) Fear of Loss of Business: During the Lockheed hearings in 1975, both Lockheed 
and its competitor, McDonnell Douglas conceded that each feared the other would be 
bribing to secure business (Sampson, 1977; Jacoby et. al, 1977).  This view also found 
support in the survey of multinational companies at Mumbai, India (discussed in 
chapter seven). 89% of the companies surveyed feared loss of business when solicited 
bribe was not paid by them. 63% of the companies surveyed, when asked whether 
they lost business when they did not pay a bribe, confirmed they had lost business. 
Another 22% confirmed that they lost business at times when they had not complied 
with bribe demands as against only 7% who said they had never lost business when 
they did not comply with bribe demands. In the same survey, it was revealed that the 
companies who had lost business due to non payment of bribes ended up paying 
bribes and did succumb to the rent-seeking system in India (Bhagwati, 1982; Bardhan, 
1997) in order to secure business.  
 
b) Personal Career advancement and Stock options: At Enron, the culture of 
‘success’ at all cost, inspired by Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay made Enron executives at 
all levels push ethical boundaries in pursuit of success (Sims, 2002; Prashad, 2002; 
McClean & Elkind, 2003; Swartz & Watkins, 2003). Enron executives had their eyes 
on stock options and career advancement as they took one corrupt decision after 
another (McClean & Elkind, 2003). For instance, Rebecca Mark was rewarded a 20 
million dollar bonus for her handling of the problems encountered with the Dabhol 
project in India (McClean & Elkind, 2003). Later, the stakeholder community at 
Dabhol accused Enron of corruption, bribery and human rights violations.35 Securing 
a contract or a bid or getting a project working may be very crucial for the survival of 
the decision-making executive. Professional realities faced by managers could range 
from fear of loss of business, non-achievement of company’s growth and return 
targets, non-performance at the stock market to personal loss of managerial 
performance incentives, career advancement and one’s job.   
                                                 
35 Human Rights Watch in their report against Enron’s Dabhol Power Corporation (CEO Rebecca 
Mark) accused the company of human rights violations in their 166 page report Accessed on May 28, 
2003 from http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/enron 7-0.html 
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c) Corporate Policy documents: Over 80% of the companies surveyed at Mumbai, 
India had a company policy to deal with corruption (discussed in Chapter seven). 
They referred to their company policy in corruption-related situations. In those cases 
where written company policy exists, the manager can refer to the policy documents 
to understand what course of action could be adopted within the policy framework. 
But corporate policy documents and codes are often crafted with public relations (PR) 
and legal defences in mind, so they tend to provide simplistic lists of ‘do nots’. This 
can prove to be unsatisfactory and impractical, as indicated in the following example: 
                         Company X is a fruit importer and distributor with a clearly worded corporate 
                        policy of ‘no bribes’. It opens up a new branch in country Y where customs 
                       officials always expect a facilitating payment to clear every consignment. The 
                       assigned manager learns that their consignments of fruit will not be cleared 
                       without a facilitating payment. The company has a clear choice of either 
                       permitting the fruit to rot and lose money, or to pay the customs officials. 
 
d) Feedback from local managers: Decision-making managers rely on feedback from 
local managers. Such feedback is usually based on fears and perceived threats to 
company’s operations, profitability or possible loss of business opportunities. 
Feedback from local managers could also be motivated by personal gains expected to 
be made by them through corrupt transactions entered on behalf of the company. 
Some of the Lockheed executives made personal gains out of slush funds that were 
created for the purpose of bribe payments to secure business (Sampson, 1977).     
 
e) One’s past experience with corruption: Decision-making managers who have first- 
hand experience of corruption may use past personal experiences or personal 
encounters with similar situations as a guideline to formulate a decision. Wartick and 
Wood (1998:143) have mentioned gullibility about local business conditions to 
ethnocentric expectations based on past experiences as factors influencing bribe 
payment decisions. 
 
 
 
Mental Models operating in an Individual  
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In each of the factors discussed above, the manager as an individual goes through a 
process of evaluating exchange utilities. That does not mean that psychic utilities are 
absent, but their presence is not acknowledged or pronounced. An analysis of both 
these utilities gives us an insight into why exchange utilities dominate or prevail in 
case of many individuals and a bribe is paid. At an individual level, the exchange and 
psychic utilities operating within one’s mind is depicted in an analytical model shown 
below with possible pros and cons in each case (see figure 4 below). 
Figure 4: An analytical mental model of a decision-maker 
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In the exchange utilities part of the model, the ‘accept mode’ shows a gain by paying 
a bribe to secure business in terms of net business benefits from the relevant corrupt 
deal, together with an increased likelihood of net benefits from future similar business 
deals (net of their expected bribe payments). Associated with securing a business deal 
are other benefits such as personal career advancement and stock options discussed 
earlier. Set against this (refer the minus signs) is the possibility of expected legal 
penalties and loss of reputation effects associated with possible discovery of the 
corrupt act or bribe. Again the perceived risks of such discovery are lower in 
countries where the entire public system is perceived as corrupt by the decision-
maker. If one adopts the ‘decline mode’, then one can expect long term financial 
benefits due to recognition by others as being ethical, benefits of strengthening one’s 
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will and enhancement of reputation but this may not be very appealing from a short-
term perspective for a decision-maker.  The ‘accept mode’ in an exchange utility 
analysis works to the immediate economic advantage of the decision-maker and 
perhaps due to that reason a decision-maker is tempted to undertake a corrupt act.                                      
 
Very rarely does a decision-maker consider the presence of psychic utilities in a 
corrupt act.  The lower half of the model depicts psychic utilities that are present. The 
‘accept mode’ shows the negative consequences of a corrupt act such as fear and 
anxiety of discovery, lowering of self-esteem and self-respect, weakening of will and 
the expectation of future character decline. These are present but go unnoticed due to 
the overshadowing presence of exchange utilities in the ‘accept mode’.  The ‘decline 
mode’ under psychic utilities is obvious in terms of the positive benefits to oneself, 
but again, exchange utilities are likely to prevail due to the immediate gain that is 
sought in real life business situations due to reasons discussed previously.    
 
Decision-makers operate from a position of Positional Objectivity 
Managers confronting demands for bribe payments are often under pressure of time 
and influenced by a negative psychological field or ambience. Economic 
considerations prevail as a combination of all the above factors. The decision-maker 
misses the non-economic objectives of one’s company (corporate social 
responsibility) because the decision-maker operates from a position-dependent 
objectivity as Sen (1993:126; 2002:465) has defined the concept. The observer 
(decision-making manager) cannot separate oneself from the object of observation 
(economic goals). “What we can observe depends on our position vis-à-vis the objects 
of observation” (Sen, 2002:465). Strong schemata (economic objectives and factors as 
discussed above) operate in the manager’s mind and are peculiar to the individual 
manager’s position as a decision-maker, thus influencing the process. Decisions are 
therefore made under fears of loss of business and opportunity, perceived corrupt 
activities of a competitor, motivated feedback from subordinates, personal career 
goals and fears, one’s negative experiences or expectations, implying coerced 
decision-making. These managerial decisions involving corruption and bribery are 
responses to a perceived situation, without questioning the perception itself.  
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The economic objectives of securing business etc have remained as the prime 
consideration in managerial decision-making even when legislation prohibits bribery. 
This is further evident in case of US multinationals such as Lockheed. The passage of 
the FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) in the nineteen seventies was expected to 
act as a major deterrent to prevent them from indulging in bribery and corruption 
overseas. Subsequent prosecutions under the FCPA reveal instances where US 
companies paid bribes and indulged in corrupt practices nevertheless. Some of these 
include names like Lockheed Corporation (now Lockheed Martin Corp), who are 
repeat offenders (Elliot, 1997:205). During the nineteen seventies, Lockheed’s corrupt 
practices overseas led to US Congressional investigations and passage of the FCPA 
(Noonan, 1984). Even after two decades the company had not altered its modes of 
securing overseas business. In 1995, Lockheed admitted to bribing an Egyptian 
official to secure business (Elliot, 1997:205). It would be almost impossible to assess 
the motives and justification of each defaulting company, but in almost all cases it 
would probably be revealed that decisions to break the law (the FCPA in this case) 
and risk severe penalties and loss of reputation were responses to managerial 
perceptions of business conditions and the presence of strong exchange utilities in a 
manager’s mind.  
 
Disrupting the dynamics of corruption 
It is safe to conclude from the aforesaid discussion that strong dynamics operate in 
favour of corruption in business. An individual decision-maker in business is expected 
to be a commercially prudent person. The constant exposure to corrupt situations in 
business is likely to transform such a commercially prudent individual into a person 
susceptible to greed. The first act of bribery may be difficult, but every subsequent act 
will become easier. Therefore, to achieve an ethical disposition, the existing dynamics 
of corruption have to be disrupted to ensure that a prudent, commercial person does 
not reach the point of becoming a greed-motivated company executive as it happened 
to many executives at Enron (McClean & Elkind, 2003). This is one of the most 
compelling reasons why a review of one’s internal persona has to be motivated to 
disrupt the dynamics at an individual level.  
 
Furthermore, it would be all the more desirable if the commercially, prudent decision-
making manager can be converted to an individual who not only remains 
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commercially prudent but also incorporates motives that include moral commitments 
to society and oneself.  This can only be done by introducing a logical decision-
making process to deal with corruption-related situations in order to comprehend the 
“moral implications of a policy decision” (Goodpaster, 1984:3) and to work out “a 
perspective and a language for appraising the alternatives available from an ethical 
point of view” (Goodpaster, 1984:3). It is also essential that stakeholder issues are 
considered as paramount in corruption-related situations. This is more so because, it is 
often whilst we are surrounded by information that we seem to lack an ability to 
explain to ourselves, or to others, why a particular action should be chosen (Zeleny, 
2004). In international business dealings in particular, information about regulations 
and procedures is readily available; but the practical know-how that enables 
appropriate decision-making and conduct in delicate situations (stakeholder context) 
is much harder to acquire. The law by itself cannot provide ethical guidance nor can 
good governance be a reality without an ethical disposition as discussed in the 
previous chapter.   
 
At the individual manager’s level, the CRDM process intends to create an ethical 
disposition with the objective of leading an individual decision-maker to the point of 
transition 2 as shown in figure 5 below.  
Figure 5: Transition in Rationalities of Managers 
 
 
 
This can be achieved by providing ethical guidance through a simple logical process 
keeping in mind the limitations faced by a decision-maker in corruption-related 
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situations. In the past, several methods have been proposed for providing ethical 
guidance to business managers within the various disciplines. Almost all have 
emphasised the need for multiple perspectives and principles, that is, some form of 
pluralism. In Strategy, for example, Hosmers’ (1991) ‘multiple analysis’ prescribes 
economic, legal and moral forms of reasoning in order to “make the right, proper or 
just decision more readily apparent.” Other inquiry-based techniques have been based 
upon plural rationalities and meta-rational arguments that link strategy with ethics 
(Robertson & Crittenden, 2003; Singer, 1994). In Business Ethics literature, 
Goodpaster (1984) set out some “steps towards ethical analysis in management”, 
which include “understanding all the facts”, identifying the moral issues and 
attempting to design a way forward that satisfies both strategic and ethical 
imperatives, through the exercise of moral imagination (Werhane, 2002). Also within 
the ‘Systems and Management-Science’ traditions, other multi-perspective and 
synergy seeking approaches to decision-making have been developed by Ackoff 
(1981); Mason and Mitroff (1981) and Linstone (1984) to mention a few. At the level 
of corporate policy and practice, the use of a multiple perspective approach has helped 
many companies adopt codes of ethics and generalised decision-making guides 
(Gordon and Miyake, 2001). Examples include the ‘ethical decision making checklist’ 
at McDonnell Douglas Corporation (Murphy, 1988:913) and the Principled Reasoning 
Approach at Levi-Strauss (Paine and Katz, 1994). Therefore, an easy to use decision-
making model relevant to corruption-related situations and its contextual peculiarities 
needs to be developed on similar lines. This will give decision-makers a fair 
opportunity to evaluate the consequences of their actions/ decisions within a short 
span of time while taking into account important stakeholder issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four:  The Theoretical context of the CRDM Model 
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Introduction:  
Understanding the decision-making context in which a multinational business 
manager operates is critical to the application of any ethical decision-making model. 
When a multinational company enters a new country and faces decision-making 
dilemmas, a debate usually ensues as to whether home country morals and standards 
are to be applied or host country morals and standards are to be adopted in its business 
conduct. Jonson (1997: 172-177) strongly argues that corruption should be evaluated 
in terms of consequentialism, whereas Bowie (1999:19-25) considers all business 
actions in terms of Kantian deontology. This debate between application of home or 
host country morals and standards has been discussed extensively in the works of De 
George (1990); Bowie (1999) and Donaldson & Dunfee, (1999). It is essentially a 
debate between consequentialism or utilitarian ethics and Kantian deontology. 
Whatever view one subscribes to in theory, a practical response is essential in the 
context of corruption-related decision-making. Therefore, a response is formulated in 
this chapter by using Integrative Social Contracts Theory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1999) with a detailed discussion of stakeholder issues such as human rights and 
sustainable development, in the context of multinational business decisions. The 
relevance of the principle of ‘double effect’ is explored in the context of corruption-
related decision-making. The discussion in this chapter provides the theoretical 
grounding for a CRDM model (corruption-related decision-making) proposed in the 
next chapter that can implement ethical decision-making. 
 
The Context of Multinational Business Decisions  
 Irrespective of the arguments provided by a universalist or a relativist, there is no 
denial that multinational business policy and operational decisions can have a 
profound impact on the commercial as well as social outcomes in host countries and 
the home country. When Lockheed Corporation chose to pay bribes through 
middlemen to Japanese government officials, senior Lockheed executives could have 
hardly imagined that Prime Minister Tanaka’s government in Japan would be brought 
down by the Lockheed bribery scandal. Carl Kotchian could never have imagined that 
his company’s actions (and his own) would change the way American companies 
would be required to do business in later years as a result of the passage of Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The aftermath of Lockheed’s bribery scandal is not 
confined to the passage of FCPA legislation in United States or the fall of Prime 
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Minister Tanaka’s government in Japan; it acted as a major catalyst for anti-
corruption efforts by the US since then and this in turn led to numerous international 
efforts during the past three decades.  
 
 The Lockheed investigations proved that irrespective of the nomenclature applied, 
payments made by Lockheed in the USA, Japan, Holland, Indonesia or Italy were 
considered as bribes in those countries. Such basic ethics are common across all 
nations and cultures (Donaldson, 1989), irrespective of the arguments offered. 
However there are exceptions, for instance in the same Lockheed case, Adnan 
Khassogi was questioned by US authorities, but not prosecuted by either party (US or 
Saudi Arabia) because payments to Khassogi were within the accepted norm in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A universalist would find moral fault with the situation 
where Khassogi was not prosecuted, while Prime Minister Tanaka was jailed. 
Universalists would make no exception to what is called bribery and punishment for 
it, while relativists may find exceptions based on diversity of cultures and norms of 
acceptance.  
 
Donaldson & Dunfee (1999:49) feel that these disagreements between universalists 
and relativists have created highly complex positions in “the practical realms of 
foreign policy and business practice” and this in turn can lead to confused decision-
making. Multinational business managers are, therefore, either confused by or forced 
to take shelter under these practical realms of business practice. While doing business 
overseas, corruption is one such complex issue that can raise all sorts of exceptions 
from relativists against universalists and add to the confusion. Donaldson and Dunfee 
(1999) have attempted to reach a common ground of understanding between the 
demands of universalists and the objections of relativists through their Integrative 
Social Contracts Theory (ISCT). Donaldson and Dundee (1999:49) explain, 
               ISCT avoids the extremes of either position by recognising  
                the dynamic relationships among the authentic ethical norms 
                of diverse communities, bounded in turn by universal 
                principles …. called hypernorms”  
The essence of ISCT thinking is depicted in appendix IV. At the core of ISCT lies 
“hypernorms” which form the basic global ethics of interaction. Donaldson & Dunfee 
(1999:50-52) define hypernorms as moral concepts that are “sufficiently fundamental 
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to serve as a source of evaluation and criticism of community generated norms.” 
According to the authors, hypernorms that are fundamental to the concepts of “right 
and the good” are substantive hypernorms whose source lies in convergence of 
human experience and intellectual thought.  A sample hypernorm that the authors 
have discussed in their work is “respect for human dignity” emerging from the 
convergence of human experience and intellectual thought. This norm is so basic and 
fundamental that it can serve as a source of evaluation and criticism of any other 
community norm that is not compatible with respect for human dignity. Using this 
hypernorm in a corporate decision-making process will solve dilemmas in 
corruption-related situations. If some corporate decision (even if it is based on 
community generated norm) is likely to undermine the hypernorm of “respect for 
human dignity” then obviously it is incompatible and should not be executed. 
 
The authors also believe that society operates on some basic norms which are 
universally recognisable as such, and whose presence is always assumed in the 
background of any contractual relationship or interaction. Basic norms help build up 
some other norms, which are not as universal as basic norms but are accepted as 
consistent norms by a vast majority of people. These are called “consistent norms” as 
they are substantially consistent with hypernorms. Norms in some cultures, which are 
mildly conflicting with hypernorms but are not totally inconsistent with hypernorms, 
form the “moral free space.” These norms, according to Donaldson & Dunfee 
(1999:222), “express unique, but strongly held, cultural beliefs” and allow room for 
relativists to address exceptions but “moral free space, in turn, implies the need to 
precede judgment with an attempt to understand” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:231).  
 
Norms that are substantially or completely incompatible with hypernorms are called 
illegitimate norms. Donaldson & Dunfee (1999:222) call them “values and practices 
(that) reach a point where they transgress permissible limits.” These illegitimate 
norms need to be rejected completely by both universalists and relativists.  Moral free 
space offers a balanced view in cases where the act cannot be called an illegitimate 
norm and rejected but can be considered in a context-specific circumstance using 
judgment and an attempt to understand. This thought process is incorporated in the 
proposed decision-making model in the next chapter in the context of passive 
corruption, especially with regard to facilitating payments and corrupt transactions 
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that do not go against hypernorms such as human rights (respect for human dignity) or 
issues of sustainable development.   
 
ISCT has tremendous practical relevance for multinational businesses, which face 
confusing stakeholder claims from universalists and relativists, while addressing 
ethical issues such as corruption.  Donaldson (1989) believes that some basic ethics 
are common across all nations and all cultures and can be termed global ethics. 
Wartick and Wood (1998:143) maintain that “it is not possible to take an ethically 
neutral stance in the arena of international business.” Elliot (1997:175) calls 
corruption a prominent “global issue,” and global issues are the concern of any 
multinational corporation that intends to ensure success and acceptance by its 
stakeholders. The success of any multinational business, irrespective of the nation and 
the culture it functions within, depends on its stakeholders and how the company 
relates to them.  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility of Multinationals 
The concepts of corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory are well 
established in management literature (Freeman, 1984; Goodpaster, 1984; Goodpaster, 
1991; Evan & Freeman, 1993; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1999). Stakeholders, according to Freeman (1984:24), include any “group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the corporation.” A multinational 
company’s stakeholders come from a diverse number of nations and cultures. These 
stakeholders are groups and individuals who benefit from or are harmed by, and 
whose rights are violated or respected by, corporate actions (Freeman, 1984). 
Whenever a multinational executes a decision involving any activity of corruption or 
bribery, whether directly or indirectly, whether onshore or offshore, unknown 
stakeholders whose presence has never been ascertained earlier can be affected. 
Therein is the decision-making challenge for a manager. For the purpose of 
stakeholder assessment, the stakeholder environment is thus the entire societal 
environment and structure within which every organisation functions as a part of a 
global social system, constantly in a process of being able to influence and be 
influenced.  
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No company, whether big or small, can argue that it is self-made or self-created and is 
therefore oblivious to its surroundings. Realism and humility demand that business 
managers controlling any corporation recognise that they as individuals and the 
company that they work for as an artificial juridical instrument in their control draw 
on resources from society and the social systems within which they function and 
intend to thrive. A corporation as a distinct economic entity has the good fortune to 
draw from society’s existing reservoir of knowledge, human resources and material 
resources created concurrently, and in the past, representing the toil of past 
generations and our heritage. Knowledge is incremental and subject to correction over 
time. It is, therefore, obligatory for a corporation and its control mechanism---
business managers to give back and enrich the same reservoir of knowledge, human 
and material resources they are drawing from, and to leave behind for future 
generations not a sad legacy of regret and pain but a substantial legacy for betterment 
and enrichment of humankind---both economic and spiritual.  
 
In this sense, Freeman’s (1984) classical definition of a stakeholder is extended, in 
this thesis, to include all “those individuals, groups or nations of future generations of 
humankind that would be affected (i.e. harmed or whose rights violated) by the 
corporate actions in current times.” Thus, our future generations too are stakeholders 
in a practical sense of the term.  Therefore every corruption-related decision needs to 
be ascertained in terms of not only present day stakeholders but also future 
stakeholders. Correct and adequate stakeholder assessment in corruption-related 
decision-making will help a decision-making manager honour human rights and 
issues of the environment and sustainable development. 
 
Wartick and Wood (1998) recommend scanning the environment, understanding and 
addressing the stakeholders’ issues and concerns, and managing emerging issues and 
trends as steps that managers can take to evaluate an issue concerning corporate social 
responsibility in hand. Multinational corporations derive their right to function in any 
society from the society in which they function. Wartick and Wood (1998:72) explain 
that a corporation’s right to function in a society is based on the principle of 
legitimacy with reciprocal responsibility, thus:  
          Economic activity, however it is organised, requires some exercise of power  
           over materials, natural resources, and people. It is this power that is at issue in 
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          questions of legitimacy. Do businesses have a right to exercise power over those 
          resources they require? If so, they have social legitimacy. But the right to exercise  
          power is matched by a reciprocal responsibility to use the power in appropriate, 
          socially sanctioned ways and not to use it in unapproved ways. 
 
Multinational corporations draw sanction for their global operations from the global 
society and not from the home country alone. If they intend to maintain legitimacy of 
their global operations, they cannot choose anything other than universally acceptable 
ways of doing business or hypernorms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). Appropriate 
managerial discretion based on recognition of hypernorms is at the core of any 
decision-making process required to maintain operational legitimacy vis-à-vis the 
stakeholder. If corporations intend to preserve the legitimacy of their corporate 
operations, then engagement in any corrupt activity (the exception being payments 
made to extortionist in life and property threatening situations) needs to be evaluated 
against universal hypernorms. Multinational managers command substantial financial, 
material and political resources and it is their choices that influence outcomes for the 
global stakeholder. It all depends on their ability to make choices in every area of 
management function, be it economic, legal, social or ethical, which brings forth 
operational results for their companies and stakeholder outcomes. 
 
According to Wartick and Wood (1998:76) managerial discretion can be exercised by 
using “tools that allow managers and companies to put the principles of corporate 
social responsibility into action.” Corruption is an emerging global issue of major 
concern that forms a part of corporate social responsibility performance. Bribery is an 
issue that has “ringing significance for contemporary global business” (Donaldson & 
Dunfee, 1999:223). Ethics as a moral commitment to the well being of human society 
is already a recognised obligation on part of business towards society. Corruption and 
bribery are ethical issues and need to be expressed in broader terms than narrow 
commercial ones or as offshoots of inter-cultural differences, especially when they 
can affect human rights and sustainable development. Corruption and the incidence of 
corruption have evoked growing concern from the global stakeholder environment. 
Corruption is a systemic problem not merely confined to the act itself, the person 
committing it, or to a particular geographical location. Recognition of its global 
ramifications has increased international efforts in combating corruption during the 
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past two decades. Underlying this concerted global action is a simple fear that 
corruption maybe the single biggest “mother”36 source of all problems facing us now 
and in the future. Researchers at Transparency International have found a high 
correlation (0.75) between incidence of corruption and environmental degradation.37  
Corruption is also seen as playing an important role in the perpetuation of global 
problems, such as organised crime, diversion of public resources for private benefit 
and consequent undermining of poverty elimination objectives, military expansion 
and the arms race, undermining of civil governments by dictators (both civil and 
military), undermining the rule of civil law and by criminal forces, and criminalisation 
(infiltration by criminals and crime money) of political administrations, business 
corporations and all human institutions. Corruption originating from any corporation 
needs to be seen as an instrument that can violate basic hypernorms in the global 
context. A reminder that a corrupt act can violate basic hypernorms is incorporated in 
the corruption-related decision-making model in the next chapter. The model helps 
the decision-maker check whether consequences of a corrupt act can violate basic 
hypernorms such as human rights and sustainable development.   
 
Human Rights and Multinationals  
Corruption by its very nature of ‘private gain’ violates rights of other individuals, 
groups and nations. This aspect of ‘private gain’ results in general detriment, and 
many a time a corrupt act can violate basic human rights. Every corporation has to 
honour certain fundamental human rights common to all societies, and therefore, 
every act of corruption needs to be evaluated against basic human rights by a 
decision-making manager. The private gain of global corporations through a corrupt 
act can encroach upon certain basic rights of individuals, who under most 
circumstances cannot fight a global corporation.  When we refer to human rights that 
we seek to protect, we can use the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as a reference document. The UN Declaration of Human Rights is a global 
instrument ratified by a large number of nations and adopted by them in theory, and 
even amongst them human rights abuses occur. Also there are many other nations 
who have not adopted the instrument in theory nor practice, with laws and their 
                                                 
36 U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anann called it the mother source of most problems afflicting the 
world, while opening the 9th Anti-corruption Conference at Durban, S, Africa, 1999.  
37 Transparency International’s website: http://www.transparency.org, January, 2001. 
 69
enforcement contrary to the basic principles and articles of the UN instrument.   
However, for the purpose of this thesis, basic human rights as understood in business 
ethics literature are relied upon. Henry Shrue (1980:170) in Basic Rights: Subsistence, 
Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, has insisted that “no individuals or institutions, 
including corporations, may ignore the universal duty to avoid depriving persons of 
their basic rights.” Shrue (1980) has used some simple propositions to define a basic 
right. These propositions are: (i) everyone has a right to something. (ii) some other 
things are necessary for enjoying the first thing as a right, whatever the first right is 
and (iii) therefore, everyone also has rights to the other things that are necessary for 
enjoying the first thing as a right.  
 
Donaldson (1989:75), using Shrue’s propositions in conjunction with James Nickel’s 
work on human rights, has enlisted certain propositions to ascertain a ‘fundamental 
international right.’ The propositions are: (i) the right must protect something of very 
great importance. (ii) the right must be subject to substantial and recurrent threats (iii) 
the obligations or burdens imposed by the right must satisfy a fairness-affordability 
test. In applying the fairness-affordability test before classifying a right as such, 
Donaldson’s (1989: 81) explains: 
            fairness-affordability’ condition to mean that for a proposed right to 
            qualify as a genuine right, all moral agents must be able under ordinary 
            circumstances, to assume the various burdens and duties that fairly fall  
            upon them in honouring the right, and, further, that some “fair” arrange- 
            -ment exists for sharing the duties and costs among the various agents 
            who must honour the right.  
Based on the above three propositions, Donaldson (1989:81) has classified the 
following as ‘Fundamental International Rights’ (i) the right to freedom of physical 
movement (ii) the right to ownership of property (iii) the right to freedom from torture 
(iv) the right to a fair trial (v) the right to non-discriminatory treatment (freedom from 
discrimination on the basis of such characteristics as race or sex) (vi) the right to 
physical security (vii) the right to freedom of speech and association (viii) the right to 
minimal education (ix) the right to political participation (x) the right to subsistence. 
Donaldson (1989) states that this is a ‘minimal list’ and this is not to be construed as 
the only rights, ignoring the existence of legal rights and nation-specific moral rights.  
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In the context of international business operations and multinational corporations, the 
above list of fundamental rights can be used as a checklist by a decision-maker. Every 
time a corporate decision for use of corrupt means to gain a business advantage comes 
up for approval, the list of fundamental rights can serve as a checklist to ensure that 
none of these rights would be violated by the decision. This idea is incorporated in the 
decision-making model in the next chapter. Such an exercise will provide a permanent 
solution to any ostensible conflict of interests between the compelling circumstances 
of business vis-à-vis a stakeholder’s fundamental human rights.  
 
Sustainable Development and Multinationals:  
The World Commission on Environment and Development defined sustainable 
development as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.”38 For business it means conducting 
activities taking into account present and future impact on environmental and social 
issues. Some of the issues such as right to physical security, right to property and right 
to subsistence are intertwined with issues of sustainable development. Wartick and 
Wood (1998:17) have developed a “Corporate Social Performance Model” that can 
demonstrate the nature of relationship between corporate behaviour and outcomes of 
such behaviour, including social outcomes. If corporate behaviour outcomes meet 
social obligations, it is said to have honoured its stakeholder commitments under 
Wartick and Wood’s model.  If corporate behaviour (decisions) results in negative 
social outcomes, the corporation is said to have failed in its corporate social 
performance obligations and stakeholder commitment.  
 
Organisations can “implicitly and explicitly create their own external environment as 
much as respond to it” (Adler & Bird, 1989:265). The external environment for any 
multinational is the global business, economic, social and human environment. It is, 
therefore, in the “firm’s best interest by creating (rather than simply reacting to) a 
positive external environment” (Adler & Bird, 1989:265). The professional challenge, 
then, for any multinational manager lies in creating and defining a standard of action 
or a standard of decision-making that will ensure a positive external stakeholder 
environment. While dealing with corruption-related situations it is essential to find out 
                                                 
38 www.un.org  
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whether the payment of a bribe or entering into a corrupt transaction shall cause 
environmental harm or impact issues of sustainable development to the detriment of 
stakeholders, either directly or even remotely (incorporated in the decision-making 
model in the next chapter). If the decision-making manager or company finds that it 
will impact stakeholder interest negatively then they should withdraw from such a 
situation. This is the bare minimum standard of decision-making expected of a 
socially responsible company.  
 
The Overarching Principles in Business Conduct 
Responsible business decision-making is not limited to respect for core stakeholder 
issues such as human rights and issues of sustainable development but extends to 
certain “overarching principles” business has to invest in its entire decision-making 
process and conduct. It is based on the utilitarian role of business for society 
integrating along with it virtue ethics and the principles of rights, justice and care 
(Velasquez, 2002: 130-132). The utilitarian role of business entails that business 
produces goods and services efficiently and economically for the overall benefit of 
society. While doing so, business conduct has to respect the right of doing business 
given by society, by displaying responsible behaviour. All actions on part of business 
are expected to display fundamentally a “morally virtuous character” as opposed to a 
“morally vicious character” (Velsaquez, 2002: 139) in order to adhere to the 
principles of rights, justice and care.  Each of these moral considerations i.e. rights, 
justice, utility, care are inter-related and have to prevail in responsible business 
conduct.  The practical implementation of the aforesaid principles will be possible 
only when the organizational culture in a company is conducive to the above and the 
indvidual decision-maker has reached a certain stage of cognitive moral development.     
 
The Principle of Double effect 
Originally formulated within the just-war tradition of Political Science, the ‘principle 
of double effect’ (PDE) has recently been applied to a variety of international 
business problems on the basis that “even if business is conducted for a legitimate 
purpose and by legitimate means, harmful side effects will occur” (Bomann-Larsen 
and Wiggen, 2005:4).  The PDE applies to actions that have harmful side effects 
(HSE). According to the PDE an action with an HSE is not blameworthy, provided 
that five conditions hold: 
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 (i) the main ends and means are good, or neutral 
(ii) the HSE is not part of the ends, nor used to achieve the ends 
(iii) the intended good outweighs the harm of the HSE 
(iv) the HSE is unavoidable if the main good is to be achieved 
(v) the actor (manager) has taken steps to minimise the HSE. 
 
In the context of multinational business operations and corruption-related decision-
making the ‘principle of double effect’ finds practical application in certain situations 
where making a facilitating payment may be the only way out. However, while 
evaluating the five conditions, ethical judgement has to be exercised lest we end up 
with a case of paradoxical cause where the outcome is the opposite of the intention. 
The intention in applying the ‘principle of double effect’ is to secure an ethical 
outcome in a corruption related situation. This can be undermined if good judgement 
is not exercised during the whole evaluation and decision-making process but a 
compliance approach adopted instead (as discussed in the case of corporate 
governance in chapter 2), then we may end up with a situation of merely ticking of the 
five conditions without actually evaluating them in their true sense.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five:  The CRDM Model 
Introduction:  
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This chapter provides a simple, easy-to-use decision-making model for corruption-
related decision-making (CRDM) by business managers, based on the theoretical 
grounding discussed in the previous chapter. Any company that is conscious of its 
stakeholder obligations will ensure that it will not enter into any corrupt transaction or 
make a facilitating payment where the outcomes are likely to cause harm to human 
rights and sustainable development. The decision-making model is designed to help a 
manager conclude within a very short span of time: whether to participate or not in a 
transaction involving bribery and/or corruption. It is an attempt to provide a 
contextual meaning to one’s decision. The model provides an opportunity to assess 
the impact of one’s decisions on stakeholders. The model does not intend to subvert 
the rule of law nor permit corruption undertaken in circumstances that this model may 
appear to permit. The proposed CRDM model aims to make managers think more 
effectively from an ethical perspective and address stakeholder issues in practical 
terms such as human rights and sustainable development in corruption-related 
decisions.  In order to use the model effectively, it is assumed that a manager has an 
ethical disposition and a desire to protect critical stakeholders while making decisions.   
 
The CRDM Model (Corruption-related decision-making model) 
 
The concepts and principles discussed in the previous chapter can be readily built into 
a practical model-based guide or heuristic, so that managers need only refer to the 
model (in the same way that they often refer to codes) rather than acquire the relevant 
ethical knowledge in full detail. Such a model, its nature and purpose, is closely 
analogous to many strategy models, such as Porter’s (1980) Industrial Attractiveness 
Model and its deployment in the context of competitive strategy formulation. 
Working with a constructed model (or flowchart, or depiction of theoretical 
framework) simply alleviates the manager’s need to study the more arcane details and 
complexities of the underlying theory (e.g., Calori, 1999; Singer, 2003). Forms of 
corruption can each be linked to its possible impact and to prescribed courses of 
action, each of which can be readily justified and explicated, as required. Figure 6 
shows the proposed CRDM (corruption-related decision-making model).  
 
 
Figure 6: A CRDM (corruption-related decision-making) Model 
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    Corruption-related Decision 
             
                                            
Is it Active or Passive Corruption? 
                                                     
 
 Active Corruption (Offer)  Passive Corruption (Demand) 
 
       
      
 
           
 
 
 
 
Decision     NO             Type A- No   Type B –Yes*     Type A-No   Type B- Yes*     Yes* 
 
 
 
Key to Model: 
 
Active Corruption:  A situation where the decision-maker designs, insinuates, 
creates a condition to pay a bribe or initiates a corrupt act. The answer is always 
“NO”.  
 
Passive Corruption: A situation where the decision-maker had no intentions or plans 
but has been approached for a bribe or a corrupt act. The answer is subject to the 
options depicted on the right hand side of the model.  
 
Type A:  Payments or acts of corruption that will adversely affect “fundamental 
human rights, the environment or issues of sustainable development.” The UN’s 
Universal Declaration of human rights or the list of fundamental human rights enlisted 
by Donaldson (1989) can be used as a checklist to determine what rights might be 
violated. Like wise a checklist of issues concerning the environment and sustainable 
development can be made from www.un.org. Another checklist could be made, based 
on the concerns peculiar to the stakeholder community relevant to the company.  
  
Type B:  Payments or acts of corruption that will NOT adversely affect “fundamental 
human rights, the environment or issues of sustainable development.” 
 
Facilitating Payment:  These are payments demanded by a corrupt system or a 
corrupt person for dispensing one’s discretionary powers. This includes petty 
payments demanded by lower level functionaries in a public office. A facilitating 
payment has to be evaluated against criteria laid down under Type A and Type B 
payments. If it is classified as Type A then the answer is a ‘NO.’ If it is classifiable as 
Type B, the answer is a conditional ‘Yes.’   
 
Corrupt Transactions: This covers all transactions that are not monetary bribes but 
are demanded to dispense a function, favour or discretion as a matter of quid pro quo.  
 
Facilitating 
Payment? 
  
   Other 
Corrupt 
transactions  
Is it Extortion 
 75
Here again, classification under Type A or Type B will determine a ‘NO’ or ‘Yes’ 
response.  
 
Extortion: These are payments or actions undertaken under grave compulsion when 
the lives of company personnel are in danger. This can also include threats to 
company property and smooth functioning of business when the law proves incapable 
of providing protection.  
 
NO: The word, ‘NO’ indicates a No answer to any form of active corruption and 
payments of Type A.  
 
Yes∗:  Indicates a conditional ‘Yes’, which implies payments to be made if and only 
if payment is unavoidable under the circumstances, and is not a Type A payment but a 
Type B payment. The word ‘Yes’ also implies that stakeholder-conscious 
multinational corporations will support anti-bribery/corruption initiatives of NGO’s 
and International bodies. They will make sincere attempts to bring about systemic 
changes. This logic is similar to dealing with harmful side-effects under the ‘Principle 
of Double Effect’ (Bomann-Larsen & Wiggen, 2005). 
 
Applying the CRDM Model  
The above CRDM model takes the decision-maker through a logical decision-making 
process in a corruption-related situation within a very short span of time. To 
demonstrate its utility and the relevance of each individual component of the model, 
let us apply it to a hypothetical situation of an US multinational company setting up a 
new manufacturing and distribution facility in India. The company being a US 
company is already bound by the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977 to adopt a 
‘no bribery policy’, and its company executives are expected to be aware of their 
responsibilities under the FCPA. However, the company’s Indian consultants and 
advisers warn that bribery is a part of the Indian business scenario and there will be 
many situations when the company will be expected to pay or suffer consequences of 
non-payment of bribes. The US company decides to use the CRDM model in India 
since (i) both the CRDM model and the FCPA permit limited facilitating payments in 
certain situations so using the CRDM model will help them comply with the FCPA as 
well justify the context if at all any payments have to be made, and, (ii) the CRDM 
model also acts as a pointer to relevant stakeholder issues and deals with non-
monetary corrupt transactions.   
As the US company goes through the process of setting up business in India, the US 
company managers encounter corruption-related situations and deal with them by 
using the CRDM model (on p.71) as under: 
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a) Is it ‘active or passive’ corruption? 
  Whenever the US company managers encounter a corruption-related situation, they 
refer to the CRDM model and start by asking themselves, whether the situation under 
consideration amounts to a situation of active corruption or passive corruption? The 
word ‘active’ and ‘passive’ as defined in the key to the model. The response of active 
corruption is ruled out at all times as per the model so the US company managers will 
never design, insinuate, create a condition to pay a bribe or initiate a corrupt act as the 
company’s response under the CRDM model is a categorical ‘No’ because the model 
recommends a ‘No’ response on the left-hand side of the model under ‘active 
corruption’.  
 
If the managers come across a demand for a bribe or a corrupt act or in other words a 
situation of ‘passive corruption’, then the model recommends examining the options 
on the right-hand side of the model to find the answer or the response to be made. 
This discussion is extended in the following paragraphs to each of the other branches 
of the CRDM model under the head ‘passive corruption’ with actual scenarios and 
response using the model in each case. 
 
b) Active Corruption 
Suppose in the case being discussed, the US company applies for company 
registration with the Registrar of companies and company entrust the task of securing 
the registration to their Indian consultants. The consultants while submitting the 
application mentions that usual process time is anywhere between 1 to 3 months but it 
could be expedited by paying a standard bribe of US $ 250 equivalent. Applying the 
CRDM model in this situation, the US decision-making executive informs the 
consultants that no bribes will be paid by the company as a matter of policy. This 
action or decision is in keeping with the left-hand side of the CRDM model where the 
response is a ‘No’ to a situation of ‘active corruption.  
 
 
c) Passive Corruption (as facilitating payment- Type B)  
 In the same example, the company does not hear from the department for several 
months, despite a few polite reminders. The company instructs its Indian consultants 
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to personally follow-up the application. The consultants personally meet the 
concerned official dealing with the application who indicates that a payment in cash 
(equivalent to US $ 300) would be required to ensure an immediate approval. The 
same day, the concerned public official replies to the company’s previous 
correspondence apologizing for the delay with a note asking for certain documents to 
complete the process. This is a typical situation of rent-seeking behaviour on part of 
the concerned public official. However, it would be difficult to prove that it is rent-
seeking behaviour because ostensibly the public official has apologized for the 
delayed response and has provided a list of requirements to complete the process. But, 
in reality, the official responded only when the Indian consultant went to personally 
meet the official and when the official had the opportunity to spell out the bribe 
demand. The company now has the choice of making this ‘grease’ payment or waiting 
for the approval for another uncertain period or adopting a complaint process with the 
higher authorities. Using the CRDM model, the US decision-making executive 
classifies the demanded amount of US $ 300 equivalent as a passive payment 
(demand made through the consultant) and in the nature of a facilitating payment. The 
US company manager evaluates the facilitating payment against ‘type A’ criteria (as 
defined in the key to the model) and concludes that it does not affect issues such as 
human rights, environmental issues or sustainable development and is therefore a 
‘type B’ payment. Since it is a ‘type B’ payment the US company executive decides 
to make the payment and obtain the registration. 
  
d) Passive Corruption (Facilitating payment-Type A) 
After securing the company registration, amongst other applications, the US company 
seeks allotment of industrial land from one of the many ‘State Governments’39 of 
India. The allotment is made promptly at a concessional rate. The company then 
submits its project plans for approval with the appropriate departments and 
simultaneously seeks clearance from the ‘Pollution Control Board’ for its effluent 
treatment plant. The ‘Pollution Control Board’ engineers point out certain design 
flaws with the treatment plant but convey to the US company that they are willing to 
overlook these flaws and approve the plans without any modification if a certain sum 
of money is paid to them. Using the CRDM model, the US company manager 
                                                 
39 India has a federal structure with a national government at the Centre called the Central Government, 
with 27 provincial governments in charge of provinces known as ‘State governments.’   
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classifies the payment as ‘passive corruption’ and as a facilitating payment. However, 
while evaluating the nature of this facilitating payment against the criteria for a ‘Type 
A’ payment, it turns out to be a ‘Type A’ payment as an incorrectly designed effluent 
treatment plant is likely to have an adverse effect on the environment. Therefore, if 
the company makes this grease payment and proceeds to construct an effluent plant 
based on a faulty design then the company is will have knowingly and willfully 
damaged the environment (a critical stakeholder issue).  The CRDM model prohibits 
this kind of a facilitating payment with a ‘No’ prescription which the US company 
executive follows.  The company rectifies the design faults and secures approval on 
the basis of faultless designs without paying any bribe. 
 
e) Other Corrupt Transactions (Type A) 
The US company starts work on its project by fencing the allotted land. Immediately 
thereafter, local villagers stage protest outside the company property asking for justice 
and compensation from the company as the company has taken over their land. The 
local villagers allege that their land was their only means of livelihood and it was 
arbitrarily acquired by the local State government without proper compensation and 
given to the company. The company approaches the local State government to 
understand the nature of the protest by the villagers. The government officials dismiss 
the villagers’ claims as frivolous and instead offer police protection for protecting 
company property. The company asks for some time and makes independent enquires 
about the land acquisition process and the veracity of the allegations made by the 
protesting villagers. The company finds that there is substance in the allegation of the 
protestors and the land acquisition process is a ‘corrupt transaction’ on part of the 
State government done with a view to attract industrial investment into the State.  
 
Since the land transaction is corrupt, the US company managers in India deliberate 
and use the CRDM model to decide whether to (i) accept police protection given by 
government officials, and (ii) hold on to the land and start the construction work or 
(iii) withdraw from the project.  
 
Using the CRDM model, the transaction is classified as ‘passive corruption’ (as 
defined in the key to the model) and not being a financial transaction, it is classified 
as an ‘other corrupt transaction.’ It is further classified as a ‘Type A’ corrupt 
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transaction as the transaction has a negative impact on the human rights (right to 
livelihood based on UN Declaration of Human Rights) of the protesting villagers. 
Therefore, by using the CRDM model which provides ‘No’ as an answer, the US 
managers withdraw from the land.  
 
f) Other corrupt transaction (Type B) 
Not only does the US company withdraw from the land, but they also withdraw from 
the State where the land was allotted to them. The company is invited to set up its 
manufacturing facility by another State government in India. While making the land 
allotment, one senior state government official asks for employment placement for 
one of his sons with the company, making it obvious that the allotment of land will be 
done promptly only if the company is willing to consider this request. The US 
company manager uses the CRDM model and classifies this demand as ‘passive 
corruption’ and a ‘corrupt transaction’ that is not a ‘type A’ transaction but a ‘type B’ 
transaction.  The US manager agrees to this transaction.  
 
g) Extortion    
The US company starts construction work through some local contractors on the land 
allotted to them. After the work commences, local hoodlums approach the company 
asking for a ‘hafta’ (protection money payable weekly, bi-weekly or monthly) to 
ensure that there is no disruption to the construction work. The company refuses to 
pay them and lodges a complaint with the local police station seeking protection. The 
local police assure protection to the company with periodic visits to the construction 
site by police patrols. But within 15 days the company experiences delays and 
stoppage of work at the construction site due to the hoodlums. The company vehicles 
are stopped with obstacles on the road almost every day and company employees are 
assaulted as a matter of daily occurrence. The water supply tankers are obstructed and 
hijacked to other places as a result water does not reach the construction site. The 
hoodlums also threaten the construction site labour who leave the site and do not 
return and that results in stoppage of work. The company seeks police intervention 
which is inadequate and does not really solve the problems. The company is again 
approached by the hoodlums for a ‘hafta’ with an assurance that everything will be 
restored to normal if the company pays up. The US company managers find this 
situation extortionate and corrupt. They use the CRDM model and conclude that this 
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is a situation of ‘passive corruption’ and ‘extortion’ as per the right-hand side of the 
model. They decide to pay as they have to protect the lives of their company 
personnel and their property.    
 
The US company does have the option of abandoning the India venture completely 
and not paying anything or doing anything that is remotely corrupt. But is it the right 
step to take in the greater interest of global society? The argument is from the 
perspective of our global society and in this hypothetical case the host country society 
i.e. India. If the US company does withdraw from India then it will also have given up 
the opportunity to bring economic progress and all the multiplier effects that go with 
it (such as employment and education) into the world’s largest democracy which has a 
few hundred million people living in absolute poverty. Therefore, applying the 
CRDM model in this case not only helps the US company meet its obligations to its 
stakeholders, comply with the FCPA but play the role of an agent of progress i.e. both 
economic and moral (corruption is expected to reduce as employment, education and 
economic progress occurs). The US company at the same time can make monetary 
contributions to NGO’s fighting corruption and support anti-corruption initiatives in 
India as the model recommends. For every ‘Yes’ payment or action in the model is 
conditional upon extending support to anti-corruption efforts.  
 
Rationale for each component of the model 
The CRDM model and the rationale behind each component of the model can also be 
represented as a relationship between a scenario and its prescription, as in Figure  
Figure 7:  CRDM scenario and its prescription 
Scenario Prescription (action) 
Active Corruption (offer) Do not proceed 
Passive Corruption (demand) 
Type A 
Do not proceed 
Passive Corruption (demand) 
Type B 
Proceed conditionally40 
Extortion Proceed conditionally  
 
Specifically in the model, where active corruption is under consideration, that is 
initiation of a bribe by a multinational business manager, the prescription is ‘do not 
                                                 
40 Conditional as per the key to the CRDM model.    
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proceed’ (except in special cases that are outside the ambit of most business dealings, 
such as offering a bribe to liberate an oppressed victim of a corrupt regime). The 
ethics here is quite simple: that one should not tempt a public official, since this might 
activate a dynamic of corruption, where none existed before. Next, in passive 
corruption decisions where there is also a reasonable expectation of human rights 
violations consequent upon payment of the solicited bribe (i.e., Type A payments) or 
harm to sustainable development, the ethical prescription is again, ‘do-not proceed’, 
since one ought not to be instrumental in such violations.   
 
Type B payments are rather different. In these circumstances, solicited payments are 
conditionally endorsed (i.e. right hand side of model) provided that they are 
essentially unavoidable; that is, there is no known alternative way of securing the 
particular business deal. However the PDE-derived ‘condition’ for agreeing to 
solicited facilitating payments, is that the relevant business entity must at the same 
time be supporting ongoing activity aimed at promoting corruption reduction, human 
rights and environmental restoration. In those cases where the model appears to 
permit payments or acts such as Type B payments or acts, the payments are to be 
made or acts entered into, if and only if it is unavoidable, and it does not impact on 
stakeholder issues spelt out as Type A.  
 
What constitutes ‘unavoidable’ is a matter of ethical judgment. For instance, in a 
country where corruption is rampant and public sector employees are underpaid, 
facilitating payments demanded by lower level functionaries for performing their 
duties (rent-seeking behaviour) can be made in extreme cases where they are not Type 
A.  Likewise in similar situations, a lower level functionary may demand a job for his 
kin with the company in question or demand some favour from the company simply 
to perform a function. This, too, can be avoided as long and as far as it can be done, 
but there are times when it is practical to comply with such a demand to buy peace 
and save time if the demand is not going to impact any Type A issue. Although these 
Type B payments or acts can be strictly interpreted as corruption under the current 
international legislation in some countries in the world, the practical reality of social 
conditions in many countries around the world would place a company in compelling 
circumstances to make such facilitating payments or go through an expensive process 
of refusing to do so. This is similar to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that 
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permits facilitating payments in “limited” circumstances to foreign public officials for 
“routine governmental action.”41 Whatever the option chosen, it will provide a 
learning curve experience for a decision-maker to work out better options to deal in 
those countries and the CRDM model will still prevail as an ethical decision-making 
instrument and a guideline. The facilitating payments that the CRDM model appears 
to permit is not to be exercised without ethical judgment taking into account the facts 
and circumstances of each case for corruption is also contextual (Johnson, 1997).   
 
The justification for making contextual decisions is within the revised framework of 
‘Principle of Double Effect’ (PDE) or just war concept as applied to corporate 
activity. Harmful side-effects do occur in course of legitimate business activities but it 
is important that these are justifiable to relevant stakeholders (Bomann-Larsen & 
Wiggen, 2005:4) and in such cases active measures are to be taken to prevent or 
minimize the side-effects (Bomann-Larsen & Wiggen, 2005:4).  Such active measures 
can be in the form of consistent support to NGO’s such as Transparency International 
in their fight against global corruption. Porter & Kramer (2002:40) have mentioned 
such an example. They write that 26 US corporations along with 38 corporations from 
other countries have joined to support the work of Transparency International in its 
work to deter and disclose global corruption. According to Porter & Kramer 
(2002:41) this in turn helps create an environment that rewards fair competition and 
enhances productivity, which benefits citizens, and helps sponsoring companies gain 
improved access to markets.  The relevance of PDE as applied to the decision-making 
process is to make a decision-maker aware and responsible for side effects if they are 
likely to occur (Bomann-Larsen & Wiggen, 2005:6).  
 
When the above discussion is applied to the context of Type B facilitating payments 
or corrupt acts in the model it means that harmful side-effects are expected from Type 
B payments or acts as they are likely to re-enforce an existing corrupt system (a 
corrupt system is assumed to be existing as the company is not going to initiate a 
corrupt move nor comply with a Type A payment or corrupt act), but at the same time 
the company will actively assist in the international anti-corruption efforts and 
attempt to bring about systemic changes within the limitations that a company 
                                                 
41 www.fcpaenforcement.com 
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operates in. Ethical judgment at all stages has to be exercised for the CRDM model’s 
commitment to corporate social responsibility or any other justification such as PDE 
to be valid (see next section).    
  
In situations of extortion where the lives of company employees and property is in 
danger and ransom is demanded or protection money is demanded, the company can 
comply with the payment and work out ways and means to either quit the place or 
seek administrative protection as is practical under the circumstances. It is difficult to 
generalize response in such cases because it will depend on the peculiar circumstances 
of each case. However, it is possible to generally say that wherever law and order 
failure has taken place and as a result the company is a victim, the company should 
pay and work its way out to save its employees and property. There are no provisions 
in any of the anti-corruption or anti-bribery legislation in existence or under process 
that prohibits companies from paying extortionist and freeing one’s employees or 
property at risks.  In situations of extortion, it is a case of a nation’s administrative 
failure and breakdown of civil society, therefore the first priority for a company 
should be to resolve such situations simply by taking care of its employees and 
property.  
 
Resolving decision-making dilemmas with the Model  
In situations like the one mentioned in chapter three (fruit rotting on a dock 
example)42 a manager might be well advised to give in to solicited facilitating 
payments, as a matter of commercial prudence, or utilitarian expectations, or even as a 
matter of principle. The manager must consider, for example, the possibility that an 
initiator of a ‘facilitating payment’ might be in a condition of poverty, that the 
payment in question might have no expected adverse consequence for human rights, 
nor for the environment (indeed, rotting food can be an immediate hazard). On the 
other hand, many thoughtful managers may become uncomfortable making such 
payments, perhaps noting that they inevitably reinforce the dynamic of corruption in 
the wider society. However, disruption of corruption dynamics in any society is not 
going to take place in a day, simply because corruption is as ancient as our 
                                                 
42 On page number 56.  
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civilisations and beyond the scope of any one actor to bring about instant reforms. 
Forms of corruption and their impact vary essentially in a contextual manner.  
 
One way to bring about a disruption in the corruption dynamics is to bring about a 
transition in decision-makers from one of self-interest, both prudential and 
commercial to self-interest with moral commitments and altruism as proposed in 
chapter three. This can be brought about by shifting the position of a decision-making 
manager from one where the decision-maker views not only economic goals but also 
reflects on the harm that one’s corrupt action may cause to society. In the case of 
facilitating payments that are not expected to lead to human rights violations, or 
environmental damage, the main ‘side-effect’ of making the payment is a 
reinforcement of the dynamics of corruption in the societies involved. A typical 
passive facilitating payment in which there is no expectation of human rights violation 
or environmental harm, is the same fruit example. It also meets the first four of 
conditions of the PDE for: 
(i) the ‘main’ ends and means are offloading the fruit and getting it to market, which 
are indeed good 
(ii) the HSE (i.e., the strengthening of the dynamic of corruption) is certainly not part 
of the ends, nor is it used per se to achieve those ends 
(iii) by almost any reasonable estimate, the intended good (i.e. marketing the fruit) 
outweighs the HSE harm (which is an abstract and negligible increment in general 
corruption, in this case) 
(iv) the HSE is likely to be inescapable and unavoidable if the good is to be achieved: 
if you don’t pay the bribe, as a matter of fact, the fruit will rot (although there ought 
to be an effort to seek or design a feasible alternative) 
(v) the PDE can be met, simply by insisting on a programme of ongoing corporate 
support of anti-corruption initiatives by NGO’s and good governments, aimed at 
disrupting the dynamic of corruption. 
 
Communicating the CRDM model  
In a study of business codes of the largest two hundred multinational companies 
world-wide, only 52.5 % of the companies or 105 companies had a business code 
(Kaptein, 2004). Out of these 105 companies only 11% had a policy that covered 
respecting the human rights or dignity of those affected by the company’s activities 
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and promoting them where applicable. Only 2% of these company codes conveyed 
“setting an example in countries where human rights are seriously and systematically 
violated” (Kaptein, 2004:20). If this is the current state of affairs with existing codes 
of business conduct amongst the two hundred largest multinationals, then it implies 
that the CRDM model will have to be first adopted as a part of the standards of 
organisational conduct in order to make it work.  
 
Formal adoption of the CRDM as a part of an organisation’s codes and practices will 
start the process of communication, both within and outside the company, as to what 
standards the company intends to adhere to. In order to succeed, the promulgation of 
the CRDM model should involve senior management. They would have to be 
involved in communication of the model to operational managers within the 
organisation. Effective communication of ethical standards to one’s managers (Ferrell 
et. Al, 2002:189) is a crucial factor to the successful implementation of the CRDM 
model. Communication starts with provision of executive training to all levels of 
managers, but with strong presence of senior management laying down ethical 
procedures and a review process. It also involves consistent encouragement to all 
strata of managers to contribute in various ways to the corruption reduction effort 
such as (i) feedback from operational managers (ii) monitoring of ethical issues 
involved while dealing with corruption-related situations (iii) communicating the 
company’s intent and operational policies in corruption-related situations, and (iv) 
setting up of ethics committees who can offer guidance to individual operational 
executives when they face ethical dilemmas in corruption-related situations.    
 
By invoking the model in specific corruption-related situations managers can re-
enforce internally the broader point that the company’s words, intent and actions 
match, whilst also re-enforcing externally the company’s commitment to critical 
stakeholder issues. Overall, the CRDM model can assist in updating business codes 
and policies which create a more transparent system within a company to deal with 
the hidden world of corruption in the external business environment.  
 
Conclusion:   
The CRDM model and the process set out in this chapter is intended to operate at the 
level of a manager’s conceptual model and within the culture of business entities. 
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Decisions about bribes can then be more readily rejected or explained and justified 
with reference to a shared contemporary purpose: the use of knowledge to create 
wealth and reduce corruption. These two words “active and passive” used in the 
model define the decision-maker’s intent and signify the role consciously chosen. 
Ethical conflict in justification or rejection of any corrupt activity is eliminated by the 
usage of these two words. If one engages in “active corruption”, one can safely 
presume that ethical reasoning was not an ingredient in the decision-making process, 
ab initio. If one is involved in “passive corruption”, ethical reasoning still has a 
chance to perform its part. The decision-maker who engages in active corruption is 
not ethically conscious and does not give stakeholder issues a fair chance. Managers 
who belong to this “school of action” may find it difficult to adopt the decision-
making model. However, those who find it difficult to take corruption related-
decisions harbouring ethical conflicts in the process shall find the CRDM model very 
useful. Managers who encounter situations that encourage them to formulate active 
corruption but would like to avoid active corruption will find utility in this model as 
well. The above decision-making model has tremendous utility in decision-making 
and has the potential to be used as a quality control measure or a good practice 
document in an organization 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six: The Relevance of CRDM to Enron and Shell  
Businesses have ongoing operational tasks, which have clear human rights dimensions - 
Royal Dutch Shell in their company’s Human Rights training supplement43 
 
Introduction:   
                                                 
43 Source: http://sww.cc.shell.com/px/humanrights/ 2002 
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In the previous chapters, the concept of CRDM and a CRDM model was proposed 
with a view to empower managerial decision-making in corruption-related situations 
within the framework of corporate social responsibility. The proposed CRDM model 
provides decision-making managers with the scope to consciously protect human 
rights and issues of sustainable development during corruption-related decision-
making. These are moral minima of tremendous significance. In this chapter, the 
cases of Enron’s Dabhol power project in India and Shell’s operations in Nigeria are 
analysed. Both Enron and Shell faced allegations of corruption, bribery, accusations 
of human rights violations and environmental degradation. In both cases, the 
companies faced protest from stakeholders, stoppage of work, loss of money and 
opportunities and damage to their company image and goodwill. These two cases 
reiterate the importance and relevance of the CRDM model proposed in this thesis 
 
Shell learnt from its experience in Nigeria (the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa by the 
Nigerian military regime44) and later introduced compulsory human rights training 
programme for its executives recognising the interconnectedness between business 
decisions, human rights issues and the environment. The Shell case is considered as 
the quintessential case that placed the interconnectedness of business, the natural 
environment, and human rights on the corporate agenda (Wheeler, Fabig & Boele, 
2002:301). Enron was another high profile company that attracted stakeholder 
protests in India (human rights violations), Brazil (environmental damage) and many 
developing countries where it operated (Prashad, 2002). Unlike Shell, for Enron, the 
Dabhol experience (India) was a case of circumvention of stakeholder interest without 
any remorse. The company blatantly ignored stakeholder issues such as human rights 
(in India) and environment issues (in Brazil) consistent with a company culture that 
lacked honesty and an ability to introspect. Enron could never seek answers by 
introspection because of its prevalent corporate culture of serious financial 
manipulations that had made Enron the “most innovative company” for five years in a 
row (Swartz & Watkins, 2003:3), in the eyes of Wall Street and the investor 
community. Such a company was not likely to ever seek answers from within. And it 
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was the same inability to seek answers from within that led to the company’s 
voluntary bankruptcy45 in 2001.  
 
Likewise, we as a society post Enron fail to introspect on anything other than 
financial implications of Enron’s collapse in USA, ignoring serious stakeholder 
violations by Enron such as human rights and environment. Although there are no 
studies to draw a connection between a company’s propensity to cheat, lie and 
defraud in financial markets with the propensity to commit environmental damage 
and human rights abuses, it is worth considering that a company culture inherent with 
propensities to violate stakeholder issues such as human rights and issues of 
sustainable development will sooner or later commit fraud in financial markets. 
Logically this can be a thesis and a direction for empirical research to examine (post 
mortem) Enron type cases and the pattern of co-relation (if any) between the two 
propensities.  The underlying factor common to both propensities is financial greed 
aided by the manipulative hand of corruption and bribery.  
 
On the other hand there are some companies of repute who refrain from corrupt acts 
under the most difficult business conditions and have succeeded in communicating its 
commitment to ethical conduct both within and outside the organization. Texas 
Instruments from USA and the Tata Group of companies from India are discussed in 
this context at the end of the chapter.  
 
Background 
Shell and Enron faced stakeholder protests in Nigeria and India respectively in course 
of their operations. Both companies faced allegations of corruption, bribery and 
human rights abuse from the media and stakeholder groups. Human Rights Watch (an 
international NGO) accused Shell and Enron of human rights violations against their 
stakeholders after conducting investigations in Nigeria and India. Should this be 
interpreted as an opportunistic strategy on part of certain stakeholder groups and 
NGO’s to pressurise these multinational companies to concede to their demands or is 
there some substance in these accusations?  
 
                                                 
45 Enron filed the largest bankruptcy in US history, electronically at 2 p.m, Sunday, December 2, 2001 
(McClean & Elkind, 2003:405) 
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To understand this situation better, it is worth noting that there are no international 
laws that oblige a corporation to respect human rights46 but the United Nations 
Committee on Transnational corporations has developed a code of conduct that places 
a responsibility on companies to respect human rights.47 The reference to human 
rights in the said UN code requires companies to respect the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a moral minimum. The international community too 
supported the UN code at the World Economic Forum, Davos, 1989 by working out 
an acceptable code of behaviour for corporations. The code announced at the World 
Economic Forum, Davos was quantified in a survey carried out by the University of 
Notre Dame and Price Waterhouse Coopers.48 These two codes of conduct (UN and 
the World Economic forum) are not legally binding on corporations but they spell out 
the expectations of the global stakeholder community. The global stakeholder expects 
that security forces called in by a company in order to protect company assets and 
employees in situations of stakeholder demonstrations and protests shall not use 
unreasonable force.49 If the security forces use unreasonable means to control and 
quell stakeholder protests to a point that it encroaches upon a citizen’s fundamental 
rights (as enshrined in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights), then it shall 
be considered as an excess use of force. As a result the corporation will bear the 
responsibility for the actions of those security forces. Therefore, in situations when a 
company faces stakeholder protest (that may or may not turn violent) and the 
company calls for help from security forces to protect its property and lives of 
employees etc., the company in question becomes morally responsible for excesses (if 
any) committed by the security forces on the protestors. Some of the excesses 
committed on protesting stakeholders in India and Nigeria range from severe beatings, 
illegal detention, arbitrary arrests, bulldozing and burning their homes, indiscriminate 
shootings and killings. Human Rights Watch considers these incidents as human 
rights violations committed on behalf of the companies by the security forces. 
 
Besides the accusations of human rights violations, in both cases, the companies faced 
allegations of corruption and bribery in the media and from various stakeholder 
                                                 
46 Human Rights Watch in their report against the Dabhol Power Corporation discusses this aspect. 
Accessed on May 28, 2003 from http:// www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/enron7-0.html 
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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groups. These allegations find credence because the decisions and actions by the 
security forces, the political and administrative structures in both India and Nigeria 
appeared to consistently favour the interests of these two companies rather than 
demonstrate a balanced view. This will be apparent from the foregoing discussion of 
the actual events in both cases. 
 
Corporations with transnational and multinational operations can adversely affect 
stakeholder interests in many ways. However, the discussion in this chapter is limited 
to corruption-related situations where human rights and environmental issues are 
involved. Companies who subscribe to good stakeholder management practices adopt 
company policies supported by an organisational culture that responds to stakeholders 
with a commitment to ensure good stakeholder outcomes. While those companies 
who use the trappings of corporate social responsibility as a public relations device (in 
documents and media statements) usually possess an organisational culture of 
deception and avoidance of stakeholder issues. Good stakeholder outcomes are not 
possible in such cases. Thus, the acid test of successful CSR50 is based on the 
outcomes of a company’s decision-making policies (Wartick and Wood, 1998:17). 
Hypothetically, if the CRDM model was made available to the decision-making 
managers in these two cases, and assuming they possessed an ethical disposition, the 
use of the CRDM model in both cases (Shell and Enron) would have prevented the 
alleged occurrences of human rights abuse and environmental degradation. 
 
The Shell Example:  
Let us consider the example of Shell’s Nigerian operations in terms of the Wartick 
and Wood CSP51 model and the CRDM model proposed in this thesis. Royal Dutch 
Shell started its Nigerian operations in 1937 and struck oil in the Niger Delta in 1958 
(Hill, 1997: C90). The Niger Delta largely comprised of land belonging to the Ogoni 
tribe. Most of the Ogoni were farmers and fishermen dependent on land for their 
livelihood. Under Nigerian law all minerals or fossil fuels discovered by oil 
companies belonged to the government of Nigeria. Oil was discovered on land that 
belonged to the Ogoni. Wherever applicable (presence of oil deposits), the land was 
taken over by the government and handed over to the oil companies. The Government 
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of Nigeria became a partner with the oil companies by virtue of providing the land 
with oil deposits to the oil companies. The land compensation policy under the 
Nigerian law called Land Reform Act, 1978 provided compensation to the landholder 
(whose land was taken over for oil drilling purposes) to the extent of the monetary 
value of the crops standing on the land or any dwelling unit on the land but not for the 
actual value of land (Manby, 2000:5). This compensation law was grossly unfair. 
Thus, land was taken from the Ogoni with practically no compensation. Whatever 
land was left with the Ogoni for sustaining their means of livelihood as farmers and 
fishermen bore the brunt of Shell’s substandard environmental practices.  
 
The environmental costs of Shell’s oil production in the Ogoni region was largely 
borne by the Ogoni in terms of loss of their livelihood52 due to oil spillage, oil waste 
dumping and gas flaring. Between 1970 and 1982, 1,581 incidents of oil spillage were 
documented in Nigeria53 and largely attributed to Shell’s operations. This continued to 
occur as is documented in an independent record of Shell’s spills from 1982 to 1992 
amounting to 1,626,000 gallons from the company’s Nigerian operations in 27 
separate incidents. It is pertinent to note that out of the number of oil spills recorded 
from Shell, a company which operates in 100 countries, 40% was in Nigeria.” 54   
 
Shell’s Nigerian operations and concern for the environment were based on dual 
standards. Shell applied different standards in home country United Kingdom vis-à-
vis Nigeria. For example, “for Shell’s pipeline from Stanlow in Cheshire to 
Mossmoran in Scotland, 17 different environmental surveys were commissioned 
before a single turf was cut. A detailed Environmental Assessment Impact covered 
every measure of the (pipeline) route. Elaborate measures were taken to avoid lasting 
disfiguring and the route was diverted in several places to accommodate 
environmental concerns.”55 On the other hand the Ogoni had never seen, let alone be 
consulted over, an environmental impact assessment.56  Shell’s lackadaisical approach 
to environmental issues in Nigeria is substantiated by yet another example. “US 
environmental regulations completely prohibit the discharge of produced water or 
                                                 
52 A fundamental right as per UN Declaration of Universal Rights.  
53 http://www.american.edu/TED/OGONI.HTMP accessed on June 18, 2003  
54 http://www.american.edu/TED/OGONI.HTMP accessed on June 18, 2003  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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drilling mud from onshore facilities into surface-water bodies; produced water has to 
be re-injected for recovery or injected into disposal wells, while drilling mud has to be 
land filled” (Nwankwo and Irrechukwu, 1981). However in Nigeria, oil companies 
(Shell) often dispose of wastes from oil drilling directly into fresh-water bodies, or do 
not follow proper pollution-reducing techniques57 to the detriment of the land and the 
Ogoni people.  As a result of Shell’s operations in the Ogoni region, the tropical rain 
forest in the northern reaches of the Delta and the mangrove vegetation to the south 
have been seriously damaged (Hutchful, 1985).  
 
The company was also accused of engaging in “widespread ecological disturbances, 
including explosions from seismic surveys, pollution from pipeline leaks, blowouts, 
drilling fluids and refinery effluents, and land alienation and disruption of the natural 
terrain from construction of industry infrastructure and installations” (Hutchful, 
1985). Shell’s dual standards between home country and host country environmental 
practices are apparent from the aforesaid discussion. Moreover, Shell had neither time 
nor inclination to attend to oil spillage cases to the detriment of the Ogoni. In an oil 
spillage case that had occurred in 1960s at Ebubu, Shell had not attended to it even till 
1993 (Hill, 1997).   
 
Shell and the Ogoni:  
Although the Ogoni paid the ecological price for Shell’s oil production in Ogoni land, 
the Ogoni got practically nothing in return for the exploitation of their land and 
natural resources. Since 1958, the company had extracted about $ 30 billion of oil 
from the region (Hill, 1997: C 90). In 1990s, the Ogoni were about 500,000 people 
amongst a Nigerian population of 110 million (Hill, 1997:C89) with no political voice 
as an ethnic minority under a dictatorial military regime that controlled power in 
Nigeria. Out of Shell’s 5,000 employees only 85 were Ogoni (Hill, 1997: C90) and 
the community supposedly received 1.5% of the oil revenue from the government of 
Nigeria between 1982 and 1991 and from 1992 the government claimed to have 
raised it to 3% of the revenue (Hill, 1997:C90). However, the Ogoni claimed that they 
had seen no improvement in their region. They had access to one unfinished hospital 
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and some government schools, which were rarely open due to non-payment of 
teaching staff (Hill, 1997).   
 
Hutchful (1985) has described the plight of the Ogoni in these words “there is an 
almost total absence of schools, drinking water, electricity, medical care, and roads in 
many peasant communities.” In contrast, the company’s operations were 
predominantly on land in the Ogoni region with five major oilfields. Therefore, the 
Ogoni under the leadership of noted author and playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa as 
spokesperson sought self-determination, a share in the oil revenues generated from 
their region and compensation for environmental damage due to oil spills from oil 
pipelines (Hill, 1997). They submitted their demand in the form of a bill of rights to 
the Nigerian government and to Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). 
Neither party, who were owners of SPDC, responded. On January 4, 1993, the 
MOSOP leadership declared Shell as persona non grata at a mass rally attended by 
300,000 people or 60% of the Ogoni population. The Ogoni claimed payment of a 
sum of $ 6 billion in rent and royalties and $ 4 billion for environmental degradation 
failing which SPDC would have to quit drilling operations in Ogoni region (Wheeler, 
Fabig & Boele, 2004).  After submitting the claim and expiry of 30 days, the region 
witnessed widespread protests and disturbances. Although MOSOP’s official policy 
was one of non-violent protest, and most demonstrations were disciplined (Manby, 
2000:4), Shell’s facilities in the Ogoni region sustained damages directly attributable 
to vandalism and sabotage amounting to $ 42 million (as per Shell’s estimates) during 
the years 1993-1995 (Lawrence, 2002:10).  
 
During the same period (1993-1995) General Sani Abacha who was in power, created 
the notorious ‘Rivers State Internal Task Force’ specifically to deal with the situation 
in Ogoni and suppress the MOSOP campaign (Manby, 2000:5). Whenever these 
protests appeared to be unsafe for the company property and personnel, Shell called 
for security forces (Rivers State Internal Task Force also known as the mobile police) 
from time to time to protect company property and lives. However, Shell failed to 
ensure that the security forces did not go to the point of extreme human rights 
violations including killings of protestors as it occurred. Human Rights Watch, the 
international body for human rights has documented on its web site Shell’s 
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involvement in human rights abuses by the Nigerian security forces. The following 
are two such incidents amongst many:  
a) The most serious case in which an oil company is directly implicated in security 
force abuses is the incident at Umuechem in 1990. Shell made a written and explicit 
request for protection from the Mobile Police, leading to the killing of eighty unarmed 
civilians and destruction of hundreds of homes. Shell has declared this incident as 
“regrettable and tragic” and decided to never call for Mobile Police protection.58 
b) In August 1995 at Iko, Akwa Ibom State, a community where a defective gas flare 
had caused significant damage, ‘Western Geophysical’ a contractor of Shell requested 
naval assistance to recover boats taken by youths who wanted to obtain benefits from 
the contractor, including employment. Following the naval intervention, Mobile 
Police came to the village and assaulted numerous villagers, beating to death a teacher 
who had acted as an interpreter in negotiations between Western Geophysical and the 
community. Shell has stated to Human Rights Watch that it does not call for military 
protection, but justified calling the navy in this case due to the terrain; it stated that 
the Mobile Police had been called by the navy and not by Shell or its contractor. In its 
detailed response Shell did not report that the company or its contractor had made any 
attempt to protest the Mobile Police action, simply reporting that “this incident is 
unrelated to Western’s seismic activities.59    
 
Human Rights Watch is of the opinion that “calling for security force protection 
increases the responsibility of the oil company to ensure that intervention does not 
result in human rights violations; but even if the security forces have acted on their 
behalf without a specific company request for assistance, companies cannot be 
indifferent to resulting abuse.”60 Yet in the great majority of cases the oil companies 
in Nigeria do not monitor or protest human rights violations by the security forces 
against those who have raised concerns about environmental problems, requested 
financial compensation or employment, protested oil company activity, or threatened 
oil production. In some high-profile cases of detention, one or two oil companies 
have, under consumer pressure in Europe and the U.S., made public statements, but 
the great majority go unrecorded. In none of the cases of abuse researched by Human 
                                                 
58 http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/Nigew991-01.htm#P234_42143 accessed on June 18, 2003 
59  http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/Nigew991-01.htm#P234_42143 accessed on June 18, 2003 
 
60 Ibid 
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Rights Watch, that had not reached the international press, did any of the oil 
companies indicate that they had registered concern with the authorities.61 In the cases 
reviewed, it was generally only after the behaviour of the Nigerian authorities had 
embarrassed the oil companies on the international stage that action of any kind 
ensued on behalf of those who were abused by the security forces. In other cases, the 
oil companies said they were ignorant of arrests or beatings that had occurred, 
although some concerned quite major incidents at their facilities.62  
 
The Hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa: 
The hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa was the final act on part of the Nigerian military 
junta that resulted in widespread international stakeholder protest against Shell and 
Nigeria. On November 10, 1995 Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of MOSOP (Movement 
for the Survival of the Ogoni People) and eight other activists of the Ogoni tribe were 
executed by the Nigerian military junta of General Abacha on charges of murder of 
some moderate Ogoni activists, although the charges were never proved. According to 
Human Rights Watch two witnesses were bribed by Shell to give false testimony 
against Ken Saro-Wiwa and others in the proceedings.63 A Nigerian military tribunal 
conducted the entire judicial proceedings termed as a “sham trial” by observers (Hill, 
1997:C89). Saro–Wiwa’s defense lawyers resigned in disgust, as it was clear to them 
that the proceedings were nothing but a farce (Hill, 1997: C89). The International 
stakeholder community condemned this act on part of the Nigerian military 
dictatorship of Gen. Abacha and condemned Shell Nigeria’s complicity in the affair 
as well as the company’s inability to plead for clemency for Ken Saro-Wiwa inspite 
of its enormous influence with the Nigerian rulers.  A series of protests and boycott 
followed at the international level with several attacks on Shell offices and 
establishments around the world.   
 
So what went wrong with Shell and its managers, especially when the company was 
considered as one of the most profitable companies on earth. The company’s revenues 
exceeded $ 130 billion (Hill, 1997:C90) during the same period. Shell’s Nigeria 
operations contributed 11 to 12 % of the company’s global output, earning Shell a net 
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income of USD$ 200 million (Hill, 1997: C90). With such excellent economic 
performance Shell stakeholder policies in Nigeria had failed as it was accused of 
serious human rights abuse. The management’s decision-making process was 
seriously flawed and lacked stakeholder commitment. Shell executives considered all 
important decisions in the economic context alone, far removed from the reality of 
environmental damage to the Ogoni’s homeland, loss of means of their livelihood 
(violation of a fundamental right), the atrocities committed by the Nigerian security 
forces in protecting Shell property and the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Ogoni 
leader.  
 
If we consider the events in this case within the framework of Wartick & Wood’s 
Corporate Social Performance Model, the social outcomes are negative for its 
stakeholders. Thus, the company failed in its corporate social responsibility 
commitments. Hypothetically, if the CRDM model was available to Shell’s decision-
making executives, it could have been applied thus:  
(a) The Nigerian government had adopted an unfair land acquisition and 
compensation process. This was a corrupt act in itself. By definition, active corruption 
includes corrupt acts. In terms of the CRDM model, Shell should not have accepted 
the land for oil exploration from the Nigerian government since it would amount to 
taking part in active corruption. However, if it did want to use the land then it could 
have prevailed upon the Nigerian government to adequately compensate the Ogoni 
before the company started its commercial drilling operations.64  
(b) Shell was obliged to the Ogoni not to destroy their means of livelihood by using 
substandard environmental practices as it did. This resulted in loss of livelihood for 
many Ogoni (right to subsistence is a fundamental human right) as the land was no 
longer fit for agriculture or fishing. The company was aware that it was using 
substandard environmental practices because it adopted a different procedure in 
United Kingdom (home country). These deliberate dual standards are a corrupt 
practice falling under the classification of active corruption.  In terms of the CRDM 
model, the answer would be a “NO” to Shell’s substandard environmental practices.  
                                                 
64   This is a historical problem. The Ogoni lands were acquired at a time (1958) when the concept of 
stakeholder rights did not exist. However, Shell could have been dealt with the land compensation issue 
in later years when global corporations were being asked to be socially responsible.    
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(c) When the Ogoni approached Shell for compensation and redressal, the company 
could have worked out the extent of the environmental damage and attended to it 
through various means of conciliation. Instead they sought protection from a corrupt 
military regime in Nigeria who was willing to support Shell in exchange for some 
corrupt gains. This again amounted to active corruption on part of Shell. In terms of 
the CRDM model, the answer would again be a “NO” in such a situation.  
(d) When the Ogoni protested in large numbers and declared Shell as ‘persona non 
grata’, Shell was obliged to work out solutions and not let stakeholder dissatisfaction 
take the form of protests that required Shell to call in security forces for protection. 
By calling security forces, the company became responsible for the brutalities 
committed by security forces (as per Human Rights Watch reports). Stakeholder 
dissatisfaction to this extent comprised of a series of acts involving active corruption 
on part of Shell.  The answer would be a “NO” to calling security forces and to all 
that led to this situation.  
(e) Shell could not have conducted business in the Ogoni region for 30 years without 
connivance and corrupt understanding with the successive political and administrative 
structures in Nigeria. This again is an indicator of active corruption on part of Shell. 
The answer would be a “NO” to all these acts and the manner in which Shell 
conducted itself for 30 years in Nigeria.   
(f) Shell was accused of bribing witnesses that resulted in the unjust hanging of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa by the military regime. This is another obvious situation where bribes 
should not have been paid (if allegations are true) as it inter-alia violated Ken Saro-
Wiwa’s right to a fair trial (a fundamental human right). This too is a case of active 
corruption on part of the company. The answer in terms of the CRDM model would 
be a “NO” to such an act.   
 
In the Shell case, the CRDM model finds further strength in the fact that it is only 
after the Ogoni experience and the extensive protests and negative publicity that Shell 
faced, the company acknowledged the importance of respect for human rights in the 
business decision-making process.  Shell had to close oil-drilling operations in the 
Ogoni region as a result of the Ogoni boycott and the incidents that followed. The 
company has not been able to resume operations in the Ogoni region at the time of 
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writing this thesis. However, what Shell appears to have done is taken on board two 
policies, which they publicly declare65:  
a) Human Rights training for their executives  
b) A policy of ‘No bribery’ 
These two affirmations (whether genuine or intended as a public relations device) by 
a global company of Shell’s size is confirmation of the practical application of the 
CRDM model in corruption-related situations involving human rights and 
environmental issues. This is also a typical case of truth prevailing only after 
destruction.  
 
The Enron Example:  
Enron is another case of a company whose stakeholder practices did not result in good 
stakeholder outcomes. Enron faced accusations of corruption and bribery from the 
Indian media and stakeholder groups. Human Rights Watch accused Enron’s Dabhol 
Power Company of human rights abuses at Dabhol. The company’s response was in 
keeping with its organizational culture of deceit, manipulation and lobbying with 
politicians.  True to its prevalent organizational culture, Enron dealt with stakeholder 
protests in Dabhol by trouble shooting i.e. lobbying with politicians in India 
(McClean & Elkind, 2003), disseminating biased information through newspapers 
that were bribed, and by purchasing the administrative/ police machinery through 
bribery to serve the company’s interest  (Prashad, 2002).  
 
Later, the parent company in USA filed for the largest voluntary bankruptcy in US 
corporate history. The immediate cause attributed to Enron’s downfall at Wall Street 
is a result of its financial skullduggery that led to the bankruptcy proceedings in 
December 2001. Almost every work that researches the Enron story McClean & 
Elkind (2003); Swartz & Watkins (2003); Jickling (2002); Seitzinger, Morris, Jickling 
(2002); Anderson (2002); Shorter (2002); Maskell & Whitaker (2002); Purcell (2002); 
Brumbaugh (2002); emphatically speaks of the company’s financial failings in 
various aspects, fraud committed by its employees and directors, corrupt 
understanding between the company and politicians in USA and around the world. 
Many of these works concentrate on reporting actual events that led to the downfall of 
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Enron and the impact on the financial markets and the accounting profession. But it is 
surprising that except for Prashad (2002), none of the aforementioned authors make a 
serious attempt to explore the role of corruption, human rights violations and 
environmental damage inflicted by the company in course of its operations in India, 
Brazil or elsewhere. This oversight speaks of us as a society, whose definition of 
success and failure still lingers within the halls of stock markets, observing the daily 
movement of stock prices, adding or depleting ‘shareholder value’ in terms of narrow 
financial performance.  
 
Although the genuine adoption of Triple Bottom Line Reporting was expected from 
companies who enjoyed the status and size of Enron, it is sad that the law 
enforcement agencies investigating Enron have not paid serious attention to 
allegations of human rights violations in India by Enron’s subsidiary nor investigated 
the environmental damage inflicted by Enron in Brazil. When a company displays no 
commitment to human rights issues (as in India) and environmental issues (as in 
Brazil) it is a matter of time before the same company will have no qualms in 
cheating, lying and defrauding investors and financial markets. While doing so, some 
fail and collapse as Enron did and some carry on as “successful” companies. The 
Enron collapse has hit the old (pension funds), the weak (small investors) and Enron’s 
employees the hardest amongst members of society, thus inflicting enormous human 
pain and suffering. The company’s collapse in December 2001 can be linked to 
Enron’s inherent corporate culture of moral bankruptcy demonstrated much earlier in 
India and Brazil. This discussion is limited to the Dabhol case in India with a view to 
find substantiation for the concept of CRDM and the proposed CRDM model in the 
multinational business environment.  
 
The Dabhol Power Plant Case: 66 
Background: Enron International, the world’s most successful energy company came 
to India to set up a $ 2.8 billion power plant during the 1990’s (McClean & Elkind, 
2003). This power project was going to be the single largest foreign direct investment 
in India (McClean & Elkind, 2003). During the 1992 US visit by Indian Prime 
Minister Narashima Rao, Enron was invited to set up independent power projects in 
                                                 
66 Used as a teaching case for Master of Engineering Management students by the author.  
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India. This was a major policy shift on part of the government of India. India badly 
needed power and projects that could meet the power requirements of a developing 
India. Most parts of India were suffering from power shortages right from 1970s. 
Very little was done to address the power shortages faced by the various states in 
India between 1970 and 1990. Industrial development was hampered due to power 
shortages.  
 
The development of the power sector in independent India (post 1947) was primarily 
based on a socialistic pattern of the government’s five-year planning. The first 
Industrial policy resolution of 1951 reserved the power sector for government 
investment restricting private sector from investing in power. Subsequent five-year 
plans continued in the same socialistic tradition and regulated industries closely with a 
series of licensing and permit requirements. Ostensibly, these requirements were 
meant to protect the interest of the common Indian but in practice these requirements 
led to a situation called the ‘License Raj’ (the rule of licenses) in the hands of Indian 
bureaucrats and politicians. Industrial opportunities were unevenly distributed 
between the state owned enterprises or the public sector and the privately owned 
enterprises or the private sector. Development of infrastructure facilities such as 
power was largely entrusted to the public sector through licensing requirements that 
were designed to keep private enterprise away from such projects. Mahatma Gandhi’s 
swadeshi (made in India) movement adopted during the independence struggle against 
the British Raj served as the raison d’être for promoting public sector enterprises. 
These newly created public sector (government owned) enterprises were established 
with a view to achieving self-reliance in production ignoring commercial logic to the 
point that such enterprises could run at a loss eternally. Their continuity was 
considered essential to the greater interest and welfare of the nation to achieve 
Gandhian self-reliance at all cost. The public sector was of vital importance to the 
survival of the then prevalent ideological belief of a socialistic pattern of economy.   
 
Public sector enterprises also provided politicians with some scope for embezzling 
funds, providing jobs and dispensing favours to cronies. For many a key politician, 
the setting up of major projects under the public sector banner had the potential of 
safeguarding their election prospects in their electoral constituencies. Most of these 
state owned enterprises lost money over the years, the bulk of them being doled out 
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by government funds diverted from other compelling requirements of a developing 
nation but this drain of scarce resources was not a deterrent to the short-sighted theory 
of self reliance.  
 
By 1970s all banks were nationalized and most foreign companies operating in India 
were required to dilute their equity holdings to 49%.  Those who refused to do so such 
as IBM or Coca-Cola were forced to close their business in India.67 Between 1977 and 
1990, the Indian political scenario underwent significant irreversible changes with the 
weakening of the Congress Party that had held power from a position of dictatorial 
strength since 1947 till 1977. After the elections in 1990, Prime Narashima Rao 
formed a federal government with coalition partners for the first time in the history of 
the Congress party in independent India.   
 
During June 1991, the Indian rupee was devalued twice within a span of 3 days by 
24.5%.  The country was facing an external debt crisis and the government negotiated 
a stand-by facility with the IMF to avert this crisis. During the same month, for the 
first time in independent India’s lifetime, overseas exporters were seeking double and 
triple confirmation of letters of credit opened by Indian banks before they shipped 
goods to India.  There was no other way out for India but to abandon the swadeshi 
theme under the pressures of international financial institutions such as IMF and 
World Bank. Thus, India under Prime Minister Narashima Rao and his Finance 
Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh (London School of Economics alumni) opened up the 
economy to foreign investors by adopting a policy of liberalisation with a nation’s 
back against the wall for survival. The economy could not sustain any more of 
swadeshi and socialistic pattern of industrial development that had led to this moment 
of reckoning. The public sector and the government could not function without dole 
outs from IMF and World Bank.   
 
The opening up of the economy meant that it was time for the Indian political 
structure to organise new sources of illegitimate funds to support political parties, 
electoral campaigns and control power. The opening up of the economy was intended 
to bring massive foreign investment into India. Most of the investment was expected 
                                                 
67 George Fernandes, Industries Minister in the Janata Party led federal government forced both IBM 
and Coca-Cola to leave India in 1977. 
 102
from major multinationals that could prove to be long-term source of funds for the 
politicians and the concurrent political structure, if carefully cultivated. Enron was 
thus invited to set up a three billion dollar power plant in India not only because 
Enron was an highly successful company but Enron was likely to co-operate with the 
rent-seeking machinations of the Indian political structure comprising of both ruling 
parties and parties in opposition as later events indicate. 
 
Fast Track Entry: Enron Corporation was assured fast track entry into India and that 
too without competitive bidding68 by the Indian government. Enron’s success strategy 
in India therefore depended upon the continued patronage and assistance from the 
political machinery that had favoured its entry into India. During May/ June 1992 a 
senior Indian delegation met Enron officials inviting Enron to set up power projects in 
India. Almost immediately after the delegation’s trip to USA, the Secretary of Power 
at the Centre (Indian central government) informed the Maharashtra State Electricity 
Board (MSEB) about a visit by Enron officials to choose a site for Enron’s power 
project along the coast of Maharashtra. Five days later, representatives of Enron and 
General Electric arrived in New Delhi and met with officials of the central 
government about the proposed project.  Three days after that, the Enron delegation 
arrived in Bombay (Maharashtra’s capital) and reviewed sites along the coast 
choosing Dabhol as the site for the project. On June 20, 1992 a MOU was signed 
between the Government of Maharashtra and Dabhol Power Corporation (joint 
venture of Enron, General Electric and Bechtel Corporation).  
 
Although the MOU was not a legally binding document, the deal-making process was 
criticised for its haste, its lack of transparency, and the absence of competitive 
bidding. The process would form the basis for a widespread belief that corruption 
played a role in the project’s implementation.  Later in 1995 when the opposition 
parties came to power (i.e. the Shiv Sena-BJP combine) a cabinet sub-committee was 
formed under the chairmanship of Mr. Gopinath Munde (Deputy Chief Minister of 
Maharashtra) to investigate the Enron affair. The Munde Committee described the 
above actions as: Thus, in a matter of less than 3 days after its (the delegation’s) 
arrival in Bombay, a MOU was signed between Enron and MSEB in a matter 
                                                 
68 Munde Report, 1995 (Report of the Cabinet Sub-Committee (of the State of Mahrashtra) to review 
the Dabhol Power project in light of media allegations of corruption).     
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involving a project value of over Rs. 10,000 crores 69(almost $ 3 billion) at the time, 
with entirely imported fuel and largely imported equipment, in which, admittedly, no 
one in the government had expertise or experience. 70   
 
Enron’s fast track entry without a competitive bidding process led to allegations of 
corruption by the opposition parties and the media. The hastily signed MOU between 
Enron and the State government of Maharashtra did not stand up to a review by the 
Central Electricity Authority (a government body to oversee the implementation of 
the Indian Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and related matters)  
 
Review by the Central Electricity Authority (CEA): The CEA concluded that the 
entire agreement was “one sided”71 in favour of Enron. Their experts pointed out that 
the MOU did not provide specific details of project costs as required under the Indian 
law. The MOU did not specify when the twenty-year contract (and its associated 
payments) would begin, and when the electricity would be available, or when the 
contract was taken to have been signed. According to the CEA, the structure of 
payments to Enron was a departure from the “existing norms”72 and the price of 
power was high. The CEA observed that, there was no provision to audit the project 
over time to ensure that the price MSEB paid to the company was commensurate to 
the actual cost of electricity.73 
 
World Bank Review: The World Bank reviewed the Dabhol project at the request of 
the Maharashtra government and concluded that the government had not provided an 
overall economic justification of this project.74 The World Bank further pointed out 
that the MOU required MSEB75 to pay DPC within sixty days, but the company had 
no limitations on actual supply of electricity, importing fuel, construction or 
financing. It implied that MSEB would have to pay Dabhol Power Company for 
                                                 
69 One crore rupees equal to Rs. 10 million.  
70 Munde Report, 1995 (Report of the Cabinet Sub-Committee (of the State of Mahrashtra) to review 
the Dabhol Power project in light of media allegations of corruption).     
71 CEA’s comments as quoted in Human Rights Watch Report accessed on 28 May 2003 from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/enron2-0.html 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid 
74 Letter from World Bank on the file of Human Rights Watch as mentioned in Human Rights Watch 
Report accessed on 28 May 2003 from http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/enron2-0.html 
75 Maharashtra State Electricity Board 
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electricity at a prescribed rate, regardless of whether the electricity was actually 
available. The project was also criticised by the World Bank for being “one sided”76 
in favour of Enron. Later in April 1993 the World Bank turned down the request from 
Government of India and Enron for financing the project. The World Bank held the 
view that the Enron project was “not economically viable”77 as conveyed in a letter 
written by World Bank country director for India to the Indian Finance Secretary.       
 
Amendment of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948: Simultaneously, Enron used the 
services of Linklaters and Paines, an UK based firm of solicitors to study the Indian 
Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and recommend changes to the Electricity Supply Act in 
order to protect the company’s interest. The U.K. firm of solicitors submitted a report 
to the Indian government titled: “Problems Concerning the Application of the Indian 
Electricity Acts.”78  This report recommended changes in Indian laws pertaining to 
accounting procedures, purchasing agreements, judicial and public scrutiny in order to 
facilitate Enron’s project.  The recommendations were designed to make Enron’s 
position less open to public and government scrutiny. Enron’s proposal to amend the 
laws of a sovereign nation is an attempt to circumvent a duty cast upon Enron as an 
Electricity company by the Indian Electricity Supply Act 1948 that would require 
Enron, “to operate and maintain in the most efficient and economical manner, its 
generating stations” in order to supply cost efficient electricity to the Indian 
consumer. The irony of the whole affair strikes one when one finds MSEB 
(Maharashtra State Electricity Board) officials suggesting, in writing, that Enron be 
exempted from the above duty cast by the Electricity Supply Act.79 
 
Enron’s project costs: incredibly high: The lack of scrutiny sought by Enron was 
evident in its pattern of correspondence with the Central Electricity Authority, which 
queried Enron on its costs structure. A table of comparative project costs of seven 
different projects that were under process in India at that point in time (see figure 7) 
confirms Enron’s project cost per megawatt of electricity generated is much higher 
than the other gas based projects. There is no evidence of economy of scale that is 
                                                 
76 Letter from World Bank on the file of Human Rights Watch as mentioned in Human Rights Watch 
Report accessed on 28 May 2003 from http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/enron2-0.html 
77 Ibid 
78 Accessed from Human Rights Watch Report accessed on 28 May 2003 from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/enron2-0.html 
79 Ibid. 
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usually expected from a large project. This can also lead one to conclude that a 
smaller project would be more viable from the Indian electricity consumer’s 
perspective, especially if a large project is unable to generate economies of scale. 
Therefore, it leaves Enron’s intentions of seeking amendment to the Indian Electricity 
Supply Act 1948, to question.  Enron was aware that its cost of generating electricity 
was higher than the prevailing cost in India, which Enron attributed to new 
technology. The Indian Electric Supply Act had to be circumvented in order to charge 
the Indian consumer more than what was being paid by them. This machination on 
Enron’s part also indicates possibility of a corrupt understanding between Enron and 
the Indian administrative and political structure.  
Figure 8: Projects in India under process that time 
                       
 
  Project  
Capacity 
Megawatts 
 Type 
 Of Fuel 
    Cost per 
   megawatt  
  (Rs. in 
Crores) 
  Enron 
 
 2,015  Gas 
(LNG) 
     4.49  
Jagrupada      235   Gas       3.52  
Godavari     208 Gas      3.60 
Vishakapatnam  1,000 Coal       5.81 
Managalore 1,000 Coal      5.08 
IB Valley    420  Coal      4.82 
 Zero Unit NLC   250 Lignite      4.50  
(Source: The Munde Report, 1995) 
 
                  
Impact on stakeholders and Land acquisition process: The Dabhol power project 
site was expected to directly displace 2000 people and indirectly 92,000 people from 
the agricultural villages of Aareygaon, Borbatlewadi, Katalwadi, Nagewadi, 
Pawarsarkari, Ranavi and the fishing villages of Anjanvel and Veldur.  These 
communities were dependent on natural resources and occupations such as agriculture 
and fishing.80 Even, consultants employed by the Dabhol Power Company were of the 
opinion that if land acquisition for the project went ahead, the environmental impact 
                                                 
80 “Enron: The Power to Do it All”, Indranet journal (Bombay), Vol 3, No2-4, 1994, p. 10-11 (Centre 
for Holistic Studies) 
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of construction and the project’s operations would affect the entire populations of 
these villages.81 
 
On March 12, 1993, during a meeting between Enron officials and the State 
government, a discussion took place about the project’s land requirements and its 
impact upon the local communities. According to the minutes of the meeting, the 
government decided to begin acquiring land after consultations with the company, but 
not the public.82  The company was legally required to post a notice in the newspapers 
stating that it was constructing a power plant and that it would attend to any inquiries, 
complaints or concerns for a two-month period following the publication of the 
notice.  This was in compliance with the Electricity Act, 1948.83  The notification was 
published in local newspapers on September 21, 1993.84 Upon expiry of the two-
month period on November 21, 1993, the company sent a letter to the government of 
Maharashtra’s Under Secretary of Energy, confirming that Enron had not received 
any objections in response to its notice in the local newspapers. Enron wrote, “It 
would, therefore, appear that the requirements of the section 29 of the Electricity Act 
have been met.85 Enron lied in its correspondence with the Maharashtra State 
government; it suppressed the fact that the company had received thirty-four queries, 
complaints from NGOs, journalists, local residents whose land had been acquired as 
well as government officials within the two-month period. Most of these queries 
remained unattended on November 21, 1993. It is not possible for a multinational 
company to blatantly lie to a government body without connivance or support from 
within the administration at the highest levels.       
 
Enron and human rights abuses:  Due to Enron’s lack of transparency in the land 
acquisition process local residents and NGOs started protests against the Dabhol 
project.  By and large these protests were peaceful and confined to seeking answers 
from Enron.  Some of these protests were led by noted environmentalist such as 
Medha Patkar and by some by local academics and social workers.86 These 
                                                 
81 Ibid 
82 Accessed from Human Rights Watch Report accessed on 28 May 2003 from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/enron2-0.html 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid 
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demonstrations met with resistance from Enron’s local contractors (local goons were 
given contracts by Enron for petty supplies and used by Enron to bully the villagers) 
and the police who were armed and spared no efforts to beat up protestors and make 
arbitrary arrests. The police monitored the demonstrations with a government 
helicopter being used as an operations control unit to direct police operations against 
protestors.87 And in one instance the helicopter carried important government officials 
who surveyed the demonstrations and police operations. Although, Enron a US based 
company was aware of that the United Nations has made consistent attempts to 
educate multinationals to ensure that their business activities do not contribute to 
human rights violations, Enron chose otherwise.  
 
According to Human Rights Watch, “there can be little question that the company and 
the police have operated in tandem against the protestors. The Dabhol Power 
Corporation pays the state forces that committed human rights violations; it provided 
other material support to these forces; and it failed to act on credible allegations that 
its own contractors were engaged in criminal activity that rose to the level of human 
rights violations due to the failure of the state to investigate the crimes.”88 Arbitrary 
arrests, illegal detention and torture, police beatings of protestors were a regular 
feature of the lives of many in the affected villages.  
 
On June 3, 1997 a police raid was conducted on the fishing village of Veldur 
involving physical abuse of villagers and destruction of property.89 The Supreme 
Court of India later held that this police raid was unconstitutional.90 Human Rights 
Watch believes that the Dabhol Power Corporation—and its parent companies Enron, 
General Electric, and Bechtel are complicit in human rights violations by the 
Maharashtra State government. Human Rights Watch have concluded in their 166 
page report that, “the Dabhol Power Corporation benefited directly from an official 
policy of suppressing dissent through the misuse of law, harassment of anti-Enron 
protest leaders and prominent environmental activists, and police practices ranging 
                                                 
87 Ibid 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid 
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from arbitrary to brutal.”91 Human Rights Watch based their findings by way of direct 
investigations in at least 30 demonstrations conducted by the villagers against Enron.  
 
Allegations of illegal diversion of water supply from the villages to the Enron 
construction site were also found to be true by the same NGO.92 This in turn had a 
severe impact on the agricultural operations in the villages. Human Rights Watch is of 
the opinion that Dabhol Power Company benefited directly from an official policy of 
suppressing dissent through misuse of law, harassment of anti-Enron protest leaders 
and prominent environmental activists, and police practices ranging from arbitrary to 
brutal.93 
 
Allegations of Corruption and Bribery: It is difficult to prove that money changed 
hands for decisions made by politicians and bureaucrats in Enron’s entry and conduct 
of business in India. However, it can be safely concluded that Enron was determined 
to succeed at all costs and its above actions left little doubt that the company did not 
respect its stakeholders. Also Enron publicly claimed to have spent US $ 20 million to 
educate Indian bureaucrats and the Indian people (McClean & Elkind, 2003:81). This 
claim was interpreted by the Indian media as a euphemism for ‘bribes paid to Indian 
bureaucrats and politicians’ and Enron’s ingenuity in recording the expenditure in 
their accounting records to avoid prosecution in USA under FCPA. The aforesaid 
discussion does lend credence to the consistent allegations of corruption and bribery 
that Dabhol Power Company faced in India (Prashad, 2002; McClean & Elkind, 2003; 
Swartz & Watkins, 2003).  
 
The allegations of corruption and bribery had reached such a point that an opposition 
political party in the State of Maharashtra campaigned for the State elections vowing 
to “push Enron into the Arabian Sea” (McClean & Elkind, 2003:81) if the people 
elected them to power. The political party did get elected in March 1995 and formed 
the Maharashtra State government. They instituted an enquiry that resulted in the 
Munde Report and as a consequence Enron’s Dabhol project faced its most crucial 
moment of survival. The Maharashtra government issued a work stoppage order on 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid 
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August 3, 1995 because of “lack of transparency, alleged padded costs, and 
environmental hazards” (McClean & Elkind, 2003:82)) sending Enron USA and Wall 
Street into a situation of controlled panic. However, what followed this event was a 
series of arm twisting and lobbying moves by Enron that included the arrival of Ms. 
Rebecca Mark (CEO of the Dabhol Power Company) in Mumbai, India. She stayed 
for a period of six weeks in India “negotiating” with people that mattered till a fresh 
agreement was signed and the work stoppage order lifted. On February 23, 1996, a 
revised agreement was signed between the government of Maharashtra and Enron 
(McClean & Elkind, 2003:82), the government being represented by the same party 
who had vowed to “push Enron into the Arabian Sea” and had produced the Munde 
Report. Critics in India were not convinced and they continued to allege corruption 
because the returns on the project remained shockingly high at 30% per annum 
(McClean & Elkind, 2003: 83), although the project was ostensibly re-negotiated by 
the government to make it feasible for the nation.  
 
Enron’s entry left a bitter taste in the minds of the local people of Dabhol who had no 
means to fight such a company supported by the corrupt political and administrative 
structures around them. But stakeholder rejection meant that the Dabhol project 
consistently faced difficulties and could never achieve commercial production. The 
project is up for sale on an “as is where is basis” at the time of writing this thesis.  
             
 If we consider the events in this case within the framework of Wartick & Wood’s 
Corporate Social Performance Model, the social outcomes were negative for its 
stakeholders. Thus, the company failed in its corporate social responsibility 
commitments. Hypothetically, if the CRDM model was available to Enron’s decision-
making executives, it could have been applied thus:  
a) The Enron project was clearly going to displace a few thousand people and these 
people were likely to lose their means of livelihood. This was apparent from the 
opinion of even Enron’s own consultants. However, the company’s actions in dealing 
with this aspect were corrupt and allegedly involved bribe payments. This is active 
corruption. The answer would be a “NO” if the model was applied. Hypothetically, if 
Enron had dealt in a fair manner with the issue of displacement of the people of 
Dabhol, the project could have taken off much earlier.    
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b) Enron not only started work on land that was not obtained in a fair manner but also 
used the corrupt influence it had with the administration to tackle stakeholder protests 
that resulted in human rights violations. Under the CRDM process a company would 
not start a project on land that was acquired in an unfair manner nor use corrupt 
influence to treat stakeholders the way Enron did at Dabhol. This is ‘active 
corruption’ and the answer would be “NO” if the model is applied.  
c) Besides, at every stage Enron appears to have been involved in ‘active corruption’. 
Events that raise doubts about the company’s active pursuance of corrupt practices 
are: fast track entry without competitive bidding, exorbitant power tariff, a one-sided 
MOU, attempt to seek amendment to the Electricity Act, change of stance by the 
opposition political party after assuming power at the state level.  
 
Opposite end of the spectrum: Companies who resist corruption 
It is a difficult task to name companies that resist corruption. Companies may claim to 
have resisted corruption to cover up some other issues and the same companies may 
later indulge in corrupt practices in some situations. Also company mergers and 
business takeovers, change in controlling stock ownership etc influence the entry or 
exit of a CEO and his or her management team. When such fundamental changes take 
place, it can result in a change in the overall organizational culture and stakeholder 
responses as well. A company that appears to be a model of virtues and appears to 
have successfully resisted corruption in current times may prove to be a fraud ridden 
company in the future.  
 
However, there are companies who display ethical intent by way of a company code 
of ethics that are widely communicated both within and outside the organization such 
as the Tata group of companies from India. The Tata group has developed a code of 
conduct that relates to corruption. It was adopted by the group during 1999 and 
commits94 
               not to give nor take any illicit payment, remuneration, gift,  
               donation or comparable benefit to obtain business or favours;  
               and not to give any donation to any government agency or its  
               representatives to obtain favourable performance of official duties. 
 
                                                 
94 Accessed from http://ww1.transparency.org/newsletters/99.2/corpnes.html 
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A US based multinational company; Texas Instruments has built a reputation of being 
an ethical decision-maker. The company has won three major ethics awards (Ferrell 
et.al, 2002:184) and declares ethical commitment in excess of legal compliance 
issues. Amongst other issues, the company prohibits election campaign contributions 
to political parties (and in effect lobbying politicians), although the US federal law 
permits election contributions by companies (Ferrell et.al, 2002: 184-186). 
 
Conclusion:  
Thus, in the cases of Enron and Shell, the left-hand side of the CRDM model could 
have been used to achieve good social and company outcomes. Both companies 
pursued an active strategy of corrupt means to secure and retain business. The 
relevance of the CRDM process and the CRDM model proposed in this thesis is 
vindicated in both cases because stakeholder rejection occurred when companies 
involved, failed to take in to account the adverse impact of their corrupt actions on 
stakeholders. On the other hand, companies such as the Tata group in India and Texas 
Instruments in USA declare their intentions not to pursue corruption. In such cases the 
course of “active corruption” (left-hand side of the model) and passive corruption has 
been publicly rejected by them. 
 
The application of the CRDM model might appear to be naïve in the context of the 
complexities of multinational and transnational business, but its usage will provide an 
orderly way of thinking to address the undisputed obligation of CSR on part of a 
decision-making manager and pre-empt stakeholder rejection.  
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Chapter Seven: CRDM in the wider Business World 
 
Introduction:  
In the previous chapter, the cases of Enron’s Dabhol power project in India and 
Shell’s operations in the Ogoni region of Nigeria, demonstrated the connection 
between a company’s business decisions and its impact on the environment and 
human rights of stakeholders. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are no 
international laws that require a corporation to respect human rights. This could be 
because the ‘UN Declaration of Human Rights’ has not been ratified by all nations, 
and there are sovereign nations whose domestic law practices are contrary to the UN 
instrument (for example: beheading a person for committing adultery). However, 
when it comes to multinational companies, there is a strong expectation from the 
global stakeholder community that multinational corporations (who usually originate 
from first world democracies) shall respect human rights of their stakeholders in terms 
of the UN Code of Conduct for Transnational Companies.95  
 
Both Enron and Shell were highly successful multinational companies at that point in 
time, but both companies ended up with allegations of complicity in human rights 
violations and environmental degradation. Enron was accused of human rights 
violations, 96disregard for the environment and destruction of means of livelihood of 
people at Dabhol, India. Shell, too, faced loss of company image, goodwill and 
attracted unprecedented negative response from the international community after the 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. One of the major causes that led to such situations is 
the scant attention paid by decision-making managers to the strategic importance of 
such issues in a company’s success. Decision-making managers of both Enron and 
Shell considered the economic implications of the events or a given situation and are 
likely to have succumbed to the rent-seeking behaviour of public officials in India and 
Nigeria as it appeared to be an easy way out. Paying a bribe may appear to be a short-
term solution to a problem at hand, but that is not in the strategic interest of a 
multinational company in a host country. In both cases it is not possible to prove that 
                                                 
95 Also agreed upon at the World Economic Forum, Davos in 1989. 
96 Human Rights Watch accused Enron and its partners of complicity in human rights violations at 
Dabhol in a 166-page report after extensive investigations in the manner in which Enron had conducted 
itself as discussed in previous chapter.   
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bribes were indeed paid but both companies did face allegations of corruption and 
bribery and stakeholder rejection. 
 
To avoid situations of stakeholder rejection and consequent loss of company image 
and long term business, it would be worthwhile to determine whether the proposed 
CRDM model has practical relevance and utility in the real business world of 
corruption-related situations.  A survey of seventy major multinational companies was 
conducted by the author at Mumbai, India (based on a pilot study conducted 
previously by the author during April and June 2002) to test the relevance of the 
CRDM model. This chapter discusses the survey, its findings and interprets the 
relevance of the findings subject to certain limitations.   
 
The Study:  
A sample of 70 prominent multinational companies and banks was drawn from a 
population of approximately 160 multinational companies listed on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange97 and 20 foreign banks operating in India. Almost all these companies and 
banks are located in Mumbai the financial capital of India (Mumbai pays about half of 
India’s income tax with a population of approximately 15 million). The companies 
were drawn from diverse industries such as banking, pharmaceuticals, engineering, 
electrical, electronics, oil and a range of consumer goods. Most of these companies 
commanded substantial market shares for their products and owned premium brands 
with a minimum turnover of I. Rs. 1 billion. Out of the 70 companies who were 
approached, 41 companies responded to the author, many of them after several phone 
calls and personal visits. The executives interviewed were at the levels of Chief 
Executive Officer or else senior managers dealing with public relations or involved in 
business promotion. The questionnaires administered were first mailed and then 
completed in person during personal interviews to ensure clarity of responses.  
 
The purpose of this study was to secure an understanding of the relevance of the 
proposed CRDM model in terms of the decision-making process. Each component of 
the CRDM model was covered in the survey questionnaire such as ‘active corruption’, 
‘passive corruption’ facilitating payments, payments made under extortion.  Besides 
                                                 
97 Source: Addresses of Companies: The Stock Exchange Mumbai, 2003 edition and 2004 edition.  
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these, certain other variables representing decision-making factors (such a fear of loss 
of business, actual loss of business when a bribe was not paid, responses to corrupt 
activities of the competitor as a consequence of losing business in the past) were 
included in the questionnaire. Also a few other variables such as personal attitudes to 
corruption and corruption legislation, the presence or absence of company policy with 
regard to corruption, the practice of gift-giving, its acceptance by public officials, 
payments to ‘organised crime’ were also explored. The most significant part of the 
survey explored perceptions of corporate executives to understand whether they felt 
that corruption could adversely affect human rights and sustainable development (see 
appendix V for the survey questionnaire and appendix VI for summary of results).    
 
The study was conducted over a period of two years starting from April 2002 to April 
2004 (an initial pilot study during April 2002, June 2002 covered 5 companies). India 
was selected for the following reasons: 
1. India is ethnically, culturally, religiously, and socially a very heterogeneous 
country (Berg & Hotlbrugge, 2001). 98  
2. Ease of access to the author to Mumbai and to multinational companies in 
Mumbai since he had lived in Mumbai and had been a Chartered Accountant for a 
number of years in Mumbai.  
3. Multinational business has traditionally been comfortable in India due to its stable 
political atmosphere, its democratic institutions, and a large base of technical 
manpower. Therefore, a large sample would be accessible to the author.  
4. Personal interviews could be conducted as per the convenience of the interviewees 
since the author could stay in Mumbai and meet the concerned persons from time 
to time.   
5. The author’s first experience with conventional mailers marked survey (sent to US 
and Indian companies) drew no response whatsoever due to the sensitivity of the 
topic. This experience was in line with the opinion of corruption researchers such 
as Klitgaard (1988) who believes that obtaining corruption-related data is difficult. 
Hence the element of personal meeting was essential to break the ice and build an 
                                                 
98 The authors Berg & Holtbrugge conducted a study of 12 German multinationals in India with a view 
to find out the ranking order of factors (by way of importance attached) in their Public Affairs 
Management in India. The results revealed that bribery was ranked number three in order of priority of 
these German companies. However, because 3 of the 12 companies declined to comment on the issue 
of bribery, Berg & Holtbrugge suspect that bribery should be ranked higher than number three. 
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atmosphere of trust between the person being interviewed and the author and this 
was possible at Mumbai due to the author’s personal network.  
 
The Findings  
a) Bribes asked for (passive corruption): The element of passive corruption or bribe 
demands that surveyed company executives faced both in India (their host country as 
they represented a multinational company in India) and in their respective home 
countries (parent company country) is as under:   
Bribes asked for 
Country Never  Rarely Sometimes Usually Extremely frequently 
Home Country  38  2  1  --- --- 
India-host country  1  3   21 13  3  
                                           Number of Respondents: 41 companies 
 
We notice from the above that about 38 companies or 92% of the respondents had 
never been asked for a bribe in their home country. There are only three respondents 
out of the 41 respondents who have had some experience of a facing a bribe demand 
in their home country. Contrast this with the host country experience for the same 
respondents. Only one of the respondents has never faced a bribe demand while three 
of them have very rarely been asked for a bribe. However, the majority of respondents 
have faced demands i.e. 40 companies or 97.5 % of the surveyed companies have 
faced some bribe demand or the other. Out of these 40 companies who faced bribe 
demands, 21 companies have ‘sometimes’ been asked for bribes with another 13  
companies who have been ‘usually’ asked for bribes. The difference between the 
home country and the host country situation is apparent in the experiences of the 
respondents.   
 
b) Non-payment of bribe resulted in loss of business: There are situations when 
bribes are demanded and the actual securing of business by a multinational in host 
country (India) is dependent on whether the company is willing to pay or not.  The 
resultant loss of business due to non-payments of bribes, amongst the surveyed 
companies is as under:        
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Non-payment of bribe, resulted in loss of business 
 
Never 3 
Rarely 3 
Sometimes 9 
Usually 26 
Extremely  
frequently 
Nil 
                                                   Number of Respondents = 41 companies 
From the above we notice that 26 companies or 63% of the companies usually lost 
business when they did not comply with bribe requests and another  9 companies or 
22% lost business ‘sometimes’. Only 14% of companies i.e. 6 companies never lost or 
rarely lost business due to non-compliance with bribe requests.  
 
c) Fear of Loss of Business:  It was also worthwhile to check whether these 
companies were afraid of losing business due to non-payment of solicited bribes. 
Level of fear 
Not at all 2 
A rare chance 3 
To an extent 23 
A great extent 13 
Number of respondent = 41 companies 
 
About 11% (i.e. 2 companies) of the surveyed companies expressed no fear of losing 
business as against 89% (i.e. 36 companies) who were afraid of losing business in 
event of non-payment of solicited bribe. One multinational pharmaceutical company 
CEO confirmed that they no longer make any attempts to supply their products to 
government funded public hospitals, as they are not able to deal with the pressure of 
solicited bribes.  
 
d) Bribes offered (active corruption): When a large number of companies may be 
losing business due to non-compliance with bribe requests it would be worthwhile to 
check whether there was a change in the behaviour of the companies who had earlier 
lost business. In short, it would be interesting to find out whether the companies later 
shifted their strategy to active corruption from a position of non-compliance with 
passive corruption.                           
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                                                       Active Corruption  
Companies that offered bribes due to the experience of losing business earlier 
Never 6 
Rarely 8 
Sometimes 14 
Usually 12 
Extremely frequently 1 
                                           Number of Respondents = 41 companies 
It is evident from the above that business managers who had earlier taken a stand of 
non-compliance with corrupt demands later chose to actively seek business by bribery 
or corruption as a matter of commercial prudence with commercial considerations 
overruling and over shadowing every other aspect of decision-making. Here we notice 
that about 66% or 27 companies chose to pay bribes or take part in corruption to 
secure business. This appears to have occurred due to the commercial considerations 
involved (the when in Rome approach, as in Francis, 1991) and due to the lack of 
ethical instruments that may lead to ethically relevant decision-making.   
 
e) Faciltating payments and other payments actually made:  A survey of payments 
made by these companies revealed that about 88% or 39 companies had made some 
form of facilitating payment or the other to lower level staff in public office. Only 5% 
or 2 companies claimed to have never made any facilitating payments. When it came 
to paying organized crime or extortionist, about 17% or 7 companies claimed to have 
made such payments while the majority said they have never made such payments. 
The responses are summarized as under:    
                                                    Payments made 
Payments for Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Extremely 
frequently 
Company 
property/human 
life in danger 
35 6 ---- ---- ---- 
Facilitating 
payment 
2 3 12 19 5 
Organised 
Crime/extortion 
34 5 2 --- ---- 
                                      Number of Respondents = 41 companies  
 
f) Company Policy: From responses in the survey, most company executives appear 
to rely on company policy when it comes to corruption-related decision-making. The 
company policy may be expressly written or maybe unwritten. In one such case of a 
German multinational the respondent CEO clarified that the company’s policy as 
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regards bribery is unwritten but they discourage bribery. When queried about the 
OECD anti-bribery convention, the CEO although aware of it said it was not 
necessary to write a policy that bribes were not to be paid. Contrary to understanding 
based on literature that issues such as feedback from subordinates play a major role, 
the findings confirm that feedback from subordinates is practically irrelevant. This in 
turn can mean that corruption-related decisions are taken at the highest levels mostly 
without consultation with subordinates. None of the respondents use any type of 
decision-making model for corruption-related situations. The respondents were 
queried on the existence of a company policy, and whether it mentions the negative 
impact of corruption. The summary of the findings are as under:  
Question YES NO 
Does Company Policy exist 33 8 
Does the company policy mention the 
negative impact of corruption 
3 37 
 
Out of 41 respondents, one chose not to answer the second part of the question, hence 
we have 40 respondents to the second question. It is observed that over 80% (i.e. 33 
companies) of the surveyed companies have a company policy as regards corruption 
but 90% (i.e. 37 companies) of the surveyed companies do not have anything 
mentioned about the negative impact of corruption in their policy.  
 
The decision-making process was also explored from the perspective of  typical 
factors (example: previous experience with corruption; feedback from sub-ordinates; 
personal discretion) that have been mentioned earlier in chapter three as well whether 
any kind of decision-making model was used. Although, majority of companies relied 
on company policy alone while dealing with situations of corruption and bribery, 
some companies used two to three of the decision-making components while none 
used any decision-making models to assist in the decision process. Therefore, in 
situations of corruption or bribery the manager refers to:                 
Company Policy 35 
Previous Experience 8 
Feedback from subordinates 1 
 Personal discretion 8 
Decision-making model nil 
Any other 1* 
Respondents = 41 companies * unwritten policy 
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g) Personal attitudes to corruption: One of the most essential parts of the survey was 
to understand the personal attitudes to corruption, as the success of any decision-
making model will be determined by the personal attitudes of the decision-maker. The 
findings are as under:                              
Personal Attitudes to Corruption 
Question  Not 
at all 
A rare 
chance 
To an  
Extent 
To a great 
extent 
Totally  No 
Reply  
Humans are by and large 
non-corrupt 
 ----  4   25 11   1 NIL 
Corruption cannot be 
completely eliminated 
12 15 11  3 NIL NIL 
Can anti-corruption 
legislation eliminate 
corruption 
NIL 11 21  8  1 NIL 
Can anti-corruption 
legislation be successfully 
enforced 
 NIL  9 24 8 NIL NIL 
 
The majority of the respondents i.e. 87% or 37 respondents have faith that human 
beings are by and large non-corrupt. About the same percentage i.e. 38 respondents 
agree that corruption cannot be eliminated. Out of which, 12  respondents believe that 
corruption cannot be eliminated with another 15 respondents  being of the opinion 
that elimination of corruption is a rare chance followed by 11 respondents who 
believe that corruption can be eliminated to some extent. The efficacy of anti-
corruption legislation in eliminating corruption as well as its enforceability is possible 
‘to an extent’ in the opinion of 21 and 24 respondents respectively. About 11 
respondents give enforceability ‘a rare chance’. Overall the personal attitude towards 
corruption is one of resignation and acceptance.    
 
h) Gift-giving: Almost all businesses give gifts to the people with whom they come in 
contact with on a daily basis be it their own employees, public officials, bank 
employees, and other service personnel. It is a custom in India during festivals. The 
cost of gifts varies depending on the position of the receiver.  From the survey it 
emerged that public officials in all cases accept gifts. None of the 41 companies were 
of the opinion that their gifts were not accepted. The majority of respondents were in 
favour of gift giving as is seen under:  
In favour of gift-giving 
Not at all Rare occasions To an extent A great extent Always 
4 5 22       8 2 
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i) Impact of corruption on human rights: The most critical component of the survey 
was to explore whether decision-making managers would consider the possible 
negative impact of corruption on society, whether they would acknowledge that 
corruption had the potential to negatively impact human rights and the environment.  
The answers were critical to the proposed CRDM model whose intention is to provide 
an orderly way of thinking to protect human rights and sustainable development.  All 
managers were of the opinion (when asked) that corruption has a negative impact on 
society and has the potential of negative impact on human rights and environment.  
There was not a single respondent who said otherwise. Therefore, if the premise 
concerning negative impact of corruption on society, human rights and environment 
already exists in the minds of decision-making managers, the proposed CRDM model 
will have a definite role to strengthen that premise and operate in case of decision-
making executives who possess an ethical frame of mind.  
 
Summary of Findings:  
Most multinational business managers interviewed in the survey rely on company 
policy whether written or unwritten, but none of them use any decision-making model 
to assist in such decisions. The personal attitudes of multinational business decision-
making managers in India towards corruption are typically that of acceptance and 
resignation. This could also be due to the continued experiences of corruption and 
graft in India on a daily basis. Gift-giving is accepted as a part of the Indian culture 
during festival times and gifts to public officials are accepted by the gift-giver and 
gift-receiver as normal by over 90% or 37 companies interviewed. Every interviewed 
manager, without a single exception, agreed that corruption and bribery could 
negatively impact society, human rights and the environment.  
 
The relevance of the CRDM model in practical decision-making is supported in real-
life business situations from this survey because (i) it confirms that rent-seeking 
behaviour exists (ii) leading to corruption dynamics such as fear of loss of business 
and a response to it is generated in the minds of decision-making managers from an 
economic perspective (iii) that results in active corruption when non-payment of a 
bribe results in loss of business (iv) that implies a change of stance from a position of  
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passive corruption (demand) to a position of active corruption (offer) (v) company 
policies do not mention the adverse affect of corruption on stakeholders (vi) 
nevertheless decision-making managers are aware that corruption can adversely affect 
stakeholders (this is in response to direct questions addressed about adverse affects of 
corruption on human rights, environmental issues) (vii) currently no decision-making 
tools are in use to remind a decision-making executive of  stakeholder issues. 
 
The CRDM model therefore can be used as a decision-making tool and as a good 
practice document in order to ensure that stakeholder issues are protected and 
fundamental stakeholder issues such as human rights and issues of sustainable 
development are protected while taking decisions connected with corruption-related 
situations. Adoption of the CRDM model will help the user company in the following 
ways (i) avoid active corruption consciously, (ii) within a short time frame establish 
corruption that affects critical stakeholder issues such as human rights, environmental 
issues and sustainable development, (iii) reject such situations as explained in (ii) and 
(iv) prevent stakeholder rejection and negative consequences on the company as well 
(v) explain and justify facilitating payments in a given context.  
 
External Validity of the findings:  
The survey findings are not only relevant in the Indian context but in the wider 
multinational context as (i) the findings indicate that multinational companies in India 
are not using any specific decision-making tools and that in turn indicates that they do 
not use it elsewhere because logically if they used any specific decision-making tools 
in other parts of the world, they would have adopted it in India too (ii) that there are 
no decision-making tools being used in corruption-related situations to protect 
stakeholder issues such as human rights, environmental issues and sustainable 
development  (iii) Rent-seeking behaviour by public officials is not unique to India 
but there is evidence of its existence in many countries around the world in varying 
degrees. Furthermore, managers in any part of the world have an incentive to respond 
to rent seeking behaviour of public officials by shifting towards a more active stance, 
especially when they infer that their competitors are gaining profitable business by 
paying bribes. (iv) Finally, the awareness expressed by multinational managers (when 
queried) about the adverse effect of corruption on stakeholders, is expected to be an 
universal response and not confined to India alone. 
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 Therefore, the adoption of the CRDM model as a good practice document or as a 
decision-making tool has universal application and not limited to the business 
environment of India. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8: CRDM within Business Theory and Practice  
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Introduction:   
 
This chapter is a discussion covering the contribution of CRDM to business theory 
and practice, the influence of business ethics on corporate behaviour, the shifting 
trends in management thought from a market influenced process to an organisation 
based approach, and the role of CRDM in an organisation based business theory and 
practice.   
 
The theory of Corruption related decision-making (CRDM), as proposed in the 
preceding chapters has universal application in dealing with corruption-related 
situations in business. It is primarily concerned in dealing with the illegal, the 
unethical and the illegitimate in the course of business dealings. CRDM is also an 
input in the contemporary process of re-conceptualising the role of business and the 
market economy in management theory and practice. Ghoshal & Moran, (2005) 
recently questioned the wisdom of analysing management theory and practice in 
terms of a market economy. The authors contend that a more appropriate level of 
analysis is the organisations and the people who run them, especially the non-
economic aspects. CRDM analyses decisions from the perspective of these key 
drivers of an economy i.e. large multinational companies and its decision-making 
managers. The concept of CRDM promotes the notion of an internal control 
mechanism (internal to the manager and the organisation) in recognition of the role 
that a company and its individual managers could play in reducing corruption in 
business. 
 
Ghoshal & Moran (2005) contend that adoption of the concept of  ‘organisational 
economy’ in formulating management theory and practice as opposed to the prevalent 
market economy concept in management theory and practice shall create value, set 
standards and contribute to society in a legitimate manner through a corporation’s 
actors i.e. its managers. CRDM, if placed in this context, is an instrument to empower 
the individual (decision-making) managers within an organisation to set standards and 
contribute to society in a legitimate manner, while also dealing with illegitimate 
situations.  
Impact of Business Ethics on Business Conduct:  
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During the past twenty-five to thirty years the business ethics movement has gained 
momentum and has influenced many aspects of business conduct (Henk Van Luijk, 
2000). At the same time the global incidence of corruption in business is on the 
increase (evident from BPI 2002- appendix- 1) despite international efforts such as the 
OECD anti-bribery convention, 1999 and other regional efforts. The series of 
corporate frauds and its magnitude too has been on the rise along with the global 
incidence of corruption in business, as is evident from many of the fraud induced 
corporate collapses during 2001 and 2002. That brings us to the question as to 
whether ‘business ethics’ has had any impact on corporate behaviour.  
 
In overall terms business ethics appears to have had some impact. It started off as a 
philosophical debate amongst academics and has progressed to a point where it has 
conceptually entered board room discussions and public declaration of ethical intent 
on part of large multinational companies (eg. company codes of behaviour, signing of 
Caux Round Table principles,99 Global Sullivan principles,100 U.N. Global 
Compact101), corporate performance evaluation criteria (eg: stakeholder relations; 
triple bottom line reporting) and international codes of conduct for business (eg: 
OECD anti-bribery Convention, 1999; United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
2003, OECD Stakeholder model of Corporate Governance, 2004). As Henk van Luijk 
(2000:4) writes, “Business ethics has matured to such an extent that it is now able to 
provide a vocabulary and a set of instruments with which we can not only discuss 
ethics in business but also work on it effectively.” These instruments or models 
provide effective course of ethical action by managers who adopt them. Adoption of 
these instruments by business managers also indicates the amount of progress that the 
subject of business ethics has made during the past three decades.    
 
 
Role of Models in Management theory and Practice:  
                                                 
99 The Caux Principles are built on the ideals of human dignity and Japanese kyosei (common goods are 
more important than individual, company or national interest). The Caux principles can be accessed at 
www.cauxroundtable.org 
100 Global Sullivan Principles refers to set of principles signed by 30 global companies to support 
economic, legal, social, political justice; encourage equal opportunity; train and advance disadvantaged 
workers; assist greater tolerance amongst people; improve the quality of life for communities and 
support human rights.  
101 This is signed by 50 major global companies agreeing to support free trade unions, abolish child 
labour, and protect the environment.  
 125
Likewise, in management strategy (eg: Porter’s five forces model), models in use 
have a profound influence on managers who adopt them in their business conduct. 
Many of these models are based on quite narrow theoretical lenses. The whole 
concept of a market economy and its role in formulating management theory has been 
questioned extensively in the works of scholars (Ghoshal & Moran, 2005; Singer, 
2003; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Singer, 1994; Simon, 1991). However, once 
managers adopt a model based on a limited theory, the managerial actions cannot 
easily overcome those limitations. For instance, Ghoshal & Moran (2005: 15) explain 
that the message that follows from Michael Porter’s model of competitive strategy to 
practising managers is “to do their jobs, managers must prevent free competition, at 
the cost of social welfare.” The authors have drawn this inference by analysing that 
Porter’s theory talks of building market power i.e. “by developing power over their 
customers and suppliers, by creating barriers to entry and substitution, and by 
managing the interactions with their competitors” (Ghoshal & Moran, 2005:15). 
Logically, as Ghoshal & Moran (2005:15) argue, what follows is “the purpose of 
strategy is to enhance this value-appropriating power of company, by restricting 
competition and thereby, sustaining and enhancing profits” and such restraint of free 
competition is to the detriment of society. This argument leads us to another aspect of 
restricting competition i.e. use of corrupt means by certain players to develop power 
over other market players and to sustain that power over other market players. 
Corruption in such situations is seen as an essential part of the business environment 
and becomes acceptable business behaviour. All of which acts to the detriment of 
society, yet all these actions are adopted by managers as part of their desire to pursue 
competitive strategies.      
 
Ghoshal & Moran (2005: 9) contend that bad theory leads to bad practices in 
management and also in understanding the role of companies in society. It is only 
good theory that can lead to good practice and creation of good decision-making 
models that shall ensure business managers take socially responsible actions. When 
theories and models (whether for ethical decision-making and/or strategic decision-
making) are adopted in teaching and practice, they influence values, attitudes and 
actions of decision-makers. The outcome of actions based on unquestioned theory and 
modelling will achieve only what the theory intended to achieve. The situation 
changes only when we question these existing models and existing management 
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theories from a social responsibility perspective instead of working incrementally on 
them.   
 
The evolution of business ethics continues by questioning existing theory and practice 
and by formulating responses to new challenges, new definitions and situations of 
corporate fraud and unethical corporate behaviour hitherto unknown (eg. corporate 
collapses in USA during 2001 and 2002). Corruption in international business is one 
such challenging area for the subject of business ethics.  It appears to be on the rise as 
indicated by Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index, 2002 and its media 
releases. But, the issue of corruption in business is often ignored within academic 
literature (Voyer & Beamish, 2004; Roy & Singer, 2005), especially its role as a 
means of competition used by players in a market based economy. More generally, 
the study of the whole phenomenon of “competition” in business as an ethical issue 
has been sidelined (Henk Van Luijk, 2000). All this indicates a significant dearth of 
scholarly work in the area of corruption in international business, its role in the 
market based economy and the underlying ethical issues involved in managerial 
decision-making while dealing with corruption-related situations. Corruption-related 
decision-making (CRDM) as proposed in this thesis is an attempt to provide 
managerial decision-making frames of reference (grounded in ethical theory). In 
doing so, CRDM not only contributes in the evolutionary process of business ethics 
but also strengthens the shift in management thought towards an organisational 
economy as opposed to a market economy.  
 
The notion of organisational economy is the recognition that large formal 
organisations are “the marshalling yards for society’s resources” and they are not 
“small and powerless actors” dominated by the invisible hand of the market (Ghoshal 
& Moran, 2005:4). Gone are the days of Adam Smith when the market comprised of a 
large number of small players whose existence depended on market forces. Today, 
these large formal organisations are the “chief actors for creating wealth and 
economic progress” (Ghoshal & Moran, 2005:4). Multinational companies are not 
weak and insignificant players in a global market, but they are dominant organisations 
whose presence generates economic progress with the capacity to bring about social 
progress (Prahlad & Hammond, 2002).The potential to bring about social progress 
lies in the quality of managers at helm of affairs, as much as in their long term ability 
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to sustain economic progress.  The quality of managers can be improved, inter alia, 
by providing them business theory and practice that generates social progress along 
with economic progress.  
 
Shift in Business theory and practice:  
Business theory and practice has been traditionally shaped by the language of 
competitive strategy fundamentally promoting the notion of outdoing or eliminating 
the competition. Any business theory that does not appear to meet the language of 
competitive strategy is viewed with scepticism, as every new theory is expected to 
pay back manifold in revenue terms, if the theory has to gain acceptance and 
recognition of any sort. In recent times, the occurrence of serious corporate failures 
(example: Enron; WorldCom, Parmalat, Adelphi)  are posing management research a 
challenge to find legitimate (for ensuring social legitimacy of corporations) solutions 
in dealing with the illegal, unethical, the illegitimate, or the more oppressive aspects 
of business. Perhaps, these corporate failures occurred as a result of the widely 
adopted language of strategy in action where beating the competition was the raison 
d’etre for one’s survival and growth in business. It may also be a result of a distorted 
perception on part of managers that ethical decision-making differs from strategic 
decision-making and ethical decision-making is not practical in the face of market 
forces.  
 
Corruption in business is a managerial response originating from a similar mindset 
dominated by the market economy model and the language of competitive strategy in 
a manager’s analytical frame of reference. As a consequence, many managers appear 
to be willing to outdo the competition even to the extent of adopting corrupt means in 
certain situations (as evident from Bribe Payers Index, 2002). The adoption of corrupt 
means such as bribery to gain business is a part of the pervasive ‘market economy’ 
culture influenced by an outdated language of strategy that assumes that our actions 
have to be determined by market influences, if we have to survive in business. 
Ghoshal & Moran (2005:9) reject the “marvel of the market” and consider the market 
framing as a matter of “analytical convenience.” The authors contend that companies 
are stronger than the market, and companies, their managers have a value-creating 
role in society, which can in turn determine the market. Corruption-related decision-
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making rejects the market influences in favour of an internal decision-making 
mechanism in recognition of the value creating role of companies and their managers.    
 
Ghoshal & Moran (2005:4) believe that economies are made of organisations who 
create economic prosperity and that in turn is dependent on (i) the quality of 
management of those organisations and (ii) an alignment of economic and moral 
dimensions of management. Social legitimacy of business will be preserved only 
when there is an alignment of both the economic and moral dimensions of business. If 
they are compartmentalised and treated as distinct entities for managerial decision-
making purposes, then the “marvel of the market economy” will not produce 
economic results always, and will surely fail to secure social legitimacy. Decision-
making models in management theory and practice based on the market economy 
model have had a profound impact till recent times on managerial beliefs, values, 
attitudes and actions. All this is a part of a wider framework of ideas, that is, the effect 
of models and language on the users (managers) attitudes, values and practices. Only 
business theory, practices and models that seek social legitimacy for business will be 
able to secure social legitimacy for business conduct.   
 
The Social Legitimacy of Business:  
As a response to the abovementioned influences of models, theory and language 
based on market economy, the business ethics movement emerged as a language of 
societal expectations with the notion of business requiring social legitimacy for doing 
business. In a new organisation based approach to management (Ghosal & Moran, 
2005) as opposed to a market based approach it implies the creation of a corporate 
conscience (Goodpaster et al, 2004) that responds to society and its expectations. The 
law cannot entirely meet that aspiration because society’s expectations are not always 
covered by the law and legal compliance alone will not suffice. The best way to 
achieve social legitimacy would be to a build corporate conscience and a 
conscientious response capability within an organisation through a corporation’s own 
actors (individual managers). This can be done by recognising that each business 
theory, practice and model of action ought to be shaped around a distinctive set of 
rationalities that can be linked backward to the core thought process through a process 
of meta-decision-analysis (Singer, 1994). This in turn emphasises the need to 
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empower and motivate managers to blend the language of strategy with ethics in order 
to make ethical intent operational in corruption-related situations.  
 
The need of the hour in business theory and practice is to find ways of reducing and 
eliminating corruption in global business and our society. The CRDM process is a 
potential contribution in that direction, because it provides ways to seek and gain 
social legitimacy for a corporation’s actions even under the most difficult business 
conditions. CRDM is a response at the individual level from and within an 
organisation to the external rent-seeking business environment, based on a 
corporation’s conscience and desire to maintain social legitimacy and respect for its 
stakeholders.    
 
Legislation against corruption or any corporate misdemeanour is an external 
mechanism which may not be the best way to build corporate conscience and 
conscientious response capability on part of a corporation and its managers. 
Legislation may indicate what society does not want to be repeated but legislation 
cannot rule out what has never happened in the past, because there must be a political 
will to devise and enact the relevant law. Legislation is at its best usually a matter of 
hindsight and not foresight (example the enactment of Sarbannes Oxley Act in the 
USA as a consequence of the corporate frauds in USA). Social legitimacy therefore 
requires conscientious decision-making mechanism that exceeds current legal 
compliance requirements and respects stakeholder issues. CRDM provides that 
opportunity to win social legitimacy in an area (corruption in business) where all 
actors (business managers, society, legislators, nations, international bodies such as 
UN and OECD) struggle to cope.  
 
CRDM as a response to corruption control and society     
Until recently, corruption as a subject was studied under the classification of political 
or legal studies (eg: Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Noonan, 1984; Klitgaard, 1988; Elliot, 
1997 to mention but a few). However, after the OECD Convention came into force in 
February 1999 and after companies such as Enron collapsed due to corporate frauds, 
an increased interest emerged in studying corruption and other illegal, illegitimate 
aspects of business. About 5 or 6 years ago there were very few articles on corruption, 
corporate crime and the illegitimate aspects of business in mainstream academic 
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journals. However, after the series of corporate frauds and failures during 2001 and 
2002 one notices approximately 25 articles in Journal of Business Ethics (as against a 
few before that) and 6 articles in Business Ethics Quarterly. A call for 
interdisciplinary papers on corruption was made by Academy of Management. A few 
papers also appeared in Strategic Management Journal (eg: Schnatterly, 2003; 
Robertson & Crittenden, 2003). But none of these papers actually made any attempt 
to approach the question of corruption in business as a ‘management decision-
making’ problem. 
  
CRDM is a response to fill that gap in academic literature and give a start to a process 
of academic enquiry in the area of management decision-making dealing with 
corruption. It is a response formulated at the level of an individual actor (manager) 
and a stakeholder conscious corporation to control corruption for the benefit of 
society. It is advocated as a part of a stakeholder conscious decision-making process 
on part of a decision-making manager. The concept of CRDM can help future 
research address ethical issues in the area of lobbying in particular, which operates on 
the borderline of legitimate business practices.   
 
Conclusion:  
CRDM, its role and purpose is a part of the larger set of approaches to corruption 
reduction at various levels (individual, business, government). It intends to influence 
organisational culture of organisations and mindset of organisations and managers as 
individual actors. The CRDM concept and the CRDM model are designed first and 
foremost, to protect critical stakeholder rights as response from a corporation which 
has a conscience and a conscience capability. It can also provide an ex-post 
justification in those situations when a manager is forced to pay a bribe or take part in 
a corrupt act with a distinct set of rational arguments. The justification in such 
situations is intended to provide strength to the corporate and individual conscience as 
a matter of internal assessment, review and improvement. The concept of CRDM 
blends the language of strategy with ethics at its core to empower the key actors in a 
potential new order of things i.e. a move from a flawed market economy to a more 
expressive, authentic and ultimately honest organisation based economy. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was specifically to assist decision-making managers deal 
with corruption-related situations ethically through a process of “learning to think” 
(Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2001:30). The corruption-related decision-making process as 
proposed in the thesis has a specific purpose: it is to make individual managers think 
and recognise moral problems, in specific contexts. It is a logical process that imports 
an ethical dimension to ambiguous areas in corruption-related situations, with a view 
to achieving either an outright rejection of an action due to its consequences on 
others, or a justification of one’s decision in a specific context within the framework 
of corporate social responsibility and moral free space. 
 
In practice, decision-making managers usually perceive the consequences of their 
decisions in corruption-related situations predominantly from an exchange utility 
perspective under pressures such as fear of losing business. This coupled with some 
other factors create dynamics conducive to corruption, which can later turn into greed 
and associated negatives with it. The whole process of dealing with corruption-related 
situations in a stakeholder context proposed in this thesis is to disrupt these dynamics 
of corruption and offer another perspective to a decision-maker.  
 
The cases of Shell and Enron are a testimony to a chosen path of active corruption and 
its results. The fall of Enron in USA is a classic example in recent times of 
commercial prudence turning to greed and all the negatives associated with it. It is 
also a case of how corruption dynamics rule and how every increasing act of 
corruption makes one greedier still in the process. The law by itself cannot correct 
human greed but what may stand a chance is an appeal to one’s conscience. 
 
The CRDM Model and the process provide an internal self-restraint mechanism for 
decision-making managers. The concept of CRDM and the CRDM model are 
instruments that can deliver good governance in the long-term strategic interest of a 
decision-making executive, the company and society in a democratic society. 
Engaging and eliminating corruption is also a process of conscience in terms of 
honouring basic stakeholders’ rights at the individual managerial level. Democratic 
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societies cannot function on legal processes alone; to thrive they need commitments 
from individuals who are part of the society. It is of great significance that every 
single manager who took part in the survey, when queried, was of the opinion that 
corruption can adversely affect human rights and sustainable development though 
their company documents/ policies did not mention this possible impact. Thus, the 
CRDM model has the potential to be used as a good practice document by companies. 
The CRDM concept and model contributes to business theory and practice by 
focusing on the organization, its actors and the notion of corporate conscience 
capability. 
   
 It is understood that it is plainly far beyond the capacity of any one actor to 
significantly reduce the overall level of corruption in the world. Instead, a multi-
faceted approach is needed, involving individual managers, corporations, NGO’s and 
governments. In order to bring about any desirable macro-level outcomes such as 
reductions in corruption and poverty, or improvements in human rights, it has become 
increasingly apparent that a multi-faceted approach is necessary; involving 
coordinated changes on many fronts (Sen, 1999). Although the primary thrust of 
systemic change remains at the level of governments, NGO’s and other institutions, 
the increased relative power of multinational corporations indicates that 
commensurate changes in their managers’ mental models can also be of tremendous 
significance.   
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Appendix I 
Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002 (source: www.transparency.org) 
 
In the business sectors with which you are most familiar, please indicate how likely companies from 
the following countries are to pay or offer bribes to win or retain business in this country 
[respondent's country of residence]?  
2002  1999  
Rank  
Total sample  
835 779 
OECD  
Convention 
(as of 14 
May 2002) 
1 Australia 8.5 8.1 Ratified 
Sweden 8.4 8.3 Ratified 2 
  Switzerland 8.4 7.7 Ratified 
4 Austria 8.2 7.8 Ratified 
5 Canada 8.1 8.1 Ratified 
Netherlands 7.8 7.4 Ratified 6 
  Belgium 7.8 6.8 Ratified 
8 United 
Kingdom 
6.9  7.2 Ratified 
Singapore  6.3  5.7  not signed  9 
  Germany  6.3  6.2  Ratified  
11  Spain  5.8  5.3  Ratified  
12  France  5.5  5.2  Ratified  
USA  5.3 6.2 Ratified 13  
  Japan  5.3  5.1  Ratified  
Malaysia  4.3  3.9  not signed  15  
  Hong Kong  4.3  -.*  not signed  
17  Italy  4.1  3.7  Ratified  
18  South Korea  3.9  3.4  Ratified  
19  Taiwan  3.8  3.5  not signed  
20  China 
(People's 
Republic) 
3.5  3.1  not signed  
21  Russia  3.2  - ** not signed  
   Domestic 
companies  
1.9  - **     
The question related to the 
propensity of companies from 
leading exporting countries to 
pay bribes to senior public 
officials in the surveyed 
emerging market countries.  
A perfect score, indicating zero 
perceived propensity to pay 
bribes, is 10.0, and thus the 
ranking starts with companies 
from countries that are seen to 
have a low propensity for foreign 
bribe paying. In the 2002 survey, 
all the data indicated that 
domestically owned companies 
in the 15 countries surveyed 
have a very high propensity to 
pay bribes - higher than that of 
foreign firms. 
 
* uncluded as part of China in 
1999 
** not included in 1999 
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Appendix- II 
 
 
The equivalent for the word Bribe in different countries:  
 
Brazil          jeitinho                               Malaysia              makan siap                     
Eqypt          baksheesh                           Mexico                 mordida 
France         pot au vin                           Nigeria                 dash  
Germany     trink gelt                             Pakistan               roshvat 
Greece         bakssissi                             Peru                     coima 
Honduras     pajada                                Phillipines            lagay 
Hongkong    hatchien                            Soviet Union        vzyatha 
Indonesia     wong sogok                       Thailand               sin bone 
Iran              roshveh                              United States       pay off 
Italy             bustarella                            Zaire                   tarif de verre 
India            speed money 
Japan           wairo 
 
(Source: Jacoby, N.H., Nehemkis, P., Eells, R. (1977), page 6, Macmillan 
Publishing Co. Ltd, N.Y.) 
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 Appendix III 
 List of current international and regional legislation/ Conventions against 
corruption in business 
 
 
Name of Convention  Year 
initiated  
Enforceability 
Status 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAP) 2003  Not in force 
as on date 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(OECD) 
1999 In force 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption   (AU) 
2003 Not in force 
as on date 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption CoE (Crim.) 
1998 In force 
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 
CoE (Civil) 
1999 In force 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 1996 In force 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977 1977 In force102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 The FCPA applies to US companies globally and non-US companies operating in the US market. 
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Appendix-IV 
Global norms under Integrative Social Contracts Theory 
(Source: Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:222) 
                              
Illegitimate Norms:                                                        Illegitimate Norms: 
Incompatible with Hypernorms                                    Incompatible with Hypernorms                               
 
 
 
                   Moral  
                     Free           Consistent 
                    Space     
                                  Norms       Hypernorms   
 
 
 
 
 
Illegitimate Norms:                                                         Illegitimate Norms: 
Incompatible with Hypernorms                                      Incompatible with Hypernorms                             
 
Examples of: 
  Hypernorms: Human Rights as per U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
  Consistent Norms: Bribery is considered unethical by a vast majority of people. 
  Moral Free space: Ritualistic gift-giving to monarchy by businesses in some                         
                                Middle-eastern countries.  
  Illegitimate Norms: Detention of any individual without a fair judicial process.  
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Appendix –V   The Survey Questionnaire 
 
1.  How often have you been asked for a bribe in your home country while 
dealing with public officials? 
            ________________________________________ 
            1           2               3            4                         5      
         Never Rarely    Sometimes    Usually      Extremely frequently 
 
2. How often have you been asked for a bribe in a host country while dealing with 
public officials?  
         _________________________________________ 
          1           2               3            4                         5      
       Never Rarely    Sometimes    Usually      Extremely frequently 
 
3: How often when you never paid a bribe, it has resulted in loss of business?  
----------------------------------------------------------          
1           2               3            4                         5      
Never Rarely    Sometimes    Usually      Extremely frequently 
 
4. Thereafter to what extent has the above experience compelled you to offer a 
bribe in anticipation?     
      --------------------------------------------------------- 
     1           2               3            4                         5      
   Never Rarely    Sometimes    Usually      Extremely frequently 
 
 5. To what extent do you believe that corruption can be eliminated?            
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         1             2                       3                        4                     5 
Not at all    A rare chance    To an extent   To a great extent   Totally 
 
6. To what extent do you believe that human beings are by and large not 
corrupt?  
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         1             2                       3                        4                    5 
   Not at all    A rare chance    To an extent   A great extent    Totally 
            
7. To what extent can anti-corruption legislation eliminate corruption?  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         1             2                       3                        4                     5 
   Not at all    A rare chance    To an extent    A great extent   Totally 
            
8. To what extent can anti-corruption legislation be successfully enforced?  
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         1             2                       3                        4               5 Not at all     
 A rare chance    To an extent    A great extent Completely 
                
 9. Does your company policy documents lay down a policy to deal with situations 
of corruption and bribery?  (please tick)           Yes/ No 
 
10. Do your company policy documents mention explicitly the negative impacts 
of corruption and bribery on society? (please tick) Yes/No  
 
11. When faced with a situation of corruption or bribery do you refer to (please 
tick one or more):  
a) Company policy b) Previous experience c) Feedback from subordinates 
d) Personal discretion e) A strategic decision-making model f) Any other, please 
specify 
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12. To what extent do you fear that corrupt activities of any competitor will result 
in loss of business to your company?  
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    1             2                       3                        4                     5   
Not at all    A rare chance    To an extent   A great extent Completely 
            
13.  To what extent do you believe that your company should give token gifts to 
public officials that you need to deal with?  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         1             2                       3                        4                     5 
   Not at all    Rare occasions   To an extent   A great extent    Always 
           
14. Are such gifts accepted?     Always/Not always 
 
15. How often have you been forced to pay because it was a situation where 
either your company property or human life was in danger?  
----------------------------------------------------------          
1           2               3            4                         5      
Never    Rarely    Sometimes    Usually      Extremely frequently 
 
16.  How often have you made a facilitating payment (payments of small sums of 
money) to lower level staff especially at clerical, administrative or security staff 
simply to avoid harassment and time delays?   
 ----------------------------------------------------------          
 1           2               3            4                         5      
Never    Rarely    Sometimes    Usually      Extremely frequently 
 
17. How often have you been forced to pay organised crime, extortionist or 
protection racketeers?                     
 ----------------------------------------------------------          
1           2               3            4                         5      
Never Rarely    Sometimes    Usually      Extremely frequently 
 
 
18. Do you believe that corruption has a negative impact on society?  
Yes/No 
 
19. Do you believe that corruption and bribery can have a negative impact on the 
environment?  
Yes/No 
 
20. Do you believe that corruption and bribery can result in human rights 
abuses?  
Yes/No 
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Appendix –VI   Results of the Survey conducted in India during 
April 2002, June 2002, September 2003, February- March/April 2004 
 
A. Frequency of Active vs. Passive corruption (from a MNC manager’s perspective who is 
operating in India- the host country)  
1. (Question asked: How often have you been asked for a bribe in your home country while dealing 
with public officials?)  
N= 41 
Never 38 
Rarely 2 
Sometimes 1 
Usually NIL 
Extremely frequently NIL 
 
2. (Question asked: How often have you been asked for a bribe in a host country while doing business 
while dealing with public officials?)  
N= 41 
Never 1 
Rarely 3 
Sometimes 21 
Usually 13 
Extremely frequently 3 
 
 
B. Impact of not subscribing to bribery (when MNC manager does not offer or pay a bribe and 
loses business as a result and later from this negative experience subscribes to active bribery as a 
matter of economic rationality)  
1. (Question asked: How often when you never paid a bribe, it has resulted in loss of business?)  
N= 41 
Never 3 
Rarely 3 
Sometimes 9 
Usually 26 
Extremely frequently NIL 
 
2. (Question asked: Thereafter to what extent has the above experience compelled you to offer a bribe 
in anticipation?) 
N= 41 
Never 6 
Rarely 8 
Sometimes 14 
Usually 12 
Extremely frequently 1 
 
 
C. Personal Beliefs of MNC managers being interviewed.  
 
1. (Question asked: To what extent do you believe that corruption can be eliminated?)  
N= 41 
Not at all 12 
A rare chance 15 
To an extent 11 
To a great extent 3 
Totally NIL 
 
2. (Question asked: To what extent do you believe that human beings are by and large not corrupt?) 
N= 41 
Not at all NIL 
A rare chance 4 
 149
To an extent 25 
To a great extent 11 
Totally      1    
 
3. (Question asked: To what extent can anti-corruption legislation eliminate corruption?) 
N= 41 
Not at all NIL 
A rare chance 11 
To an extent 21 
To a great extent 8 
Totally 1 
 
4. (Question asked: To what extent can anti-corruption legislation be successfully enforced?)  
N= 41 
Not at all NIL 
A rare chance 9 
+To an extent 24 
To a great extent 8 
Completely NIL 
 
5 a) Do you believe that corruption has a negative impact on society? 
   b) Do you believe that corruption and bribery can have a negative impact on the environment? 
   c) Do you believe that corruption and bribery can result in human rights abuses?  
N = 41 
 YES NO 
Corruption has a negative impact on society 41 NIL 
Corruption and Bribery can have a negative impact on society 41 NIL 
Corruption and Bribery can result in human rights abuses 41 NIL 
 
 
D. Company Policy 
 
1. (Question asked: Does your company policy documents lay down a policy to deal with 
situations of corruption and bribery?)  
N= 41 
 YES NO 
Company policy laid down to deal with situations of corruption and 
bribery 
33 8 
 
2. (Question asked: Does your company policy documents mention explicitly the negative impacts 
of corruption and bribery on society? 
N = 41 
 YES  NO  No Comments 
Company policy documents explicitly mention the negative 
impact on society 
3 37 1 
 
E. Gift giving practices:  
1. (Question asked: To what extent do you believe that your company should give token gifts to 
public officials that you need to deal with?)  
N= 41 
Not at all 4 
Rare occasions 5 
To an extent 22 
To a great extent 8 
Always 2 
 
2. (Questions asked: Are such gifts accepted?)  
All 41 managers confirmed that whatever company token gifts are made during festive occasions 
are accepted by public officials.  
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F. Fear of loss of business (competitor’s bribery)  
1. (Question:  To what extent do you fear that corrupt activities of any competitor will result in 
loss of business to your company?) 
N= 41 
Not at all 2 
A rare chance 3 
To an extent 23 
To a great extent 13 
Completely NIL 
 
G. Decision-making process    
1. (Question asked: When faced with a situation of corruption or bribery do you refer to a) company 
policy b) previous experience c) Feedback from subordinates d) Personal discretion e) strategic 
decision-making model f) any other, please specify)  
N= 41 
 Company 
Policy  
Previous 
Exp  
Feedback  Personal 
discretion 
Decision-making 
model 
Any other, pl 
specify  
 
 Responses    35  8  1 8  NIL   1(verbal 
company 
policy)  
 
 
2 a) How often have you been forced to pay because it was a situation where either your 
company property or human life was in danger? ( keyword: Extortion- life/property) 
 
b) How often have you made a facilitating payment (payments of small sums of money) to 
lower level staff (public office) especially at clerical, administrative or security staff simply to 
avoid harassment and time delays?  (Keyword: facilitating payment) 
 
c) How often have you been forced to pay organised crime, extortionist or protection 
racketeers?  
(Key word: Organised crime)  
 
 
N= 41 
 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Extremely 
frequently 
Extortion-
Life/property 
 
35 
 
6 
 
NIL 
 
NIL 
 
NIL 
Facilitating 
payment 
 
2 
 
3 
 
12 
 
19 
 
5 
Organised 
Crime 
 
34 
 
5 
 
2 
 
NIL 
 
NIL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
